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Abstract 
Throughout the last fifteen years, the phenomenon of International Election Monitoring 
(IEM) has become increasingly widespread. IEM works to enhance the credibility and 
transparency of elections; over time, as the outcome of one election (and the success of 
IEM) conditions the electoral context of future elections, IEM can encourage internal 
political reform. In a number of states, particularly in Latin America, monitoring efforts 
have succeeded in steadily improving domestic political conditions and facilitating 
democratic consolidation. Yet, IEM effectiveness is conditioned not only by the 
characteristics of the monitoring groups involved, but also by the domestic context of a 
state. Hence, the unique structural conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa present distinct 
challenges and opportunities for IEM. This thesis investigates the relationship between 
IEM and internal political reform in four Sub-Saharan African states. While IEM can 
encourage the progress of reform through a feedback mechanism, the extent of such 
reforms is greatly affected not only by domestic structural conditions, but by additional 
and often overlooked intervening variables. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I. Overview 
 In the last few decades, democracy has spread dramatically around the world.  
Not only did a “third wave” of states (as Samuel P. Huntington termed it) in Southern 
Europe in the 1970s, Latin American in the 1980s, the former Soviet Union in the 1990s 
transition from authoritarian rule, but the human rights discourse and regime grew 
steadily. Accordingly, democracy has come to be seen by many in the international 
community as the only legitimate form of governance. In 1990, for example, the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) produced a document 
recognizing democracy as the only legitimate form of governance in Europe.1 One year 
later, a resolution passed by the Organization of American States (OAS) echoed the 
sentiments of democratic entitlement for all member states.2 Since that time, international 
pressure for internal political reform in authoritarian and quasi-pluralistic states has only 
grown. Democracy assistance now figures greatly in the diplomacy of many major 
powers, including the hegemonic power, the United States, the result of which has been a 
growing emphasis on elections.3 
 Free and fair elections are an integral part of democracy and the process of 
internal political reform.  While they are not alone sufficient for complete democratic 
transition and consolidation, several scholars have shown that elections play an important 
                                                 
1
 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), "Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of 
the Conference of the Human Dimension of the Csce,"  (1990). 
2
 Organization of American States (OAS), "Representative Democracy,"  (1991). 
3
 Eric Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 2004), 7. 
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role in driving internal political reform.4  As a result, international electoral monitoring 
(IEM) has also become a common phenomenon in the process of encouraging such 
reform, because of its role in facilitating and observing elections.  Much has been written 
in recent years, not only on the role of elections in the process of internal political reform, 
but on the role of the international monitors in the electoral process. In particular, 
scholars of democratization have focused on Latin America and Eastern Europe, where 
the effects of elections and election monitors on the political reform process have been 
acknowledged, explored, and assessed. 5 
 However, the more recent transitions towards democracy in many of the states of 
Sub-Saharan Africa present a distinct opportunity for a deeper exploration of the 
relationship between IEM and internal political reform due, in part, to the unique 
structural conditions across the region. Many states in Sub-Saharan Africa, including the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Zambia are undergoing 
democratic transitions in the aftermath of violent and often ethnic conflict, a condition 
absent during a majority of the transitions in Southern and Eastern Europe as well as in 
Latin America.  Additionally, levels of economic development are lower in Sub-Saharan 
Africa than anywhere else. Therefore, the variance across Sub-Saharan Africa offers a 
unique opportunity for empirical investigation of the relationship between less favorable 
domestic conditions and the effectiveness of IEM. 
 
                                                 
4
 See Clark 2000; Bratton and Van der Walle 1997; Lindberg 2006; Nevitte and Canton 1997.  
5
 See Chand 1997; Baloyra 1998; Linz and Stepan 1996; López-Pintor 1998; McCoy 1998; O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986; Santa-Cruz 2005. 
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II. Defining IEM 
 IEM is much more than just the observation of voting booths or ballots on the day 
of an election. Election monitoring efforts often begin when elections to be held are 
announced. The definition of election observation put forth by the United Nations in the 
Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation is: 
the systematic, comprehensive and accurate gathering of information 
concerning the laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of 
elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment; 
the impartial and professional analysis of such information; and the 
drawing of conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on 
the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of 
analysis.6 
 
External actors are inherently involved in IEM, as they seek to encourage internal 
political reform and build civil society in Sub-Saharan Africa. These actors primarily 
include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). IGOs such as the African Union (AU), Commonwealth 
Secretariat7, European Union (EU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
and the United Nations (UN) have all participated in IEM efforts. Other U.S.-based not-
for-profit organizations such as the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI) also participate in regional efforts 
towards internal political reform, particularly in Latin America and Africa. All of these 
groups play a role in facilitating and monitoring elections as well as promoting the 
protection and exercise of individual rights so as to encourage internal political reform.   
                                                 
6
 United Nations, "Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct,"  
(New York: United Nations, 2005). 
7
 The Commonwealth Secretariat consists of the fifty-three member states of the British Commonwealth. 
See www.thecommonwealth.org for details. 
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 The various activities of these monitors include “passive observation of the 
electoral processes; pressure for changes in the electoral environment; verification of 
voter registration lists; balloting and the count; mediation between the government and 
opposition; the provision of technical assistance; and… [in some cases] the actual 
administration of elections by outsiders.”8  Additionally, domestic observer groups such 
as civic organizations and non-governmental organizations often work in conjunction 
with IEM efforts to enhance civil society participation, support the electoral infrastructure 
and logistics, help with observation recruitment and training efforts, and aid electoral 
evaluation.9 Ultimately, IEM serves to foster legitimacy of elections both domestically 
and internationally through efforts to deter electoral fraud, reduce voter intimidation, 
provide technical assistance to enhance the electoral process, mediate disputes among 
rival political groups, improve flawed or weak electoral laws and processes, and stabilize 
volatile domestic conditions during an election.10 
 IEM has had success in encouraging free and fair elections in a number of cases. 
The Zambian elections of 1991, for example, were not only the first democratic elections 
in the country’s history, but also resulted in the defeat of a leader who had held power 
since 1964.11 Still, inadequate attention has been given to the role of IEM in both 
                                                 
8Vikram K. Chand, "Democratisation from the Outside In: Ngo and International Efforts to Promote Open 
Elections," Third World Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1997): 546. 
9Neil Nevitte and Santiago A. Canton, "The Role of Domestic Observers," Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 
(1997): 48. 
10
 Chand, "Democratisation from the Outside In," 546-47. And Thomas Carothers, "The Observers 
Observed," Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): 18-21. 
11
 Carter Center, Zambia (2006 [cited November 30 2006]); available from 
http://www.cartercenter.org/countries/zambia.html. 
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legitimate and illegitimate elections and how domestic conditions may shape this 
outcome.12 
 
III. Argument 
 The main questions that this paper seeks to address are as follows: Is IEM an 
effective way to facilitate internal political reform in the region? In which countries is 
IEM most helpful and in which is it least effective at improving the quality of 
governance? What explanations account best for differences in outcomes across or 
among these cases? To what extent do conditioning variables, that is, the internal 
conditions of the state in which the election is held, alter the independent variable, or the 
actions and organization of international election monitors? Why would this be so? What 
intervening variables, if any, account for unexpected outcomes? In what ways and to 
what extent can IEM undermine domestic political development?  Are there any instances 
where IEM has legitimated or been manipulated by political elites or factions in Sub-
Saharan Africa to produce an illiberal or hybrid regime? For example, this was the case 
when observers from the Commonwealth of Independent States declared the 2006 
elections in Belarus free and transparent amidst strong condemnation from other 
monitoring groups.13 How can IEM effectiveness be improved? 
 This paper seeks to argue that IEM does have an effect on internal political 
reform, but the initial characteristics of political culture and economic development will 
                                                 
12
 For more detail on this and other cases of IEM progress, see Susan Dayton Hyde, "Observing Norms: 
Explaining the Causes and Consequences of Internationally Monitored Elections" (University of California, 
2006), 47-53. 
13
 ITAR-TASS News Agency, "Belarus Polls Open, Free, Transparent--Cis Observers," March 20, 2006. 
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condition how effective IEM will be. There are three main hypotheses of this study, 
which will be explicated in greater detail in the following chapter. First, IEM is more 
effective in regimes with an advanced and stable political culture (H1). Second, IEM is 
more effective when higher levels of economic development exist (H2). Third, IEM is 
more effective in cases where monitors are present long before, during, and after the 
election, are highly professionalized, organized, well-funded, and work with domestic 
observer groups (H3). Yet, in some African states that do not possess some or all of the 
aforementioned variables (-H1, -H2, and -H3), IEM may have potentially negative effects 
on internal political reform. There is the possibility that IEM may legitimate an unfair 
election or be manipulated to produce or preserve an illiberal or hybrid regime, which 
was the case during the 1995 elections in Kazakhstan and 1993 elections in Gabon.14  
 This issue will be examined in the context of qualitative studies of eight elections 
in four Sub-Saharan African states. By varying the conditioning (H1, H2) variables and 
the characteristics of the independent (H3) variable, this paper seeks to investigate which 
phenomena have the greatest impact on facilitating or hindering the dependent variable, 
internal political reform, via elections. To do so, I will examine elections that have 
occurred in the following countries from the years 1999 to 2006: Botswana, Uganda, 
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. These cases comprise a wide variance in the presence or 
lack of H1, H2 and H3 and will be discussed in moderate depth. 
 The sources for this qualitative data will consist of primary and secondary works. 
Primary sources, such as reports from international election monitoring groups, prove 
                                                 
14
 Carothers, "The Observers Observed," 23. 
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most helpful when researching and evaluating international monitored elections in the 
four countries. The Carter Center, EU, IRI, NDI, SADC, and the UN offer country 
profiles, details of past activities within the country, or observation reports from past 
elections accessible online. For data regarding political and economic characteristics of 
each regime, which are necessary for assessing the impact of internal political reform, 
reports from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Freedom House, the Polity IV 
Project, the U.S. State Department, and the World Bank, and are most useful. Secondary 
analyses of particular elections will also be consulted. Works on IEM more generally 
help to define the roles of external actors in processes of internal political reform. For 
example, articles from relevant journals, such as the Journal of Democracy, Third World 
Quarterly, or World Politics, also provide greater detail and analysis of IEM as it relates 
to political reform in the region. Books with a regional or thematic focus also provide 
useful historical background as well as secondary analyses of the electoral outcomes. 
 
IV. Do IEM and Elections Matter? 
 The main discourse in this field focuses primarily on the question of which 
variables matter most in bringing about internal political reform, the independent 
variables or the extent to which they are affected by conditioning variables. Essentially, 
scholars seek to determine whether external agents can bring about significant political 
reforms, or if it is an organic process, in which external intervention may prove a 
hindrance more than a help. Believers in modernization theory argue that structural 
variables do most to encourage internal political reform. Other scholars argue additional 
  
8
structural and conditional factors such as ethno-political cleavages, social or political 
stability, colonial legacy, religion, or international pressures factor most into the success 
of internal political reforms.  Aside from a small number of theorists that discuss the role 
of civic culture and political structures, and therefore electoral competition and politics, 
in political modernization,15 each of these aforementioned explanations generally gives 
insufficient attention to the role of elections. Moreover, few, if any, look at IEM in the 
movement towards internal political reform and political development as it is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. 
 Some argue that political reform occurs only when structural and conditional 
variables are ripe for it. For example, arguments on the links between economic growth 
or GDP levels and democracy are widespread. This has become known as a 
modernization theory of internal political reform, an endogenous theory of democracy 
that argues as states develop economically, they tend towards political reform.16 First 
advanced in decades earlier by Seymour Martin Lipset, this theory is often evaluated. 
Scholars such as Boix and Stokes have argued that as per capita income rise, it has an 
income equalizing effect and can bring about or sustain democracy.17 Huntington echoes 
these sentiments in his seminal work, The Third Wave, asserting that as states develop 
economically, they enter a stage where political reform is more likely.18 Another scholar, 
Barrington Moore purported a theory of capitalism as a vessel of internal political 
                                                 
15
 See Almond and Powell 1966; Almond and Powell 1984; Almond and Verba 1965; Apter 1965. 
16
 Adam Przeworkski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," World Politics 49, no. 
2 (1997): 156-57. 
17
 Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, "Endogenous Democratization," World Politics 55, no. 4 (2003): 544. 
18
 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, The Julian 
J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series ; V. 4 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
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reform.19 Again, this too incorporated a theory of democratization based upon economic 
structures.  
 Other scholars looking to encourage internal political reform stress additional 
structural or conditional factors, such as ethno-political cleavages, social or political 
stability, legacies of colonialism, or religion.  Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich demonstrate 
the influence of ethno-political divisions on emerging democracies in Africa.20  Some 
argue domestic civil and political stability figure more in progress toward reform. In the 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Manning and Antic suggest “even the most finely tuned 
and carefully honed electoral procedures are powerless to change” the underlying 
conditional variables of domestic instability.21 Particularly in Africa, the legacies of 
colonialism also condition internal political reform efforts. Works by Doyle, Young, and 
Mamdani examine the effects of decolonization on the emergence of democracy in 
Africa.22 Finally, some scholars like Robinson suggest that international pressure and 
interventionist policies of democracy promotion, often by the hegemonic power, may 
best explain a shift, albeit an incomplete one, from authoritarianism.23 However, this is 
not quite the case for the region in question. With the end of the Cold War, Sub-Saharan 
Africa is considered to be of limited strategic importance for the United States in 
                                                 
19
 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993). 
20Shaheen Mozaffar, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich, "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, 
and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies," American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 
(2003): 388. 
21Carrie Manning and Miljenko Antic, "The Limits of Electoral Engineering: Lessons from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina," Journal of Democracy 14, no. 3 (2003). 
22
 See Michael W. Doyle, Empires, Cornell Studies in Comparative History (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP, 
1986).; Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1996).; and 
Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale UP, 1994).  
23
 William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, Us Intervention, and Hegemony, Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations, 48 (New York: Cambridge UP, 1996). 
  
10
comparison to other regions, like the Middle East or Asia. Still, each aforementioned 
explanation for the emergence of and challenges to democracy primarily looks at the 
structural and conditional variables as most significant for internal political reform 
processes, neglecting a more functional approach. 
 In each of the previous theories of internal political reform, however, there has 
been little mention of the role of elections and IEM. While Almond and Powell assert the 
significant implications of voting and elections24, the development and prominence of 
IEM in the period since these authors have written necessitates a new examination and 
comparison of structural and functional explanations for internal political reform. One 
must consider the extent to which functional explanations regarding the role of IEM and 
elections in encouraging internal political reform matter in light of structural or 
conditioning variables. Indeed, some scholars like Fareed Zakaria or Guillermo 
O’Donnell argue that an emphasis on elections in the movement towards democracy may 
produce unintended ill-effects such as illiberal or delegative democracy, respectively.25 
According to Zakaria, illiberal democracy results when elections are given primacy in the 
process of reform, producing regimes characterized by “strong executives, weak 
legislatures and judiciaries, and few civil and economic liberties.”26 This is indeed the 
case in states such as Zimbabwe, where elections have taken place for decades.  
                                                 
24
 See, Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics Today: A World View, 3rd ed. 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1984). 
25
 See Guillermo A. O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994).; and 
Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, 1st ed. (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 2003). 
26
 Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, 98. 
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 Still, elections are an underpinning of democracy; while they can never be 
sufficient for internal reform, they are necessary. Elections, and therefore election 
monitoring, do play some role in internal political reform. International monitors and 
elections often bring about internal political reform primarily by changing a political 
culture in ways more favorable to democracy. One scholar argues elections grant 
“transitional countries experience with organizing parties and civil society, improving the 
protection of civil liberties.”27 Election monitoring enables the encouragement of 
democratic norms and institutions by fostering conditions for fair and free elections to 
occur, including expanded political participation and institutionalized channels of 
competition.28 International support or condemnation that stems from externally 
monitored elections may also aid in the process of reform, for example, by isolating 
autocratic regimes. IEM can also lessen the conditional effects of ethno-political and 
religious cleavages by enhancing the legitimacy of the electoral process and outcome and 
aiding in rebuilding civil and political stability, particularly in post-conflict societies.29 
The prevalence and, in a number of important cases, successes of IEM indicates that it 
does matter in the process of internal political reform. Yet how it matters, that is, the 
exact significance and role IEM has in the emergence of reform in Sub-Saharan Africa 
vis-à-vis structural and conditional factors remains to be seen from the forthcoming 
analysis. 
                                                 
27Elizabeth Spiro Clark, "Why Elections Matter," The Washington Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2000): 27. 
28
 Chand, "Democratisation from the Outside In," 550-51. 
29
 Eric Brahm, Election Monitoring (University of Colorado,  2004 [cited October 26 2006]); available 
from http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/election_monitoring/. 
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 The cases in this study demonstrate that aspects of both structuralist and 
functionalist explanations are valid. In each of the eight elections, the initial conditions 
under which IEM operated did affect the agency of the monitors. At the same time, the 
outcome of the election (the dependent variable) over time conditions the IEM (the 
independent variable) of the next election. Thus, a feedback effect is at work, where the 
dependent variable of the first election positively or negatively conditions the 
independent variable of the second election. Ideally, through positive feedback, IEM can 
favorably modify the structural conditions of a state. Yet, in some of the cases in this 
study, the outcome of IEM deviated from that expected by this causality. This signals that 
other, hitherto unexamined, intervening variables must be accounted for in the conclusion 
of this study. 
 
V. Outline of the Study 
 Chapter two addresses the research design of this paper, in which the method of 
analysis will be considered. Key concepts and hypotheses will be defined, followed by an 
explanation of case selection. The methodology and limitations of this research study will 
also be considered in this second chapter. Chapter three will be a qualitative study of IEM 
in the case of Botswana, a state with favorable economic conditions and political culture. 
According to the hypotheses in this study, IEM is expected to be most effective under 
these circumstances. Internationally monitored elections in Uganda will be the focus of 
the fourth chapter. In comparison to more favorable economic conditions, Ugandan 
political culture is less advanced, as its social and political structures remain quite closed. 
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Therefore this chapter will analyze whether higher levels of economic growth enhance 
the ability for IEM to foster internal political reform, or if it may in fact undermine it. 
Chapter five looks at IEM in Mozambique. Mozambique provides an interesting case 
because it has managed to make significant progress in political reform, even after 
decades of a violent civil war that only ended in 1992. This case provides a good 
opportunity to assess the role IEM has played in this process. It also enables one to study 
the impact that economic challenges may have on IEM success. Chapter six will conclude 
the empirical portion of this study with a look at IEM in Zimbabwe. This will be the 
critical case for this study because both the economic context and political culture are 
least favorable for IEM success, despite the long electoral history of the state. Depending 
on the results of this qualitative analysis, a strong case can be made either for or against 
the ability of IEM to facilitate internal political reform under adverse structural 
conditions. Also, it presents an opportunity to examine how IEM may be manipulated by 
the regime and possibly legitimate fraudulent elections. The seventh and final chapter 
concludes this study with a discussion of the findings from the cases and subsequent 
implications for IEM and international efforts at encouraging internal political reform. 
  
14
Chapter 2: Research Design 
 The following evaluation of IEM in Sub-Saharan African states rests upon several 
key concepts and hypotheses; it is therefore helpful to define key terms, explicate the 
conditioning and intervening variables, and describe the method of analysis to be used in 
this study. This chapter will first explore primary concepts and variables. Next, it will 
examine the design and methodology of the qualitative cases, addressing which states and 
elections will be studied, why they are relevant, and how they will be analyzed. This 
chapter will conclude with a consideration of the limitations of the study. 
 
I. Key Concepts and Hypotheses 
 As this study seeks to gage the relationship between IEM and internal political 
reform under a variety of conditions, it is important to clearly define what is meant by 
“internal political reform.” Political reform, according to one scholar, is the “institutional 
changes that rationalize bureaucracy, strengthen the rule of law, expand political 
participation, and protect human rights.”1 It is especially important for this study to 
distinguish this understanding of political reform from “democracy,” as the latter varies 
in meaning and often may have Western, liberal, or capitalist connotations. Because 
“internal political reform” is more precise in meaning, it is the preferred term and 
measurement when employing the three hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3) used to study the 
efficacy of IEM. 
                                                 
1
 Mixin Pei, "Political Reform in China: Leadership Differences and Convergence," in Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (2006). 
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H1: IEM is more effective in regimes where domestic political culture is more stable and 
advanced 
 H1 relates the effectiveness of IEM with the social and political conditions 
existing within a given state. IEM is more likely to succeed in state with greater social 
modernization or mobilization for a number of reasons. In a state with greater societal 
organization, citizens are often better informed about and have greater access to the 
domestic political arena. More groups are willing to participate in political processes or 
assert a greater influence on domestic affairs. Because these civil society groups are 
independent from the state, they have the ability to place greater demands on that state. 
Political competition is also better institutionalized in a state with a more advanced 
political culture. Moreover, international election monitors are likely to face fewer checks 
on or obstacles to their activities. These factors enable monitors to engage as many 
citizens in the electoral process, work effectively to with domestic NGOs and other civil 
society groups, have greater autonomy in their duties; all of which accounts for the 
increased likelihood of success.  
 But what exactly is meant by “political culture”? This term, as understood in this 
study, refers to the way in which members of a society view politics and government, and 
how these views are reflected in the structures in governmental structures and political 
channels.2 The political culture of a state also references the degree of social and political 
development; and states with a more advanced and stable political culture often have 
social and political structures common in politically reformed regimes. These include 
                                                 
2
 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), 13, 
30-35. 
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institutionalized constraints on executive power, an independent and unbiased judiciary, 
broad political participation, academic, associational, and press freedoms. A competitive 
and fair multi-party political system is another important characteristic. The existence and 
extent of what many would call civil society groups, such as labor unions, charitable and 
religious organizations, indigenous groups, community-based organizations, professional 
associations, and NGOs are also an inherent part of the socio-political conditions in a 
state.3 The absence or occurrence of ethnic or religious conflict is another factor in 
assessing the condition of political culture. Finally, the inclusion of women in the 
political process and their constitutional and customary legal protections also denote 
greater social and political development. The extent to which these conditions vary from 
one state to another denotes the differential in political culture. Though these factors are 
not the only determinants of political culture, they provide a critical basis for definition 
and classification of regimes in this study. 
 
H2: IEM is more effective when higher levels of economic development exist 
 At a basic level, a state with greater infrastructural development enhances IEM 
efforts, as observers are not only able to travel with ease from one polling station to the 
next, increasing the coverage of election. Monitors also benefit when a state has greater 
economic resources for electoral administration. Monitors, both domestic and 
international, can take advantage of such resources to aid in voter education efforts or 
                                                 
3
 This definition of civil society is based upon that used by the World Bank. See, 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20101499~menuPK:244
752~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~thesitePK:228717,00.html>. 
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other critical stages in the electoral process. However, H2 is closely related to H1, as 
economic modernization makes possible social and political modernization. Scholars 
purporting an endogenous theory of democratization assert that economic modernization 
results in differentiation and specialization of social and political structures, via 
urbanization, industrialization, education, communication etc., which makes IEM 
success, and political reform, more likely. A higher share of income or resources for the 
middle and lower classes may reduce social or political polarization; and a consensus on 
economic, political, and social policies becomes more likely.4 Often, these extreme 
divisions, and violence or electoral fraud that results, undermines IEM efforts to promote 
a credible vote and observe all aspects of the process. Others argue that, while higher 
levels of economic development are not definitively correlated with the emergence of 
democracy, the chances of democratic success are greater when a state is economically 
better off.  The likelihood of internal political reform success is greater in a transitional 
regime that is has favorable economic conditions. According to Przeworski, et al., even 
in poorer states, democracy can survive if they generate economic growth, controlled 
inflation, and lower levels of income inequality.5 Regardless of whether one subscribes to 
an endogenous or exogenous theory, higher levels of economic development grant more 
favorable conditions for the success of IEM as it enhances the likelihood of durable 
political reform. 
                                                 
4
 William Easterly, "The Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development," Journal of Economic 
Growth 6, no. 4 (2001). 
5
 Adam Przeworkski and et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 
(1996): 39. 
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 Because H2 deals primarily with the relationship between IEM and economic 
development, it is also necessary to explicate how the latter is defined. For the purposes 
of this study, the measurements of the level of economic development or stability within 
a state will depend upon several factors. The gross national income per capita (GNI p/c) 
and gross domestic product per capita (GDP p/c) of a state are important indicators of 
economic size and strength.6  Moderate to high levels of GDP growth also signal the pace 
of economic development; persistent, and often high, rates of growth signal an economy 
is steadily developing, if it is not so already. Additionally, relatively low and steady rates 
of inflation, often characteristic of a stable and developed economy, affect a state’s 
ability to attract foreign investment and savings, and are another indicator of economic 
health. Finally, low levels of poverty, unemployment, and income inequality (which is 
measured by the Gini coefficient) signal higher levels of economic stability and 
development. However, it is important to keep in mind that, while several of the cases in 
this study exhibit favorable economic indicators, these states remain some of the poorest 
economies in the world. These aforementioned indicators will be used in this study to 
facilitate the assessment of the level of economic development and stability; however, the 
economic condition of a state will be analyzed only within the context of the region. 
 H1 and H2 deal primarily with the effects of conditioning variables on 
effectiveness of IEM in encouraging internal political reform. H3, however, examines the 
                                                 
6
 World Bank, Quick Reference Tables (2006 [cited November 19 2006]); available from 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20399244~menuP
K:1504474~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html. 
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the independent variable, that is, the actions of the international election monitors on 
processes of reform.  
 
H3: IEM is more effective in cases where monitors are present long before, during, and 
after the election, are highly professionalized, organized, and well-funded, and work with 
domestic observer groups 
 A presence long before election day allows monitors to best ascertain the 
conditions under which the voting occurs.  Monitors are better able to gage whether voter 
intimidation, fraud, or manipulation has occurred; they can also aid in voter registration, 
widening electoral participation. A presence long after election day helps to ensure that 
the results of the vote are taken seriously, opposition claims of wrongdoing are 
investigated, and instances of fraud are condemned. Professional and well-organized 
monitoring groups can enhance electoral success by providing technical and logistical 
assistance, helping to minimize voting irregularities, developing electoral standards, and 
enhancing the legitimacy of the poll, overall. Monitors that work with domestic civil 
society groups aid in the success of internal political reform. These domestic groups not 
only best know the language, culture, and political situation but they have a vested 
interest in the outcome of the vote as they remain long after the international monitors 
leave. Each of these activities encourages real political reform enhancing the likelihood 
of a freer and fairer vote with broad participation. 
 Despite its growing prominence, IEM can have some notable shortcomings, 
which, if present during elections in fragile states, may in fact do more harm than good. 
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As Thomas Carothers observes, “election observation has attracted too many groups, 
many of whom do amateurish work.”7 Unprofessional monitors may detract from the 
work of other, more established groups, making hurried post-election reports, patronizing 
local culture and groups, or impeding the work of the electoral commission with trivial 
requests.8 Thus, professionalization and organization of monitors during the electoral 
process are important standards to account for when evaluating the results of the 
intervening variables in the study. Monitoring groups that lend greater significant to the 
day of the election, rather than the period leading up to and following it, are also 
problematic, as this unbalanced approach fails to achieve any lasting reform; as was the 
case in the 1996 presidential elections in Russia, it may even make possible overly-
optimistic judgments of success.9 Problems may also arise if elections are not placed 
within the broader process of reform. When monitors neglect the “deeper political 
functions and contexts of elections,” they risk legitimating unfair elections or producing 
hybrid regimes.10 When the implications of H3 are evaluated in the subsequent case 
studies, much attention will be paid to the potential shortcomings of this explanatory 
variable. 
 The presence of H1, H2, and H3 should, according to this causality, enhance the 
progress of internal political reform. Over time, through the feedback effect, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter, IEM should engender political progress in developing 
countries. As IEM improves over time, opportunities for advancing H1 and H2 should 
                                                 
7
 Carothers, "The Observers Observed," 21. 
8
 Ibid.: 21-22. 
9
 Ibid.: 22-23. 
10
 Ibid.: 23. 
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also progress, even in the most adverse conditions. Therefore, any deviations from these 
expected results, which do appear in some of the elections in this study, signal other 
important variables at work. 
 
II. Case Selection 
 In order to assess the effects of conditioning and independent variables on the 
success of IEM in facilitating political reform, the design of the qualitative study employs 
degrees of freedom based upon the conditioning variables of H1 and H2. Four states have 
been chosen on account of the variances in their respective structural conditions.  A 
positive sign (+) indicates more stable and advanced political culture (H1), or higher 
levels of economic development (H2), while a negative (-) sign indicates less stable or 
advanced political culture or lower levels of economic development.  
 +H1 -H1 
+H2 Botswana 
 
(9) 
Uganda 
 
(-4) 
-H2 Mozambique 
 
(6) 
Zimbabwe 
 
(-7) 
Figure 2.1 Case Study Matrix 
Though each case will not fit perfectly into a classification, the case study matrix 
provides helpful analytical framework for examining the structural conditions in each 
state. Additionally, the Polity IV11 ratings of political regime characteristics (10 being 
                                                 
11
 The Polity IV Project contains information on the characteristics of political regimes of all independent 
states, as well as regime transitions.  The data set includes information from the year 1800 to 2004. 
Regimes are coded by the patterns of authority on a scale from -10 (being most autocratic) to +10 (being 
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most democratic and -10 being most autocratic) are included in parentheses in Figure 2.1. 
The justification for classifying each state into its respective cell is provided below. 
 
A. Botswana 
 Among Sub-Saharan African states, Botswana has experienced over four decades 
of largely democratic rule and, as a result, has one of the continent’s most successful 
economies.12 According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 
Botswana is the least corrupt state in Africa, ranking thirty-seventh out of the 163 
countries surveyed.13 Strong executive constraints characterize the presidential system in 
Botswana.14 Though the elected multiparty legislature has been dominated by Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) since independence, the judiciary remains independent of the 
executive.15 The government dominates the media and in some cases restricts 
objectionable stories; however, in spite of this, academic and press freedoms are 
generally respected, creating a space for open political debate.16 Civil society groups such 
as NGOs operate freely and labor unions are permitted, with some restrictions on strikes 
or collective bargaining on wages.17 While women are constitutionally guaranteed equal 
                                                                                                                                                 
most democratic); the regime data is also examined semi-annually. The project is headquartered at the 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, College 
Park. The website for the project is <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/>. 
12
 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Botswana," ed. The World Factbook , U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (2007). 
13
 Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2006 Regional Results: Africa,"  
(Transparency International, 2006). 
14
 Center for International Development and Conflict Management Polity IV Project, "Polity Iv Country 
Report 2003: Botswana,"  (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2003). 
15
 Freedom House, "Country Report: Botswana," in Freedom in the World (2006). 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid. 
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rights as men, in practice, such protections are often limited.18 In recent years, however, 
the struggle for gender equality has “taken on a more overtly political stance in 
demanding representation and political space in decision-making structures of 
government and political parties.”19 Botswana also lacks violent ethnic or religious 
conflict;20 and although HIV/AIDS, a common destabilizing force, remains a critical 
issue, the government has embarked on a program to actively combat its further spread.21  
 In addition to its relatively advanced political culture, the Botswana economy is 
remarkably stable and successful. With a GDP growth rate in 2005 was over five percent, 
Botswana has “maintained one of the world’s highest economic growth rates since 
independence in 1966.”22 Per capita GDP in 2005 was $10,700, one of the highest in the 
region and GNI per capita was $5, 520.23 Like nearly all Sub-Saharan African states, 
poverty and unemployment remain persistent problems. Though rates are high in 
Botswana, approximately twenty-four percent by official estimates and close to forty 
percent by unofficial estimations, they are comparably better than neighboring states.24 
Inflation has also remained low and stable, with a rate of approximately eight and a half 
percent in 2005.25 In all, the economy of Botswana is among the most favorable in Sub-
                                                 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Onalenna Doo Selowane, "Gender and Democracy in Botswana: Women's Struggle for Equality and 
Political Participation," in The State and Democracy in Africa, ed. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja and Margaret 
C. Lee (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998), 25. 
20
 However, the San, a minority ethnic group evicted from ancestral lands by the government on grounds of 
constructing a wildlife refuge, has taken legal action against the state. Freedom House, "Country Report: 
Botswana." 
21
 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Botswana." 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid. and World Bank, "Botswana at a Glance," ed. Africa Data and Statistics (2006). 
24
 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Botswana." 
25
 Ibid. 
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Saharan Africa, as it has high levels of development and stability. Due to these factors, 
Botswana is scores relatively high in both H1 and H2 (see Figure 2.1). 
 Given these encouraging structural conditions, the impact of IEM on the process 
of further internal reform is expected to be positive, as is argued in H1 and H2. Hence, 
variations in the independent variable, H3, will likely account for any unexpected 
outcomes. Essentially, the case of Botswana is a hoop test for the H3. If the hypothesis 
does not hold in this case, then IEM may be less effective in encouraging internal 
political reform than previously thought. If this is the case, one must account for other, 
hitherto unexamined, structural or intervening variables that account for changes in the 
outcome.  The elections that will be studied are the parliamentary elections of October 
1999 and 2004. As the president is elected by the National Assembly, the lower 
legislative body, it will also be examined within the context of these elections. 
 
B. Uganda 
 Though not as strong as Botswana’s, the Ugandan economy has performed solidly 
for over a decade.  Per capita GDP in 2005 was estimated at $1,80026, with annual GDP 
growth over five and a half percent.27 In 2005, the Ugandan GDP (purchasing power 
parity) was $47.76 billion, almost three times the size of Botswana’s GDP and the largest 
of the four states in this study.28 For two decades, the government, aided by various states 
and international agencies, “has acted to rehabilitate and stabilize the economy by 
                                                 
26
 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Uganda," ed. The World Factbook , U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
(2007). 
27
 World Bank, "Uganda Data Profile," in World Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2006). 
28
 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Uganda." 
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undertaking currency reform, raising producer prices on export crops, increasing prices of 
petroleum products, and improving civil service wages.”29 As a result, inflation has been 
controlled, and reduced to about eight percent.30 In comparison to other Sub-Saharan 
African states, inequality is lower in Uganda, with approximately one third of the 
population is below the poverty line.31 Uganda’s rich natural resources have supported a 
growing export market and revenues, helping reduce its trade imbalance.32  
 Despite its relatively strong and stable economy, Uganda maintains a closed and 
under-developed political culture. Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance 
Movement (NRM or “Movement”) have headed the government since 1986, when formal 
political parties were banned, effectively creating single party system.33 Though the 
presidential and parliamentary elections of 2006 were the first multiparty elections held 
in the country in over two decades,34 the NRM still dominates the legislature. In fact, the 
constitutional referendum that repealed the party ban also overturned the term limitation 
on the presidency; this has enabled Museveni to seek a third term in office.35 Executive 
constraints are limited, as Museveni’s NRM controls the parliament.36 The judiciary is 
only nominally independent, as it suffers from executive interference and insufficient 
resources.37 Furthermore, opposition parties face an uneven field of competition, as the 
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 Freedom House, "Country Report: Uganda," in Freedom in the World (Freedom House, 2006). 
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 European Union Election Observation Mission, "Uganda 2006 Final Report on the Presidential and 
Parliamentary Elections,"  (European Union, 2006), 4. 
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 Freedom House, "Country Report: Uganda." 
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 Center for International Development and Conflict Management Polity IV Project, "Polity Iv Country 
Report 2003: Uganda,"  (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2003). 
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Movement enjoys the support of government resources.38 Despite this closed system, 
some independent media outlets do exist.39 Additionally, NGOs are especially active in 
Ugandan civil society; however, both NGOs and as well as certain media groups are 
sometimes subject to government restrictions.40 The National Organization of Trade 
Unions functions more or less independently of the government or political parties, with 
some limitations on the ability to strike and in some cases, to unionize.41 While women’s 
rights are constitutionally protected and quotas have been passed to increase political 
representation, discrimination and violence against women are persistent problems.42 
Finally, ethnic divisions and conflict present severe threat to stability. Due to ongoing 
guerilla warfare in the north on the part of the Lord’s Resistance Army, thousands have 
been kidnapped, killed, or forced to flee their homes.43 Discrimination against other 
ethnic and religious groups across the country generates further socio-political instability.  
 The case of Uganda offers an opportunity to investigate the impact of IEM on 
states with growing and stable economies, but limited internal political reform. It also 
offers the chance to investigate whether closed social and political structures may be 
tolerated in the case of countries with successful economies, as long as growth persists. 
The presidential and parliamentary elections of 2001 and 2006 will be examined in this 
study. Much attention will be given to the most recent election, as it was the first 
multiparty contest since Museveni came to power in 1986. 
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C. Mozambique 
 By the time a UN peace agreement ended years of civil conflict in 1992, years of 
war and poor economic management wreaked havoc on the Mozambican economy and 
socio-political structures were left extremely fragile. Today, despite relatively high 
growth rates and a series of economic reforms, Mozambique still faces enormous 
economic challenges. The Mozambican economy relies heavily on foreign aid, and nearly 
seventy percent of the population lives below the poverty line.44   Mozambique maintains 
a considerable current account imbalance of $-639 million, the largest of the countries in 
this study, and is nearly $5.5 billion dollars in debt.45 Per capita GDP was $1,300 in 
2005; the total GDP (purchasing power parity) that same year was just over $26 billion, 
nearly half of the Ugandan GDP. Still, inflation is a remarkably low six and a half 
percent, a considerable achievement given the difficulties facing Mozambican economic 
policymakers. 
 Mozambique has, however, made significant advances in the direction of political 
reform, given its recent history of civil conflict. Despite his long tenure of power that 
began in 1986, President Joaquim Chissano “accelerated reforms aimed at transforming 
Mozambique into a multiparty democracy” throughout the 1990s.46 Though Chissano and 
his Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) party dominate politics in the 
country, the executive does face moderate constraints from the National Assembly.47  
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 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Mozambique," ed. The World Factbook , U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (2007). 
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 Center for International Development and Conflict Management Polity IV Project, "Polity Iv Country 
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President Armando Guebuza, newly elected in 2004 replacing Chissano, has made 
reducing corruption a top priority, and many in the media and civil society organizations 
have noted the government’s increased attention to its own activities.48 The judiciary, 
however, lacks sufficient power to check the executive.49 Since 1992, over twenty 
political parties have formed in opposition to Frelimo, the most important being the 
civilian branch of the Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo).50 While 
Frelimo maintains access to state-run media outlets and therefore a competitive 
advantage in the electoral process, the party has “accepted several proposals from 
[opposition forces] to revise electoral law and reexamine several controversial aspects of 
the constitution;” hence, political participation and competition is set to improve.51 
Though freedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed, the state either controls or 
heavily influences most media outlets.52 Still, independent coverage is slowly growing. 
Additionally, academic and religious freedoms are generally respected.53 NGOs and other 
civil society groups such as labor unions operate openly.54 Unfortunately, societal and 
legal discrimination against women remains a significant problem in Mozambique.55 
While Mozambique has made significant progress in improving its political culture, 
important divisions still exist, a legacy of a long civil war. 
                                                 
48
 Freedom House, "Country Report: Mozambique," in Freedom in the World (2006). 
49
 Polity IV Project, "Mozambique." 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Freedom House, "Mozambique." 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Ibid. 
  
29
 In all, Mozambique provides an interesting study of the impact of IEM on the 
processes of internal political reform in post-conflict and economically underdeveloped 
states. Mozambique has made significant progress in rebuilding and reforming social and 
political structures; therefore, this study aims to determine the extent to which IEM 
played a role in such a transition. The 1999 and 2004 presidential and parliamentary 
elections will be examined in this study. The significance of the former is that it was the 
second election since the civil conflict had ended, and arguably most critical in keeping 
the politically fragile state moving in the direction of reform.  The latter is significant in 
that there was a transfer of power to the newly elected, albeit Frelimo, candidate. 
 
D. Zimbabwe 
 Zimbabwe, unlike the states mentioned above, faces dual challenges of a 
repressed political culture and economic collapse. The government’s confiscation of 
white-owned farmland beginning in 2000 crippled the Zimbabwean economy. Because 
much of this land went to supporters of President Robert Mugabe lacking a background 
in farming, the “commercial farming sector that accounted for the majority of the 
country’s exports, foreign exchange, and jobs” subsequently collapsed.56 Today, 
Zimbabwe faces severe economic challenges. Although the GDP (purchasing power 
parity) is $25.69 billion, the economy is shrinking at an astonishing rate, and the GDP 
growth rate is roughly negative eight percent.57 Unemployment is estimated to be eighty 
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percent, with an equal percentage of people living below the poverty line.58 Official 
estimates place inflation at 266.8%, although unofficial estimates are higher.59 
Zimbabwe’s current account balance is $-519 million and it carries just over $5.2 billion 
dollars in external debt.60 As a result of economic mismanagement, Zimbabwe is, 
therefore, heavily dependent on foreign aid. 
 Zimbabwe also has one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Mugabe’s 
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party dominates the 
political system and the executive faces minimal constraints.61  The nominally 
independent judiciary lacks the capacity to act wholly separate from the executive.62 
Opposition groups such as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) cannot equally 
compete a “discriminatory electoral framework, biased media coverage, and the 
unscrupulous use of state resources” by ZANU-PF.63 Academic and press freedoms are 
minimal in Zimbabwe.64 Though they are small in number, civil society groups remain 
quite active; however, they face growing restrictions and intimidation.65 Women and 
minorities also experience societal and legal discrimination. As a result of such curtailed 
political rights and civil liberties, the MDC and various other movements have garnered 
widespread support and present a growing challenge to Mugabe’s authoritarian system. 
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 Zimbabwe presents the critical case for determining whether IEM, in spite of 
adverse structural conditions, can bring about internal political reform. An adverse 
political culture, compounded by severe economic conditions, makes Zimbabwe the most 
challenging case for IEM success. Therefore, a strong argument can be made for or 
against IEM depending on the outcome of this study. The elections that will be 
considered will be the National Assembly election of 2000, where the MDC presented a 
significant challenge to Mugabe’s ZANU-PF; the heavily criticized presidential election 
of 2002; and the National Assembly and newly-created Senate elections of 2005. 
 
III. Methodology and Limitations 
 Each of the next four chapters will proceed as follows. First, a brief background 
of each state will be included, as it describes the political culture and economic context of 
the elections being studied. Next, the independent variable—the actions and 
characteristics of external monitoring groups—will then be examined in the period 
before, during, and after each of the two elections. The period of study will be limited to 
the last ten years, in an effort to control the effects of generational variation. Primary 
reports of international and domestic groups will be used to ascertain the role IEM played 
in each election. Internal political and societal conditions following the elections will be 
analyzed in greater detail to gage any progress towards reform. At the end of each case 
study, conclusions will be drawn as to the relation of the varying structural and 
intervening variables.  
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 This study is limited in two main ways. First, as with any qualitative analysis, 
case selection bias is an inherent limitation. However, the case selection covers a wide 
range of structural conditions, many of which are commonly found in a number of other 
states beyond Sub-Saharan Africa; the result is the enhanced applicability of this study. 
Second, this study is limited by the fact that the author has never visited the region, and 
therefore lacks firsthand knowledge of the internal conditions in each case.  Given this 
constraint, this study will employ an academic approach toward assessing the structural 
conditions and will rely upon a number of primary sources in the evaluation of IEM on 
internal political reform. With an understanding that IEM is not the only feature in the 
reform process, the study will remain sensitive to the cultural dynamics of each case. 
Although these limitations exist, they do not significantly undermine the analysis or 
applicability of this study. 
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Chapter 3: Botswana 
I. Overview 
In a region that has historically grappled with problems of severe economic 
underdevelopment, political instability, and civil strife, Botswana is viewed by many to 
be the exception of southern Africa. Despite being amongst the poorest nations of the 
world at its independence in 1966, Botswana has managed a remarkable economic 
turnaround and is now classified by the World Bank as an “upper-middle-income 
economy.”1 Political developments in Botswana have also been significant.  Following 
independence from the British, Botswana transitioned peacefully into a self-governing 
state and has since remained a stable democracy, holding multiparty elections every five 
years. Botswana’s elections are considered by numerous scholars to be amongst the freest 
and fairest in all of Africa.2 Although certain critical challenges remain for democracy in 
Botswana, such as the under-representation of minority groups, for the most part 
favorable, political culture and economic conditions are noteworthy. 
A landlocked country in southern Africa, Botswana is roughly 220,000 square 
miles, comparable in size to France or Texas.3 Botswana neighbors the Republic of South 
Africa to the south, Namibia to the west and north, Zimbabwe to the northeast; and 
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Zambia on its northern border, at a single point on the Zambezi river.4 The population of 
Botswana is approximately 1.6 million;5 however, it is concentrated in the northeastern 
part of Botswana,6 as the Kalahari Desert makes up 84 percent of the terrain.7 In fact, 80 
percent of the population lives near the eastern border, along a rail line that links 
Zimbabwe and South Africa.8 On account of its semi-arid climate, a large majority of the 
land is suitable only for grazing. Consequently, cattle raising has traditionally been of 
particular economic importance. Compared to other African states, Botswana is 
ethnically homogeneous. Indeed, nearly 80 percent of the population belongs to the 
Tswana tribe,9 which consists of about eight sub-groups also described as individual 
tribes—the Bangwato (or Bamangwato), Batawana, Bangwaketse, Bakwena, Balete, 
Bakgatla, Barolong and Batlokwa.10 Linguistically, Botswana is also quite homogeneous. 
According to CIA statistics, about 80 percent of Batswana speak Setswana;11 another 
scholar suggests the number of Setswana speakers could be as high as 90 percent.12 Some 
credit the post-independence success of Botswana to this homogeneity, while others point 
to its unique colonial legacy and pre-colonial structures, wise policies and institutions, or 
prudent and skillful leadership. 
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This chapter seeks to examine IEM’s ability to facilitate internal political reform 
during the 1999 and 2004 National Assembly elections in Botswana, exploring the effects 
of conditioning variables on the outcome. It will evaluate H1 and H2, which suggest that 
the impact of IEM on the reform process is expected to be positive, reflecting the 
generally encouraging structural conditions. It will also assess the characteristics of the 
international electoral observers and analyze their ability to engender political reform 
over the course of two elections. This chapter will begin with a brief survey of the 
political and social conditions in Botswana. It will then proceed with an economic 
overview, and a description of the current political and social structures in Botswana. The 
second part of the chapter will focus on the independent and dependent variables, that is, 
the role of external monitors in the push towards greater political reform in Botswana. It 
will examine the National Assembly elections of 1999 and 2004, as they are the most 
recent national elections and are significant for a number of reasons that will be discussed 
below. The implications of this finding for the hypotheses of this study will be considered 
in the conclusion section of this chapter. 
 
II. The Political and Social Context 
 British colonial rule of the Bechuanaland Protectorate (present-day Botswana) 
was unlike that of any other British colony. Described by one scholar as “so mild that 
even the term ‘indirect rule’ would be an exaggeration,”13 British governance of 
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Bechuanaland was comparable to “benign neglect.”14 This colonial policy meant little 
investment in the educational, social, and physical infrastructure of Bechuanaland. The 
Protectorate thus became “a satellite political entity with no development of its own but 
with a strong link to South Africa through communication infrastructure, markets, and 
labor migration.”15 Additionally, the negotiations between British officials and Tswana 
tribal chiefs that led to the creation of the Protectorate ensured that aspects of traditional 
tribal structures would be reflected in the colonial administration.  
 By the time the British altered their policies towards the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate in the mid-1930s, and sought to establish a greater authority within the 
colony, it was already too late. The onset of the Second World War further strained the 
colonial budget and prevented the British from implementing their desired policies. By 
the time the war had ended, rising nationalism in South Africa and Botswana led the 
British colonial administration to officially abandon its aim for Bechuanaland to be 
absorbed into South Africa.16  
 Nationalist sentiment in the Bechuanaland Protectorate was exacerbated in 1948 
by British attempts to prevent the return of Bangwato chief Seretse Khama, who had been 
studying in Britain. His marriage to a white English woman had enraged the white South 
African leadership, leading the British to impose his exile.17 Khama rescinded his claims 
to the tribal chieftainship in 1956, and returned to Bechuanaland. Over the following 
years, Khama actively involved himself in politics. He formed the Bechuanaland 
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Democratic Party (BDP) in response to the Bechuanaland People’s Party (BPP),18 an 
urban-based party that adopted an extreme anti-colonial and anti-apartheid stance.19 The 
BDP appealed to a broader base of Bechuanaland society, as it integrated the newly 
emerging educated elite with the traditional tribal structures.20 Growing nationalism and 
emerging political parties in Bechuanaland and across the British Empire made the 
maintenance of colonial control a costly endeavor; thus, the British embarked on a 
process of decolonization. In March 1965, Botswana’s first elections were held, and the 
BDP won a landslide electoral victory. A year later, in September 1966, Botswana gained 
its independence and Khama became Botswana’s first president. 
 When Khama assumed his presidency, he faced numerous challenges. In addition 
to economic insecurity, which will be addressed in the next section, he faced three main 
political obstacles. Threats to the new democratic state arose from tribal chiefs, the white 
settler community, and neighboring white settler regimes hostile to Botswana’s inclusive 
democracy.21 However, Khama’s unique position as former chief of the Bangwato with a 
European education and an interracial marriage enhanced his ability to co-opt moderate 
tribal chiefs and white settlers into his BDP. As local governing institutions, unions, and 
civil society groups arose, the state maintained a strong influence over them.22 The 
centralization of power under Khama’s government, though helpful in facing internal and 
external threats, ultimately stunted the growth of an independent civil society.  
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 Under Khama, the BDP won three more electoral victories. In 1969, a new 
opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF) surpassed the BPP as the primary 
opposition party. When Khama died in 1980, the presidency fell to his deputy, Quett 
Masire. Masire continued the political and economic consolidation of Botswana, and 
pushed for several important electoral reforms, such as the creation of an independent 
electoral administration body and a lower voting age.23 Although such reforms were not 
put into place until the elections of 1999 (two years after Masire’s retirement), his 
administration played an important role in making these reforms possible. Also during 
the Masire administration, the opposition movements gained strength. In 1994, the BNF 
gained ten seats in the National Assembly.24 Civil society movements advocating for 
women and minority rights also strengthened. 
 When Masire retired from office in 1997, the office of the president passed to the 
vice president, Festus Mogae.25 He remains in office today. Mogae’s presidency has 
focused especially on labor and economic reforms along with poverty alleviation.26 Calls 
for broad restructuring of the tribal administration at the local level, and electoral system 
reforms are also important issues of Mogae’s presidency.27 These calls reflect a push for 
more inclusive policies towards women and minorities. Generally, socio-political 
conditions in Botswana are among the most favorable in Africa, evidenced by four 
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decades of a stable, multiparty democracy and an absence of violent civil conflict; 
however, these continuing pressures for reform suggest more progress is necessary.  
 
III. The Economic Context: Historically and Today 
 In addition to socio-political effects, British colonial neglect generated economic 
constraints as well. The most important economic feature of British rule was the hut tax. 
This one pound tax, which was instituted in 1899, was later “increased by the addition of 
a three shillings ‘native tax’ in 1919.”28 In order to pay these taxes, many Batswana 
entered the labor market, often relocating and working in the mines South Africa. Indeed, 
“at its peak in 1943, the emigration of Botswanan men into South Africa for employment 
reached nearly 50 percent of the adult male population.”29 The absence of a large portion 
of the Batswana population exacerbated the already deficient social, physical, and 
economic infrastructure. Consumer demand decreased; women undertook a greater 
domestic burden; tribal political structures, such as the kgotla, also suffered.30 The 
colonial legacy was doubly felt by the population—British taxes placed an even greater 
strain on the already neglected economic, educational, political, social, and physical 
infrastructure.  
 Accordingly, at independence, Botswana was severely economically under-
developed, and among the poorest countries in the world. For example, “when the British 
left, there were 12 kilometers of paved road, 22 Batswana who had graduated from a 
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University and 100 from secondary school.”31 On account of the predominantly 
uneducated population, nearly three quarters of civil servants were expatriate workers.32 
The country was highly dependent on foreign aid and imports, and dismissed by many as 
a lost economic cause.                                                                                                                                     
Yet, Botswana has managed a surprising economic turnaround. In fact, its annual 
GDP growth rates from 1966 to 1991 were among the highest in the world.33 This 
transformation can be seen as the product of several factors. The discovery of diamonds 
and other valuable natural resources in the years following independence proved a huge 
boon to the Botswanan economy. In 1975, Khama’s government renegotiated the mining 
agreement with DeBeers, securing 50 percent of all diamond profits.34 Wise policies on 
the part of the government ensured these new and large revenues were invested in 
building up the physical and social infrastructure. The National Development Plan 
(NDP), a series of five year development programs first instituted in 1966, has 
significantly transformed Botswana.35  
In the decades since independence, NDPs have focused on improving 
employment, rural development, education and health.36 Significant gains in employment 
were witnessed between 1970 and 1990 and such “increased employment has 
significantly improved incomes in both urban and rural areas.”37 However, in recent 
years, unemployment has been on the rise, and those most affected are women, youth, 
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and unskilled laborers.38 The government has also implemented a variety of policies 
targeting the poor quality of life for the Batswana living in rural areas. Though they have 
met with success in enhancing physical infrastructure and access to water in rural areas, 
many challenges remain as rural underdevelopment persists.39  
Despite the mixed success of employment and rural development policies, 
significant progress has be achieved in the arenas of health and education. In the last two 
decades, the Botswanan government has spent nearly 40 percent of its yearly budget in 
the area of social development.40 The result of this is telling. Educational statistics show 
that “by the mid-1990s, 83 percent of primary school-aged children were attending 
school. Some 35 percent were attending junior secondary school and about 25 percent 
senior secondary school.”41 Consequently, the literacy rate in Botswana is now close to 
80 percent.42  
Healthcare in Botswana has also improved. 85 percent of the population is now 
estimated to live within “a fifteen-kilometer walking distance from the nearest health 
facility.”43  Sanitary waste disposal facilities and clean drinking water access are reaching 
more and more of the population, over 55 and 40 percent, respectively.44 However, an 
educational and health disparity exists between the rural and urban populations, with 
those outside of urban centers generally worse off. Additionally, the prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS presents a critical challenge, as Botswana has the world’s second-highest 
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infection rate.45 Still, the government has acknowledged and is committed to fighting  
this pandemic.   A partnership with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
pharmaceutical company Merck has enabled Botswana to offer antiretroviral medication 
to anyone in need—a first for any African country.46 These and other policies designed to 
fight HIV/AIDS offer some opportunities for hope, amidst a growing problem. 
On a continent where underdevelopment is generally the norm, Botswana has 
managed to transform its economy into one of the strongest in all of Africa. While 
diamond-generated wealth certainly has enabled this transformation, good economic 
policies and political governance have also driven this change. However, persistent 
problems of unemployment, inequality, poverty and HIV/AIDS (which is devastating at 
such high levels) threaten to undo decades of economic progress. 
 
IV. Current Political and Social Structures 
A. The Botswanan Constitution—Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Structures 
 The constitution of the Republic of Botswana was written in March of 1965 and 
enacted at its independence in September 1966.47 It established a parliamentary republic 
with a separation of powers between the three branches of government, the executive, 
legislative, and judicial. The executive branch is headed by the president, who is elected 
by the National Assembly and is the head of government, the head of state, and the 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces.48 The Parliament of Botswana, the primary 
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legislative authority, consists of the National Assembly and a House of Chiefs. Because 
the House of Chiefs has no legislative powers, and is largely advisory, some categorize 
the Botswana legislature as unicameral, others as bicameral.  The judiciary consists of an 
independent high court along with other district and appellate courts, and is charged with 
interpreting the constitution and enforcing its human rights protections.49  
 The president of Botswana is, as was aforementioned, elected by the National 
Assembly, rather than by popular vote. The president must be a citizen of Botswana by 
birth.50 He must also be at least thirty years of age and fulfill the qualifications for 
election to the National Assembly.51 The president is elected to a five-year term, of which 
he can serve no more than two.52 The BDP has controlled the executive for over thirty 
years, despite a smooth transfer of executive power. In addition to the president, a twenty 
person cabinet, members of which are appointed from the majority party in the National 
Assembly by the chief executive, acts as an advisory body.53 The president heads the 
cabinet and is not required to consult the parliament on the appointment of its members.54 
According to Bauer and Taylor, the size and composition of the cabinet enable it to 
“completely dominat[e] the country’s National Assembly and effectively blun[t] any 
trend towards parliamentary autonomy.”55 
 Following a redistricting of constituency boundaries in 2002, the number of 
members of parliament (MPs) in the National Assembly increased from 40 to 57. In 
                                                 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Botswana Const Chapter IV, § I, cl. 33. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid., Chapter IV, § I, cl. 33. 
53
 Ibid., Chapter IV, § II, cl. 42. 
54
 Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, 94. 
55
 Ibid., 89. 
  
44
addition to these popularly elected MPs, four other “specially elected members” are 
selected by the president.56 Although this often cements the ruling party’s majority within 
the legislature, these MPs can enhance the representation of women in government. 
Indeed, in 1994 half of the four additional MPs were women.57 Traditional tribal 
structures have also been integrated into the legislative system. For example, the kgotla, a 
consultative assembly consisting of the adults in the tribal community, convenes to 
discuss important community issues or voice any criticisms. In addition to tribal district 
councils and kgotlas at the local level, the House of Chiefs exists as a formal, but only 
advisory, role for tribal chiefs in the parliament.58 This fifteen-person body consists of 
eight chiefs from the each of the main Tswana subgroups, four elected members from 
specific locales, and three other members elected by the House.59 The House of Chiefs 
does not maintain any law-making capacities, and in its advisory capacity, has little effect 
on the decisions of the National Assembly. However, the House serves as a channel that 
links the kgotlas of rural society to the national legislature,60 and thus contributes to 
successful governance across the country. Still, it is important to note the large extent to 
which the executive can influence the legislature, particularly via his cabinet and strong 
party loyalties. 
 Although the legislature is subject, to a certain extent, to executive will, the 
judiciary remains independent from external influence. Since independence, Botswana 
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has maintained a dual legal system, where customary law exists alongside a more modern 
judicial system based upon the Roman Dutch legal tradition.61 The Roman Dutch 
tradition is enshrined in common and statutory law and is administered by magistrate 
courts, a high court, and a court of appeals.62 Customary courts deal primarily with civil 
or penal law and are presided over by local chiefs and tribal authorities.63 As is the case 
in the legislature, the preservation of the traditional structures has allowed the state to 
govern more effectively by merging familiar tribal laws and practices with those of the 
modern state. 
B. The Electoral System 
 The electoral system is quite important in this case study, perhaps more so than 
any other structural variable. The simple but problematic First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) 
system is used in Botswana. Under this simple plurality system, voters in each 
constituency in Botswana elect the candidate to the National Assembly who garners the 
most votes. An absolute majority is not necessary for electoral success. There are some 
advantages to this system. First, the FPTP structure often gives rise to “a duopolistic 
party system… [and] it presents a clear choice [for] voters between the two main 
parties.”64 The simplicity of this system is advantageous in Africa, where voter education 
is often inadequate. Additionally, the FPTP system, as compared to the more complex 
proportional representation system, links MPs directly to their constituencies, which can 
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enhance accountability.65 Yet, the FPTP system has problematic characteristics as well. 
The dominance of two parties fosters the exclusion of minority parties from and the 
under-representation of women in the government.66 Moreover, as is evidenced in the 
case of Botswana, the simple plurality system facilitates one-party dominance. The BDP, 
for example, garnered only 54.3 percent of the vote in the 1999 election, but gained 82.5 
percent of National Assembly seats.67 This skewed representation is most common under 
the FPTP system, and is therefore especially problematic for political reform in 
Botswana. 
C. Political Parties and Civil Society 
 Despite its long history of multiparty elections, the BDP dominates politics in 
Botswana. Certainly aided by economic success, the BDP has won every election since 
independence. Nevertheless, the electoral dominance of the BDP has declined in recent 
years. The percentage of the vote has declined in the last decade and a half, from nearly 
65 percent in 1989 to 51 percent in 2004.68 Additionally, corruption scandals have tainted 
the historically clear reputation of the BDP; some attribute these developments to the 
BDP’s lower showing during the elections of the 1990s. During this time, the number of 
opposition parties also grew. Up until the mid-1990s, the primary challengers of the BDP 
included the BNF, BPP, and the Botswana Independence Party (BIP). In 1999, factions 
within the BNF led to the creation of two new rival groups, the Botswana Congress Party 
(BCP) and the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM). Yet, the BDP and these opposition 
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groups have, at times, suffered from internal divisions and leadership problems, which 
have generally undermined their respective electoral success.  In addition to internal 
political problems, opposition political parties in Botswana face structural impediments. 
The incumbent party enjoys unequal access to government-controlled media. For 
example, the state-owned Daily News paper and Radio Botswana have been widely 
accused of favoring the BDP in their coverage.69 Ultimately, multiparty politics in 
Botswana, while certainly not ineffectual, is challenged by growing factionalism within 
parties and the structural deficiencies of the FPTP system, which makes it difficult for 
multiple parties to win representation. 
 Civil society in Botswana has been growing since the early 1990s. Still, these 
groups face a number of challenges common in states across southern Africa, namely, 
funding, staffing, and membership shortages.70 In Botswana, civil society groups face a 
further challenge. According to some scholars, “the government has in some respects 
monitored the growth of civil society, mandating that organizations register with the 
government, but only after meeting certain requirements.”71 In some cases, as civil 
society groups search for funding and other resources, they become co-opted by the state, 
diminishing their influence and independence.  
This is not the case, however, for all civil society groups. Women’s organizations 
are among the most active and prominent groups in Botswana today. Throughout the 
1980s, women’s groups campaigned for more inclusive citizenship laws, which had 
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stipulated that the citizenship of the father was the determinant for the citizenship of the 
child.72 During the 1994 election, such organizations strongly pushed for more expansive 
women’s rights guarantees, in both the constitutions of political parties and the national 
policy arenas.73 Other civil society groups have arisen, including organizations promoting 
human and indigenous rights. Much activity has arisen around the issue of the 
aforementioned forced evacuations of the San tribesmen.  
Trade unions, which play a large role in neighboring states such as Zimbabwe, are 
noticeably weak in Botswana. This results from several factors, including, the large 
emigration of labor to South Africa during colonialism, the small scale of 
industrialization, poor organization and leadership, and the prohibition of strikes.74 This 
is not so say, however, that unions will remain marginal civil society actors. Since the 
BNF garners many of its supporters from these urban groups, it is presumed that as BNF 
representation in parliament grows, the strength of the labor movement will also grow.75  
 While Botswana faces several important challenges, it remains a stable and 
relatively successful multiparty democracy. Since independence, each national election 
has been widely considered free and fair. Electoral legitimacy, both within and outside 
Botswana, is perceived to be high. According to Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, Botswana was ranked least corrupt in all of Africa.76 Societal and 
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political conditions are generally conducive to further internal political reform, despite 
lingering challenges. 
 
V. IEM and the Election of 1999 
A. The Electoral Context 
 Botswana’s parliamentary election of 1999 was significant for several reasons. 
First, the BDP was able to maintain its electoral dominance, despite losses in the previous 
election. Significant gains by the BNF, the primary opposition party, in the 1994 election 
initially shook the governing BDP and sparked further divisions within the party as many 
feared further losses in the 1999.77 When increasing factions among the BDP threatened 
eventual loss of a parliamentary majority in the upcoming election, President Masire 
managed to pass a constitutional amendment that allowed Festus Mogae, then vice 
president and Minister of Finance and Development Planning, to succeed to the 
Presidency, upon his resignation in 1998. Mogae’s choice of Ian Khama, son of Seretse 
Khama, managed to reconcile the divisions within the BDP in time for the 1999 
elections.78 The reconciliation of factions within the BDP, combined with growing 
divisions among opposition parties, enabled the BDP to regain a number of seats in the 
National Assembly. The progress of the opposition movements in the 1994 election was 
undermined as internal rifts resulted when a faction of the BNF split to form the BCP.79 
In late 1998 and early 1999, progress was further undermined when the BNF and BCP 
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failed to join the BAM, an opposition electoral alliance.80 This effectively split any 
opposition to the BDP and hindered chances for significant electoral gains. 
 Second, the election of 1999 was also significant because it was the first vote in 
which the three major electoral amendments of an October 1997 referendum were 
enacted. The voting age was lowered by three years, to age eighteen. Batswana living 
outside the country, especially in South Africa, were allowed to vote via an absentee 
ballot; and, perhaps most importantly, the vote was to be administered by an Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC). The IEC replaced the Supervisor of Election, which had 
generated much controversy regarding his independence from the executive, as he was 
appointed directly by the President.81 The seven commissioners of the IEC are chosen at 
a meeting of all registered parties (an All-Party Conference), and have been given clear 
orders to “[ensure] that elections are conducted efficiently, properly, freely, and fairly.”82 
These three electoral changes significantly expanded the number of registered voters,83 
and marked significant progress in internal political reform. 
During the 1999 National Assembly elections in Botswana, only one international 
observer group was present. Upon invitation by the IEC, the Electoral Commissions 
Forum (ECF) of the SADC sent a seven member observer mission team. The purpose of 
the ECF mission was: 
to consider the various factors that may alter the credibility of the electoral 
process as a whole; to ascertain whether conditions exist for a free 
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expression of the voters’ will; and to make recommendation as to how the 
[IEC] of Botswana and other electoral role-players could improve the 
management of elections in the future.84 
 
Given such purposes, the observers were to meet with members of the IEC, the Botswana 
government, political parties, media, NGOs and other domestic civil society groups that 
played a role in the elections.85 Upon complete of their mission, the election monitors 
were to present a report of their findings to the ECF, IEC, and other interested groups. 
B. The Pre-Election Period 
 Due to financial and time limitations, the ECF was unable to directly observe all 
phases of the electoral process. Therefore, pre-election observation was done by members 
of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), a non-profit organization committed 
to promoting credible elections and governance in the region.86 This research team, led 
by Dr. Staffan Darnolf covered the pre-electoral and post-electoral phases of the 1999 
election, gathering information and reporting on related activities.87 The EISA team 
published their pre-election findings monthly from August until October 1999. They 
provided details on “voter registration, the compilation of party lists, party registration, 
election campaigns, media coverage of the elections and the results.”88 
 In the run-up to the October vote, two major issues proved problematic for the 
IEC. First, problems arose over the national identification card required for voter 
registration, the Omang. Difficulties and delays that the national registration office 
experienced in printing new or renewed Omangs were compounded by the increased 
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number of newly-eligible voters seeking identification cards.89 Having recognized this 
problem, the government amended the electoral law to permit expired Omangs as valid 
identification for voter registration. Consequently, nearly half of all eligible voters, 
approximately 460,000, were registered to vote. 
 Due in large part to these high registration numbers, the IEC was unable to 
complete the compilation and certification of a supplementary voters roll by the time the 
president issued a writ of election on August 26, 1999. According to Botswana electoral 
law, the date of the election is kept secret until it is announced by the president, at which 
point the parliament is dissolved and any uncertified voters’ rolls become invalid.90 When 
the president announced the date of the 1999 election, there were 67,000 names on an 
uncertified voters’ roll, all of whom became ineligible to vote.91 Consequently, a state of 
emergency was declared in September by the President Mogae, who recalled parliament 
and amended the Electoral Act to allow for the certification of the remaining roll. 
Although the situation was rectified, the miscommunication between the president and 
the IEC revealed potential problems in the administration and fairness of future elections. 
 The second problem during the pre-election period was controversy over the 
validity of Prseident Mogae’s nomination. Under the law, all presidential candidates have 
twenty days to turn their nominations into the High Court in Lobatse, once the writ of 
election has been announced.92 By the time this period had ended on September 18, 1999, 
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President Mogae’s papers were submitted by members of his staff without his signature.93 
Despite his incomplete nomination, the Chief Justice ruled Mogae’s nomination papers 
were eligible in spite of this, declaring his nomination and those from the BAM, BCP, 
and BNF candidates valid.94 This inconsistency generated many calls from the opposition 
that Mogae’s candidacy for the BDP was indeed invalid, casting some doubt on the 
fairness of the process. 
 According to pre-election reports, voter education programs were, according to 
both EISA and domestic NGOs, inadequate in explaining new voting procedures. Initial 
reluctance on the part of the IEC to undertake such programs resulted in an unclear 
mandate and insufficient measures. Working with youth and women’s groups, religious 
institutions, human rights organizations, and other domestic groups, the IEC conducted a 
voter education campaign primarily via posters, radio broadcasts, print media, and the 
kgotla.95 Unlike previous elections, the 1999 elections were done via ballot papers, rather 
than the costly but easy to understand colored disks that had been used up to that point. 
According to some NGOs, the IEC hampered voter education efforts by not providing a 
sample ballot; the IEC did, however, report to international observers that it had 
distributed samples.96 Regardless, voter education was not undertaken in the most 
effective manner by the IEC, NGOs, and political parties alike, and thus the high 
frequency of spoilt ballots is no surprise. 
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 On October 7, 1999, the ECF observer mission arrived in Botswana and continued 
EISA’s pre-election monitoring efforts. The team met with the IEC, political party 
representatives, NGOs, and various media outlets. During this time, monitors also 
observed campaign rallies. These rallies were for the most part poorly attended, and 
observers found “the general public seemed visibly indifferent towards the campaigns.”97 
Motorcade campaigns were more successful at attracting participants; however, 
attendance at campaign events was generally low.98 The ruling BDP party did use the 
kgotla as a forum for campaigning. Yet, Botswana law, which limits those who can 
request that a chief summon a kgotla, effectively prohibited the opposition from using 
these forums.99 The use of kgotlas, and the alleged use of campaign money from DeBeers 
and public resources,100 has generated claims of unequal access to electoral resources 
between the ruling and opposition parties. Still, the campaign was remarkably peaceful 
and no reports of violence were reported by ECF observers during the pre-election 
period. 
C. October 16, 1999: The Vote, Count, and Results 
 ECF monitors observed the voting and counting of 55 polling states in Botswana. 
On the day of the poll, monitors arrived at voting stations in Gaborone, Francistown, and 
Lobatse well before the scheduled 6:30am opening time, in order to observe preliminary 
electoral procedures.101 Monitors observed the opening of ballot boxes, the confirmation 
that they were empty, and the resealing of the boxes. Voting could begin at 6:30am, once 
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these procedures were complete; and, for the most part, polling states opened on time. 
The poll was conducted according to electoral law,102 and in a generally peaceful 
environment. To ensure even greater transparency and expedite the voter identification 
process, polling staff and political party members were given a copy of the voters roll.103 
Monitors noted the thorough and efficient distribution of voting materials, as well as a 
fair representation of women and youths among polling staff and party members. 104  
 Monitors did however note several problems during the election. First, the voting 
process was slow and inefficient. Insufficient voter education about voting procedures 
necessitated on-site explanations of the new ballot system.105 The use of uniform and 
statewide ballot papers created further voter confusion; in some constituencies, for 
example, parties that were not standing for election in that district were still present on 
the uniform ballot.106 Voter confusion was further compounded by ill-timed inking 
procedures. Rather having their fingers inked upon completion of voting, voters were 
often inked before voting, as the new procedures were being explained to them. This not 
only distracted voters from the new voting instructions, but increased the chance of a 
spoilt ballot, as additional marks from the ink were often left on the paper.107 Other 
difficulties during polling included inadequate communication between the IEC and 
polling stations over the presence and rights of international monitors, as well as a failure 
to update the ballots or inform the electorate that one BNF candidate was no longer 
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standing in the election.108  Complications also arose over IEC permission for journalists 
to observe the polling stations, and journalists without IEC introduction letters were 
unable to gather information about the election.109 Monitors cited the slow and inefficient 
vote, as well as complications for domestic and international observers as the key 
problems during the vote itself. 
 When most polls closed at 7:00pm, the counting began. Problems and 
inefficiencies were noted in a limited number of cases. First, the use of centralized 
counting offices for each constituency meant that counting could not begin until all boxes 
had arrived.110 This delayed the counting and announcement of the results significantly. 
Further delays were observed in Lobatse, where there were no established procedures for 
dividing the work between verifiers and counters.111 However, when the results were 
announced, over 77 percent of registered voters (between 39 to 44 percent of all eligible 
voters) had turned out on election day.112 The BDP, once again, won the 1999 
parliamentary elections, winning nearly 55 percent of the vote, and 33 of 40 seats in the 
National Assembly. The party also, therefore, garnered the four seats of the “specially 
elected” MPs. The BNF won six seats in the parliament, and the BCP won only one seat. 
The BAM and MELS parties failed to win any seats. Notably, six female MPs were 
elected to the National Assembly; when combined with the two specially elected MPs, 
the total number of women in parliament was double that of 1994. 
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D. IEM Findings and Recommendations 
Upon their departure on October 19, the international election monitors released a 
press statement with some of their preliminary findings. They later presented their 
findings in a report to the ECF, which was forwarded to the IEC. Though monitors 
commended the IEC and found the elections to be free, fair, and reflective of popular 
will, they did make several important recommendations. These recommendations reflect 
problems and inefficiencies noted during all stages of the electoral process. 
First, ECF monitors recommended that IEC commissioners be appointed for longer 
terms of office.113 This would allow commissioners to devote greater attention to the 
electoral process, rather than having to also focus on winning another selection to the 
IEC. Second, monitors also stressed the need for clearer communication between the IEC 
and the president, so as to avoid the state of emergency that occurred during the 1999 
elections.114 Third, the ECF observers recommended the presidential nomination period 
be extended in order to give all candidates sufficient time to submit their nominations and 
avoid future controversy over the validity of party candidacies.115 Fourth, in response to 
difficulties during the pre-election and election period that arose over inadequate voter 
education, monitors also suggested the need for more substantial and effective voter 
education programs.116 The IEC, with the assistance of political parties, NGOs and other 
domestic groups, should devote greater resources to voting procedure awareness. Fifth, 
monitors recommended the national uniform ballot be replaced by ballots printed per 
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constituency (after all candidates have been certified).117 Sixth, complaints regarding the 
unequal access to and use of kgotla meetings by the ruling party should, according to 
monitors, be addressed. Monitors made no indication of how this should be done, but 
instead suggested that the “Batswana themselves should decide how best to use these 
reputed non-political gatherings.”118 Finally, ECF monitors suggested that counting be 
done and results announced at each of the polling stations, rather than at centralized 
locations, so as to expedite the counting process.119 
 
VI. IEM and the Election of 2004 
A. The Electoral Context 
 Unlike the 1999 elections, the 2004 parliamentary elections in Botswana were 
observed several groups.120 The IEC and Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited EISA to 
send an IEM mission for the October 24, 2004 elections. Although this mission was sent 
under the auspices of EISA, it was led by a member of the 1999 ECF observer mission, 
Denis Kadima. The 22 member EISA team included representatives from a number of 
African states, including Angola, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe.121 Although other groups were involved in observation efforts, the EISA 
                                                 
117
 Ibid., 30. 
118
 Ibid. 
119
 Ibid. 
120
 The international groups involved in observation of the vote include: EISA, the UK Parliamentary 
Group, the AU, and the SADC Parliamentary Forum. For further information of observer groups see, 
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Botswana Parliamentary and Local Government Elections, 30 
October 2004, 43. 
121
 Ibid., vii. 
  
59
mission the only publically available report and will thus be used in evaluating the 2004 
election and IEM efforts. 
 The EISA observers had objectives similar to those of the 1999 ECF mission. The 
EISA mission hoped to: 
Assess whether conditions existed for the conduct of elections that would 
reflect the will of the people of Botswana; to assess whether the elections 
were conducted in accordance with the electoral legislative framework of 
Botswana; to assess whether the election met the benchmarks set out in 
[the Principles for Electoral Management, Monitoring and Observation 
(PEMMO)], developed under the auspices of EISA and the ECF of the 
SADC.122 
 
Monitors arrived in the capital one week before the poll, on October 23 2004. The 
activities of the EISA monitors were similar to the 1994 observers and included meetings 
with IEC officials, political parties, civil society groups and NGOs.  Monitors also 
attended political party rallies and related meetings. 
Like the 1999 election, the 2004 election occurred under peaceful conditions. 
Again, there was real interest in whether opposition groups would be able to challenge 
the long-standing dominance of the BDP.  The 2004 elections were notable because the 
number of seats in the National Assembly was increased from 40 to 57, following a 
census and redistricting of constituencies in 2002.  Aside from this change, the electoral 
laws remained essentially the same as in 1999.  
B. The Pre-Election Period 
 Like the ECF mission of 1994, the EISA mission was limited in its pre-election 
coverage by funding shortages. Again, researchers based in Botswana were used to 
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conduct much of the research and analysis of electoral developments leading up to the 
October vote. According to Kadima, “this information was published fortnightly in the 
Election Update series, which was extensively disseminated electronically and in 
print.”123  
 During the All Party Conference to designate IEC commissioners, a majority of 
opposition parties walked out, alleging the ruling BDP had ignored many of their 
concerns. The aims of the boycotting parties included “the public funding of political 
parties, the introduction of proportional representation, and the IEC’s independence [from 
the direction and supervision of a presidentially-appointed secretary].”124 Because the All 
Party Conference failed to reach an agreement on IEC membership, the Judicial Service 
Committee was, by law, charged with the selection of all seven IEC members.125 
Other developments in the pre-election period included an increase in the number 
of polling stations. 44 stations were established to address problems of low voter turnout, 
with the aim of making such facilities more accessible to the electorate.126 This change 
necessitated an update of existing voters’ rolls. In order to generate these new rolls, voter 
registration occurred during November 2003, nearly a year before the scheduled election. 
From November 2003, until the certification of the voters’ rolls in July 2004, 
approximately 550,000 voters had been registered. Candidate nominations took place on 
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September 24, 2004.127 Twelve political parties were represented among the 178 
candidates, and two candidates ran as independents.128  
In response to IEM recommendations and a 2001 voter apathy study, the IEC 
launched an extensive voter education campaign, in conjunction with various civil society 
groups, political parties, religious organizations, and the media.129 Despite the popularity 
of an IEC-produced election song, which was broadcast widely via radio and television, 
these attempts were again insufficient.130  
Monitors noted the electoral campaigns of the political parties proceeded in a 
peaceful and tolerant manner.131 Generally, the campaigns were carried out in a manner 
similar to the 1999 election. Posters, motorcades, and political rallies were again used to 
attract voters. The BDP again had the most visible campaign. EISA observers noted no 
signs of intimidation or violence, even when public spaces were double-booked by 
opposing political parties.132 They did observe, however, that the government-controlled 
media occasionally censored stories or sources “deemed undesirable;”133 again, the BDP 
dominated media coverage in the state-owned media. 
C. October 30, 2004: The Vote, Count, and Results 
 On election day, EISA monitors visited 113 polling stations. Like their counter-
parts in 1999, they arrived at these stations before the scheduled 6:30am opening, in order 
to observe initial procedures. All observed stations opened on time, aside from one 
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polling station, which opened at 7:15am.134 Ballot papers used in the 2004 election were 
specific to each constituency and these materials were distributed efficiently.135 The 
increased number of polling stations also aided in the efficiency of the vote, even though 
some polling stations were substantially more crowded than others.136 The staff members 
at each polling station were observed to be highly professional, and representative of 
women; security for each station was also “effective and discreet.”137 Unlike the 1999 
elections, monitors and party agents had little impediments to their activity at the polling 
stations.138 EISA worked in conjunction with other IEM groups and the participation of 
both international and domestic observers further increased the transparency and 
legitimacy of the election. 
 When the polls closed at 7:00pm—and observers noted this was the case for most 
stations—the counting and verification began. The sealed ballot boxes were again 
transmitted to centralized counting stations by the returning officer, and under the 
observation of party members and election observers.139 Observers noted that there were 
several miscounts due to human error, likely caused by fatigue; however, these errors 
were caught and immediately rectified.140 However, the counting process was 
unnecessarily slow and election results were announced on the morning of November 1, 
2004, only one day before the scheduled presidential inauguration.141  
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 The BDP again won decisively, garnering 44 of the 57 seats in the National 
Assembly. The BNF won twelve seats, doubling the number of seats won in 1999. The 
BCP again won only one seat. Many have suggested that the BDP’s electoral dominance 
was the result of the opposition’s inability to form a coalition and prevent a split of the 
vote.  
D. IEM Findings and Recommendations 
 EISA monitors concluded that overall, the parliamentary elections of 2004 were 
“free and to a large extent fair, with room for improvement to further enhance the 
fairness.”142 In their final report, EISA monitors made several important 
recommendations. First, and most importantly, they called for change in the FPTP 
electoral system, so as to allow greater representation of women, and other minority 
groups.143 Indeed, the number of women in parliament declined after the 2004 vote to 
four MPs, evidencing the EISA’s conclusion of the need for changes in electoral law. 
Second, monitors cited the need for fairer electoral competition. They recommended the 
monitoring or prohibition of the use state resources by the incumbent party; public 
funding of political parties; and balanced media coverage of parties.144 Third, in regards 
to the processes on election day, the monitors made recommendations that the date of the 
election should be provided for in law, rather than upon presidential announcement, and 
it should be declared a public holiday, allowing more citizens the opportunity to vote.145 
Finally, like the observers of 1999, EISA monitors asserted the need for counting the 
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ballots at each polling station, rather than at a centralized location, so as to expedite the 
announcement of the results.146 The similar recommendations of both the 1999 and 2004 
monitors reveal that, although internal political reform has come a long way in Botswana, 
more changes need to be made to ensure an even freer and fairer vote. 
 
VII. Conclusions and Implications 
Earlier in this study, it was proposed that IEM would be of greatest effect in 
Botswana because the structural conditions were most favorable for free and fair 
elections. However, the role and impact of monitors in encouraging internal political 
reform during the 1999 and 2004 elections was, in reality, very limited. Monitors 
generally found the 1999 and 2004 elections to be free and fair, and made a number of 
recommendations for greater internal political reform. IEM proved neither a significant 
impetus for political reform, outside of a supervisory capacity, nor a detriment to the 
outcome of either election. While some of the 1999 monitors’ recommendations were 
enacted in the 2004 elections, namely the use of area-specific ballots and increased 
efforts for voter education, many recommendations remain unheeded. In both cases, IEM 
has functioned in more of an oversight role, rather than an active or reformist role. One 
must therefore analyze the implications of this outcome on H1, H2, and H3. 
 H1 proposes that international monitors will have greater effect in states with 
stable and advanced political culture. In the case of Botswana this is, for the most part, 
true. The open social and political conditions enabled monitors to conduct a careful 
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survey of the electoral process. Not only were they able to meet with government 
officials, but they freely met with members of political parties and civil society groups. 
Aside from limited cases during the 1999 election where confusion at the polling stations 
prevented some impediments to monitors, international observers were given full access 
to all stages of the electoral process. The all electoral stakeholders, including the state, 
valued transparent and legitimate elections and this, in turn, allowed enhanced the 
observation and analysis of monitors. The state and society of Botswana worked in 
conjunction with, rather than against, international election monitors, to ensure free and 
fair elections. It can therefore be concluded, that H1 still stands in the case of Botswana.  
H2 proposes that the higher levels of economic development enhanced the ability 
for monitors to fulfill their mission. Monitors were able to easily travel to a number of 
polling stations. The comparably low levels of inequality prevented extreme societal 
divisions. The absence of political violence, intimidation, or fraud that often accompanies 
extreme polarization enhanced observers ability to monitor all parts of the electoral 
process. While Botswana was not a critical test case for this component of the 
hypotheses, the higher level of economic development at the very least did not impede 
monitoring efforts, and at most aided in their functioning. In general, therefore, the 
validity of H2 is not questioned in this case. 
  According to H3, IEM groups that are present throughout the electoral process, 
work with domestic observer groups, and are better organized and funded, are more 
effective in encouraging internal political reform. Yet, both the ECF and EISA observer 
missions were hindered by funding shortages and small staff sizes. As a result, they were 
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not able to fully monitor all phases of the electoral process and all regions of the country. 
Additionally, international monitors did not engage any domestic observers to help with 
their work and enhance the coverage of polling stations. While these shortcomings did 
not adversely affect the outcome of either election, monitors were less effective in 
encouraging internal political reform. Thus, cases of IEM during the 1999 and 2004 
elections in Botswana strongly support H3, by confirming the contrapositive of the 
hypothesis. 
 If H1, H2, and H3 generally hold in the case of Botswana, and the monitors had 
minimal effect on encouraging internal political reform, other factors must account for 
this outcome. IEM was able to ensure legitimate, free, and fair elections; however, it was 
unable to make major strides in the direction of political reform, despite favorable 
conditioning variables. Most recommendations of the international election monitors 
focused not on increasing the transparency or legitimacy of the election but on making 
the political and electoral system more representative of political parties, minorities, and 
women. The 1999 and 2004 elections reveal that specific structural variables, particularly 
the structure of the electoral system, matter most in promoting internal political reform. 
IEM is certainly not harming Botswana.  Thus, one may question if, in cases where the 
structural conditions are least favorable for reformed political regimes and least 
conducive to free and fair elections, IEM can do more. This matter shall be examined in 
the subsequent cases and at the conclusion of this study. 
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Chapter 4: Uganda 
I. Overview 
 Like Botswana, Uganda has been heralded by scholars, particularly those at the 
World Bank, as an example of economic achievement on the African continent. Years of 
oppressive rule and ill-conceived economic policies during the 1970s and 1980s resulted 
in complete economic collapse.  Yet when Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986, he 
embarked upon an economic revitalization policy, the Ugandan Economic Recovery 
Program (ERP), and implemented World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-
sponsored structural adjustment programs.1 While Uganda is regarded as a “pioneer of 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa,”2 it falls 
short of the socio-political development and internal political reform seen in states like 
Botswana.3  From its inception until 2005, Museveni’s “no party” system banned the 
existence of political parties, with the exception of his nominally apolitical and all-
inclusive National Resistance Movement (NRM) or “Movement.” Although the political 
party ban was repealed in 2005, opposition parties face a number of challenges and 
restrictions. Additionally, despite some notable accomplishments, civil society in Uganda 
remains relatively weak, and socio-political reforms have long lagged behind economic 
reforms. 
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 Located in eastern Africa, Uganda comprises over 90,000 square miles, an area 
slightly smaller than the state of Oregon.4 Landlocked, it neighbors the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo to the west, Rwanda and Tanzania to the south, Sudan to the 
north, and Kenya to the east. A majority of the climate is tropical, and generally rainy, 
with the exception of semi-arid land in the northeast.5 Over 20 percent of land is arable, 
and Uganda is rich in natural resources like copper or cobalt.6 Needless to say, these 
conditions and resources have played a large part in Uganda’s economic growth. The 
population of Uganda is approximately 2.8 million.7 Like most African states, Uganda is 
composed of many ethnic groups, the largest being the Baganda at seventeen percent of 
the population.8 The Baganda is concentrated in southern Uganda, and the northern 
territory is mainly comprised of Nilotic and Sudanic ethnic groups.9 In addition to its 
ethnic diversity, Uganda is religiously diverse—a third of the population is Roman 
Catholic, another third is Protestant, nearly one-sixth is Muslim, and the remaining 
population holds indigenous beliefs.10 English is the official national language in Uganda, 
while Ganda or Luganda is the most widely spoken native language.11 Luganda is the 
preferred native language for print media in the capital city, Kampala.12 Remarkably, in 
spite of its high ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity, Uganda has, in recent decades, 
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managed to stem the extreme and widespread violence prevalent during the 1970s and 
early1980s. 
 This chapter seeks to examine the effects of conditioning and explanatory 
variables on IEM’s ability to encourage internal political reform during the 2001 and 
2006 presidential and parliamentary elections in Uganda. According to H1 and H2, the 
effects of IEM on the process of further internal reform are expected to be mixed, 
reflecting the relatively negative socio-political conditions and relatively positive 
economic conditions. IEM efforts in Uganda in 2001 and 2006 were generally well-
funded and well-executed. So, according to H3, IEM is expected to have a greater and 
more positive impact on reform, due to the favorable characteristics of the international 
electoral observers. This chapter will evaluate the relevance and validity of H1, H2, and 
H3 in the case of Uganda. It will begin with a brief survey of the socio-political and 
economic conditions and structures in Uganda. The second part of the chapter comprises 
two case studies of the 2001 and 2006 Ugandan elections. These elections are significant 
for several reasons that will be explicated below. Monitors during these elections found 
that in general, the vote was conducted in a reasonably ordered and transparent manner; 
however, certain cases of violence, fraud, technical and other irregularities were noted 
and found particularly alarming, casting doubts on the credibility of the elections. 
 
II. The Political and Social Context 
Uganda was granted internal self-government by the British in 1961, receiving its 
formal independence in October, 1963. The decades following independence, however, 
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were marked by great political upheaval and economic decline.13 A military coup in 1971 
led by Idi Amin ousted President Milton Obote’s government. Amin, having declared 
himself as president and taking absolute power, ruled for eight years—a period that 
resulted in “economic decline, social disintegration, and massive human rights 
violations.”14 The National Liberation Front, a group of Ugandan exiles and Amin 
opponents, with the aid of Tanzanian troops, toppled Amin in 1979; an interim 
government was created, and eventually Obote returned to the presidency, following 
highly controversial and fraudulent elections in December 1980.15  
The second Obote regime was also characterized by further human rights 
violations and growing inter-ethnic tensions. In May 1985, tensions between ethnic 
factions in the armed forces led to the overthrow of Obote by Brigadier Basilio Okello 
and General Tito Lutwa Okello.16 From 1980 to 1985, both the Obote 2 and Okello 
governments tried, in vain, to deal with an uprising led by Yoweri Museveni and his 
National Resistance Army (NRA). Although the Okello government urged national 
reconciliation (and many insurgent groups did join the Okello government), the NRA 
refused to accept the regime and continued to wage an insurgency.17 Ultimately, after 
prolonged violence, the NRA seized power in 1986, organizing a single-party 
government with Museveni as president.18 Upon assuming power, Museveni’s 
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government enacted a series of economic reforms, aimed at economic recovery and 
liberalization,19 while at the same time restricting social and political freedoms. 
Upon assuming power, Museveni began to implement the “Ten-Point” Program 
of his Movement. These included:  
(1) The notion of popular democracy; (2) the restoration of security; (3) the 
consolidation of national unity; (4) defending national independence; (5) 
building a national economy; (6) the restoration and rehabilitation of social 
services; (7) the elimination of corruption and misuse of power; (8) the 
resettlement of displaced people; (9) regional co-operation and human 
rights and (10) a mixed economy.20 
 
To accomplish these goals, Museveni saw the abolishment of political parties as the best 
course of action, believing multiparty democracy to promote further divisions and 
violence. Under Museveni’s “no party” system, a supposedly all-inclusive Movement 
(not itself considered a political party) existed and personal merit replaced party 
affiliation as the basis for candidacy. In addition to the ban on political parties, the NRA 
created a National Resistance Council (NRC) to govern during the transitional period; 
however, this unelected body remained in power for five years and repressed any 
perceived political activity, in some cases with great force.21 
 Desiring to install a popular and grassroots democracy, Museveni and the NRC 
created a five-level system of governance, establishing Resistance Councils (RCs) 
(renamed Local Councils or LCs in 1995) from the village to district levels.22 The RCs 
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did seem to broaden popular participation in government, particularly at the local level; 
yet, at the national level, this was not necessarily the case. Indeed, as Mahmood Mamdani 
notes, “The higher one went up the RC pyramid, the more watered down was the 
democratic content of the system.”23 Even though the NRC was replaced by an elected 
parliament in 1996, a number of seats are still reserved for non-elected members of “the 
army and other government sectors and interest groups [who] tend to be NRM-aligned.”24 
While the Movement marked a significant and positive turnaround from the turbulent 
decades following independence, many problematic aspects of Museveni’s “no-party” 
system remain, threatening further political reform.  
 Finally, it should be noted that these political developments in Uganda have 
occurred in the context of persisting conflict between the Ugandan government and the 
paramilitary rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). This insurgency, led by 
Joseph Kony and other individuals who have been indicted by the International Criminal 
Court, has for the past twenty years wreaked havoc in the northern regions of Uganda. It 
is estimated that over two million Ugandans have been affected by this humanitarian 
crisis, a vast majority of whom have been displaced.25 The LRA has targeted and killed 
civilians; over 20,000 children have been abducted and forced to be child soldiers or sex 
slaves.26 This ongoing war has had immense effects—devastating the economy; 
increasing the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, especially among children; fostering 
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animosity between northern civilians and Museveni’s regime (which is perceived to be 
ethnically biased and doing too little); and destabilizing the region.27 
 
III. The Economic Context: Historically and Today 
 The Ugandan economy is perceived by many, especially World Bank and IMF 
officials, as a successful example of economic liberalization and post-conflict recovery. 
Long before Museveni and his NRM came to power, the Ugandan economy had 
collapsed under the misrule of the Amin, Obote, and Okellos regimes. In the 1970s, Amin 
confiscated the property of Asians living in Uganda, 70,000 of whom had at one point 
owned 90 percent of the Ugandan businesses.28  These confiscations, combined with 
predatory state policies, the mass flight of skilled labor and refugees, a murderous 
regime, and general civil instability utterly devastated the Ugandan economy.29 By 1985, 
the average rate of GDP growth was negative fifteen percent.30 In 1987, already one year 
into Museveni and the NRM’s rule, inflation was 240 percent.31 
 When Museveni did assume power in 1986, he immediately enacted plans for 
post-conflict recovery, economic rehabilitation, and liberalization. As part of his Ten 
Point program, Museveni sought to revive the Uganda economy and alleviate widespread 
poverty. Under his ERP, Museveni aimed to expand and diversify the economy, create a 
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climate attractive for investment, increase social services, and rebuild infrastructure. Yet, 
in order to achieve such a turnaround, Museveni acknowledged the need for external aid; 
and in 1987, he appealed to the World Bank and the IMF for assistance. In order to create 
a favorable investment climate, Museveni “lift[ed] exchange control, disband[ed] state-
run marketing boards, slat[ed] inefficient companies for privatization, offer[ed] tax 
incentives and establish[ed] a healthy dialogue between state and private sector.”32 In 
early 1993, he also returned properties confiscated by Amin to its original owners; this 
has led to increased Asian investment in Uganda.33 Tariff reductions and further 
privatizations aided Uganda’s economic recovery. For example, the liberalization of the 
coffee sector and a removal of export taxation led to a boom in coffee revenues, which 
further contributed to poverty reduction.34 From 1985 to 1995, Uganda’s average annual 
growth rate was 6.1 percent;35 in that same time, inflation dropped to around five percent. 
Public spending programs increased have also. Military spending has been curtailed 
(although it did remain relatively high) so as to finance the rebuilding of physical 
infrastructure.36 For example, the rebuilding of roadways has become a large initiative, 
which garnered much public approval.37  
Uganda’s economic recovery and its embrace of strict structural adjustment 
programs have not only attracted much praise from various international financial 
institutions but significant foreign aid as well. Uganda has benefitted immensely from 
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foreign aid, particularly in the area of debt relief. Although Uganda has experienced high 
growth rates, it has accumulated significant debt.  By 1995, Uganda had over 3.5 billion 
dollars of debt.38 Consequently, Uganda was the first country to receive a grant from the 
World Bank as a part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative in 
1998; the 1998 HIPC, in addition to an expanded HIPC agreement two years later, has 
resulted in “a total of US$1 billion of debt relief in net present terms.”39 Increasing 
foreign aid, debt relief programs, and economic growth have, since 1986, have markedly 
aided in poverty reduction.40 Indeed, from 1992 to 2000, the percentage of Ugandans 
living below the poverty line dropped from 56 percent to 35 percent.41  
Extensive foreign aid, in conjunction with Museveni’s economic liberalization 
and structural adjustment programs, are largely responsible for Uganda’s economic 
turnaround. Today, economic conditions in Uganda are some of the most favorable in 
Africa. Inflation has been decreased to a manageable six percent; and current GDP 
growth is estimated at five percent.42 2006 estimates place Uganda’s public debt at just 
under 30 percent of its GDP.43  Although only accounting for 30 percent of the GDP, 
agriculture remains the most important sector in Uganda, as it employs nearly 80 percent 
of all labor.44 Because agricultural exports account for a significant portion of Uganda’s 
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foreign revenue, the recent upturn in the export market has benefitted this vital sector.45 
Of the states in this study, Uganda has been most successful at poverty reduction, with 35 
percent of the population living below the poverty line.46 Additionally, Uganda has been 
remarkably successful in preventing and managing the spread of HIV/AIDS. The 
Ugandan government’s has actively worked to combat the pandemic via government 
research programs, public awareness campaigns, and a general openness about the 
issue.47 Since 1990, when the Ministry of Health began its AIDS Control Program, the 
adult prevalence rate has dropped from 30 percent to under five percent.48 Museveni’s 
adept economic management, along with his commitment to poverty reduction and 
combating HIV/AIDS, has generated economic stability and success. Once devastated by 
civil war and economic collapse, Uganda now boasts one of the most favorable economic 
climates in the region.  
 
IV. Current Political and Social Structures 
Despite its economic reforms and success, Uganda lacks comparable socio-
political reforms and accomplishments. Indeed, some argue that too much international 
attention has gone to Uganda’s economic development, at the expense of civil and 
political development. According to the Human Rights Watch, the World Bank and other 
donors have undermined internal political reform efforts by praising Uganda’s economic 
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progress but neglecting to acknowledge its inadequate civil and political development.49 
Dibie and Rashid argue further that “the persistence of Western aid further strengthens 
the Movement’s claims of legitimacy,” granting Museveni external legitimization without 
internal political liberalization. 50 It is important to note, therefore, that Uganda’s 
economic progress has been achieved despite limited socio-political reform.  
A. The Ugandan Constitution—Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Structures  
 The Ugandan constitution was rewritten in 1995, almost ten years after Museveni 
and the NRM came to power. The constitution established the Republic of Uganda and a 
three branch system of government, similar to that of Botswana. The executive branch is 
headed by the president of the republic, who is “the Head of state, Head of Government, 
and Commander-in-Chief of the Ugandan Peoples’ Defense Force [UPDF].”51 He must 
be a Ugandan citizen by birth, between 35 and 75 years of age, and qualified for election 
to the Parliament.52 The president is elected by popular vote, unlike the president of 
Botswana, and his term in office is five years. He appoints a cabinet from MPs or those 
qualified for election to Parliament.53 Although the 1995 constitution set a two-term 
limitation on the president, the Ugandan parliament voted in August 2005 to lift the term 
limitation altogether.54  This change enabled President Museveni to win a third term in 
office in 2006 and his 21-year tenure in office has been the source of much controversy. 
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 The main legislative body in Uganda is the unicameral parliament, the National 
Assembly. The 332-member National Assembly consists of 215 popularly elected 
members of parliament (MPs), 79 specially chosen women representatives (one for each 
district); 10 representatives from the army; and five representatives each for youths, 
labor, and disabled persons.55 Like the president, MPs are elected to five-year terms. To 
be qualified for office, MPs must be Ugandan citizens, registered voters, and formally 
educated at the Advanced Level standard (or an equivalent).56 While the provision for 
female representation in the legislature presents great progress in the reform process, the 
involvement of unelected members of the armed forces could prove potentially harmful 
to the quality of Ugandan democracy. 57 What is more, the legislature provides little 
executive constraint, as supporters of Museveni and his NRM hold a vast majority of 
seats in the parliament.58  
 The judiciary of Uganda consists of a Supreme Court, a High Court, and a Court 
of Appeal.59 The Ugandan judicial system is based on English common and customary 
law.60 The judicial branch is limited in two important ways. First, “poor training and lack 
of resources” limit the professional and efficient functioning of the judiciary.61Second, 
while the constitution explicitly provides for an independent judiciary, it is not free from 
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influence by the strong executive.62 Executive influence on court proceedings was 
especially evident in the treason and rape charges brought against the main opposition 
candidate, Dr. Kizza Besigye, during the 2006 election. The first two judges that heard 
the case stepped down, one citing military interference, the other “external pressure that 
had had grave effects on his health.”63 Although Dr. Besigye was acquitted of both 
charges, this recent development casts doubt on the separation of the branches of 
government, and the checks on executive power. 
B. The Electoral System 
 In Uganda, as in Botswana, elections are won by the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) 
simple plurality system. This system therefore comes with similar advantages and 
drawbacks for Uganda, as it did in the preceding chapter. The country is divided into 214 
constituencies and 94 special interest constituencies, from which one MP is elected.64 
Suffrage is universal and voters must be 18 years of age to vote.65 However, all eligible 
voters are required, under the constitution, to register to vote.66 The constitution also 
states that elections are to be administered by an independent Electoral Commission;67 
however, the commissioners are appointed by the president, which undermines the 
credibility of the Commission’s independence.68  Commissioners are only appointed for a 
period of seven years, which can also be problematic. As this tenure only includes one 
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election, commissioners seeking a renewed appointment may be more susceptible to 
outside influences.69 Not only is the structure of the electoral system problematic, but the 
role of the executive in the appointment of Commissioners remains a further challenge to 
free and fair elections and political reform. 
C. Political Parties and Civil Society 
Under the 1995 constitution, three political systems are permitted in Uganda—the 
Movement system, a multiparty system, and “any other democratic and representative 
political system.”70 Yet prior to the 2005 referendum, Museveni’s Movement was, in 
reality, the only legal political organization. Essentially, “the 1995 constitution allowed 
political parties to exist in name, but outlawed all the activities normally associated with 
political parties.”71 In June of 2000, a referendum on the political system was held. 
Though voters overwhelmingly favored a continuation of the Movement system for 
another five years, low voter turnout and a boycott by the opposition marred the vote.72 In 
the wake of the referendum, domestic and international pressure for a multi-party system 
continued to mount. By the July 2005 referendum, the ban on political parties was lifted 
as citizens voted in favor of restoring a multi-party system.73 
Today, political parties are permitted in Uganda; however, the ruling NRM  party 
continues to dominate Ugandan politics, and opposition parties are often disadvantaged in 
a variety of ways. Particularly in the lead-up to the 2001 and 2005 elections, many 
reports surfaced regarding intimidation and violence towards members of opposition 
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parties.74 Opposition parties also find themselves more financially limited that the ruling 
Movement organization, whom benefit greatly from the use of government resources.75 
Media access is also unequal, and state-run media outlets generally favor Museveni’s 
NRM.76 According to Freedom House, restrictive registration policies also hamper the 
functioning of opposition political parties.77 Despite these disadvantages, several political 
parties have emerged in opposition to the NRM, namely the Ugandan Peoples’ Congress 
(UPC), Democratic Party (DP), the Conservative Party (CP), and the Forum for 
Democratic Change (FDC).  
 Assessments of civil society in Uganda are generally mixed. Many NGOs operate 
in Uganda representing these groups, as well as other causes, like human rights. For 
example, the National Association of Women’s Organizations in Uganda, an umbrella 
organization for women’s rights NGOs formed in 1993, actively works to promote 
female empowerment.78 However, years of the Movement system has meant that 
important civil society groups, such as the women and youth organizations, are heavily 
state influenced. According to the Human Rights Watch, the “government exercises 
significant control over NGO activities through the Non-Governmental Organizations 
Registration Statute, which requires that all NGOs …be registered.”79 Oftentimes, many 
NGOs and journalists will practice self-censorship, so as to avoid sanctions by the state.80 
The state also exerts a great deal of control over trade unions. Like NGOs, all trade 
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unions must register with the state and only unions with over 1,000 members can register; 
these requirements allow the state to easily manipulate or ban unions or groups perceived 
as threats81 Finally, as has been suggested above, the great impediments placed upon 
organizations separate from the NRM greatly hinders the flourishing of an independent 
civil society in Uganda. While in some ways, the Movement system has given rise to 
certain civil society elements, the strong grip of the NRM-dominated state on NGOs, 
trade unions, and political parties reveals that civil and political development in Uganda 
lags behind the pace of economic reform and achievement. 
 
V. IEM and the Election of 2001 
A. The Electoral Context 
 The 2001 presidential and parliamentary elections in Uganda were significant for 
several reasons. First, the elections took place in the aftermath of the 2000 referendum on 
the Ugandan political system, in which voters chose to continue the Movement system 
for five more years. Second, the 2001 polls allow for analysis of the impact of the 
Movement “no party” system on electoral and reform processes. Third, the presence of a 
large number of international and domestic monitoring groups enables one to assess the 
role and impact of IEM on a state with limited socio-political development; in this case, 
one can ask whether IEM was able to place a significant amount of pressure on the 
regime to facilitate greater civil and political reform.  
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 The 2001 presidential elections took place on March 12, after having been 
postponed from the scheduled date of March 6. The parliamentary elections were held 
three months later, on June 26, 2001. In contrast to the elections in Botswana, a number 
of international and domestic electoral observation groups participated in the 2001 
Ugandan elections. The Ugandan Electoral Commission (EC) accredited 165 
international observers for the presidential elections,82 and 168 for the parliamentary 
elections.83 Of these international observers, a vast majority worked under the Post 
Referendum Support Group (PRSG), an umbrella organization drawn from states who are 
the primary donors of assistance and aid.84 In addition to international monitors, a 
number of domestic monitors observed the 2001 elections. The largest and most 
extensive domestic observer group was the NGO Election Monitoring Group of Uganda 
(NEMGROUP-U). This organization is composed of six leading domestic NGOs that 
work alongside the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC); NEMGROUP-U is funded 
in large part by the PRSG and has received technical assistance from the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems and the Electoral Reform International Services.85 
Because the election report produced by the Norwegian Institute of Human 
Rights/Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM) draws 
together the observations of the PRSG, NEMGROUP-U, and reports from additional 
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international monitors (and because other assessments were not available), it will form 
the primary source for analysis of the 2001 election.86 
B. The Pre-Election Period  
 Because the IEM groups were only deployed to Uganda for short-term observer 
missions, much of the pre-election coverage for both presidential and parliamentary votes 
was done by NEMGROUP-U. During the months of January and February, 
NEMGROUP-U released two reports detailing the lead-up to the March presidential vote; 
issues covered in the reports included campaigning activities, human rights issues, media 
coverage, participation by women, and instances of violence.87In addition to these two 
key reports, weekly updates were also published during the campaign period and as the 
election drew near, NEMGROUP-U issued updates every 48 hours.88 The pre-election 
coverage by domestic observers was extensive, and brought to light several important 
issues surrounding the conditions of both presidential and parliamentary votes. 
 According to a number of reports, the pre-election periods for both the March and 
June votes were marred by “allegations of political violence, intimidation, and 
corruption.”89 Throughout the parliamentary and presidential campaign periods, 
observers noted that the president and the candidates whom he supported enjoyed 
significant advantages over others seeking office. Museveni enjoyed legal access to 
government resources, in, for example, areas of transport and security, giving him an 
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advantage over other candidates.90  A number of parliamentary candidates received 
financial and campaign support from the president and staff; and “some reports suggest 
that funds from government coffers were illegally spent to bolster certain candidacies.”91 
While candidates for president and parliament were generally able to campaign freely, 
some reports of intimidation or intervention by government officials were noted during 
opposition rallies or meetings.92 In some cases, instances of serious intimidation and 
violence by presidential supporters and Ugandan security forces were noted; and “these 
acts were not convincingly denounced by the president or the government apparatus.”93 
Some candidates for parliament even sought EC protection, as they felt their personal 
safety threatened during the campaign period.94 Many voters “felt that the free expression 
of opinions and affiliation was risky” during the pre-election period, a result of fear of 
intimidation and the generally tense lead-up to the March and June elections.95 
Though Uganda enjoys a range of independent media outlets, some problems did 
arise over media coverage during the campaign. The state-run media, while required by 
law to allot equal coverage and access to all candidates, monitors did cite some reports of 
disproportional coverage in favor of the president and his supporters.96 The Human 
Rights Watch also noted an increase in the harassment of journalists and editors during 
the pre-election period.97 Personal attacks, particularly between Museveni and his main 
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opposition, Dr. Besigye, grew especially hostile and dubious, and their accusations 
greatly increased the tension and potential for violence during the pre-election period.98 
Other issues arose over voter registration. The requirement that all eligible voters 
register necessitated the updating of the existing voters’ rolls. This was especially time-
consuming during the 2001 elections, and EC inefficiencies created further delays in the 
electoral process. The delayed update of the register created problems with the issuing of 
voter registration cards, and as Peterson notes, “voters were in many instances frustrated 
in their efforts to be registered, transferred, or to obtain a voter card.”99 Monitors noted 
the opportunity for voter fraud that arose from these conditions, and the fact that EC 
officials did not record the collection of voter cards.100  
 During the March elections, the EC voter education efforts had little effect. While 
most voters displayed knowledge of electoral procedures and locations, this was because 
they were required to vote in the referendum one year earlier.101 In the parliamentary 
elections, however, voter education efforts were delegated to the Uganda Project 
Implementation and Management Center (UPIMAC), which worked in conjunction with 
a group of NGOs.102 UPIMAC and the NGOs used posters, leaflets, and radio programs 
to enhance voter awareness of polling procedures and their rights.103 These efforts were 
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more successful than prior voter education campaigns, and some observers noted the 
change in the voter preparedness and knowledge during the poll.104 
C. March 12, 2001 and June 26, 2001: The Vote, Count, and Results 
 During the presidential election, international monitors were dispatched to 
seventeen of Uganda’s 53 districts and reported on nearly 500 stations;105 however, 
NEMGROUP-U had the largest observer presence, with members at nearly every polling 
station (15,156 of approximately 17,000 stations).106 During the parliamentary elections, 
international observers were deployed to 20 districts, primarily in central Uganda,107 
while NEMGROUP-U representatives were again present at nearly all polling stations.108 
Polling on election days, according to electoral law, takes place from 7:00am to 5:00pm. 
During the presidential elections, most polling stations were opened in the first hour; late 
arrival of election materials and unfamiliarity with opening procedures by polling staff 
contributed most to the delays.109 NEMGROUP-U observed that only 59 percent of 
polling stations opened on time during the parliamentary elections, citing similar causes 
for delay.110  
 Although the periods leading up to the March and June elections were tense, the 
voting itself was for the most part peaceful and orderly. During the presidential election, 
most polling stations had sufficient electoral materials, and polling agents were generally 
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professional and organized.111 Some technical flaws were observed, but they were not 
believed to seriously mar the vote. However, in some southwestern polling stations, 
observers noted clear attempts at fraud, and attempts by polling staff to influence 
voters.112 Other problems arose from confusion over voter cards. The EC’s last minute 
announcement that voters no longer needed to present their cards to vote, but that 
“physical identification” and a name on the register was sufficient; these new procedures 
were not clearly articulated to all polling staff or observers.113 This miscommunication 
also increased chances for fraud. 
 During the parliamentary election, monitors noted that over 90 percent of polling 
staff members followed basic procedures.114 Yet, NEMGROUP-U observers reported 
some attempts at voter fraud and vote buying; they also noted that the indelible ink was 
not applied correctly at some locations, which increased the chances of electoral 
manipulation or fraud.115 They also noted, “[one] percent of voters nation-wide were 
forced to vote for certain candidates, while many voters were turned away as their names 
were already ticked in the register.”116 Similar problems were also reported during the 
election of special MPs, such as women and youths.  
 Both PRSG and NEMGROUP-U observers reported that nearly all the polls had 
closed on schedule at 5:00pm.117 For the most part, the counting processes for the 
presidential and parliamentary elections were transparent with few irregularities reported. 
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At the district level, the aggregation of the counts was also observed to proceed in an 
orderly and transparent manner. The results of the presidential election were publically 
reported on schedule, by the following Wednesday.118 The parliamentary results were 
reported in a timely fashion, on June 27, 2001.119 When the votes were all tallied, 
Museveni won 69.3 percent of the vote, and his main challenger Besigye garnered 27.8 
percent.120 Further violence was reported once the presidential results were announced, 
when nail and pipe bombs exploded in Kampala, killing eleven and injuring many.121 
Museveni’s supporters gained a large portion of seats in the parliament;122 and many 
argue that the Movement political system gave these candidates a clear advantage.123  
D. IEM Findings and Recommendations 
 International and domestic observers concluded that, although citizens in most 
parts of the country were free to vote for the candidates of their choice, serious flaws in 
the pre-election process and at certain polling stations marred the overall vote. In both the 
presidential and parliamentary elections, monitors concluded that the Movement political 
system and electoral framework favored Museveni and his incumbent supporters in the 
National Assembly.124 Museveni and parliamentary candidates with his endorsement had 
greater resources at their disposal for use in the campaign process. Opposition candidates 
were further disadvantaged by financial constraints, and in certain cases, intimidation by 
the state security apparatus. The failure on the part of the EC to update voter registers on 
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time and to require identification with voter cards increased the instances of electoral 
manipulation and fraud. Monitors reported that the IEM evaluation forms given to 
observers by the EC “were not up to standard, which made the reporting less concise than 
desired.”125 International and domestic observers concluded that “technical and other 
irregularities [did] not amount to numbers that would significantly affect the results of the 
elections;”126 however, they noted that shortcomings observed during most stages of the 
2001 elections merited attention and reform. 
 Accordingly, monitors offered several important recommendations for future 
Ugandan elections, not only for Ugandan authorities and the EC, but for international 
observation missions as well. First, monitors urged Ugandan authorities to move towards 
a political system that would “[accommodate] political debate and contest in an 
environment of tolerance towards divergent views and interests.”127 They also 
recommended that greater efforts be made to ensure fairer competition between 
candidates, legal provisions for equality, and security forces that are not politicized.128 
Essentially, monitors called for an end to the Movement political system and the creation 
of a multiparty system. Monitors also recommended greater preparation on the part of the 
EC so as to avoid delays in voter registration and problems with voter cards.129 They also 
called for enhanced training of electoral officials.130 
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 With regards to IEM efforts, the observers of the 2001 elections recommended 
future monitors: 
Arrange independent briefing[s] for observers; make [their] own report 
forms based on the Election law; try to deploy observers according to 
principles of representative samples; deploy observers to the regions as 
early as possible; arrange for proper processing of reports; [and] present a 
more observation based statement.131 
 
Monitors also expressed the need for greater understanding of local politics and electoral 
processes, particularly for the special parliamentary elections.132 While monitors 
recognized the methodological shortcomings of the their efforts, they did believe that the 
presence of international observers did have a positive impact in helping to dissuade 
some instances of fraud and in gathering data useful for analysis. 
 
VI. IEM and the Election of 2006 
A. The Electoral Context 
 The 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections in Uganda were distinct from 
the 1996 and 2001 elections in several ways. First, and most importantly, they were the 
first multiparty elections in twenty years. The 2005 referendum on Uganda’s political 
system resulted in a return to multiparty democracy.133 The 2001 elections had shown 
“that the Movement had become openly partisan and was no longer fully inclusive, since 
it favored some candidates over others.”134 Domestic and international pressure in the 
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wake of the 2001 vote influenced the Ugandan government’s stance on the toleration of 
political parties, and government’s support of a return to multi-party elections.135 Second, 
the 2006 elections were also significant because, as a result of a controversial 
parliamentary vote in July 2005 to lift the presidential term-limit, Museveni was allowed 
to run for a third term in office.136 Third, both the presidential and parliamentary elections 
were held, for the first time, on the same day, February 23, 2006. This presented an even 
greater challenge for the EC and election monitors to ensure an efficient and transparent 
vote. Finally, the 2006 vote was significant because of its relevance, as it occurred just 
about a year ago. 
 Like the elections of 2001, a number of domestic and short-term international 
observers monitored the 2006 parliamentary and presidential votes. The primary 
international monitoring groups included the European Union Electoral Observation 
Mission (EU EOM) and the Commonwealth Observer Group. The EU EOM dispatched a 
long-term mission of eight observers three weeks before the election, and 170 short term 
observers as the vote drew closer.137 The Commonwealth Observer Group sent a two-
person team ten days on February 4, 2006; ten days later, the other members of the 
thirteen-person Group arrived, chaired by Ketumile Masire, former president of 
Botswana.138 The primary long-term domestic observer group was the Democracy 
                                                 
135
 Ibid. 
136
 Dagne and Ploch, "Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in Northern Uganda," 2-3. 
137
 Carl E. Peterson, "Uganda: Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Council Elections 2006," in Nordem 
Report, Working Paper 08/2006 (Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Institute of Human Rights/The Norwegian 
Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), 2006), Preface. 
138
 Commonwealth Observer Group, "Uganda Presidential and Parliamentary 2006," 4-7. 
  
93
Monitoring Group (DEMGROUP), an association of three leading NGOs.139  Like 
NEMGROUP-U during the 2001 elections, DEMGROUP sent observers to nearly all 
polling stations in Uganda.140 
B. The Pre-Election Period 
 As in the 2001 elections, the long-term domestic observer groups provided the 
greatest insight into conditions of the pre-election period. During the campaign period, 
DEMGROUP published a number of statements regarding the problems of the pre-
election period. These issues included difficulties with voter registration and voter card 
distribution; interference in or obstruction of the campaign of the main presidential 
challenger, Besigye; unequal access to campaign resources and media coverage; and 
incidences of violence or intimidation, often by state security forces. 
 Despite measure taken on the part of the EC to avoid the voter registration and 
card delays similar to those of the 2001 elections, difficulties seemed inevitable. In an 
effort to reduce voter fraud, the EC instituted a photographic voter register; however, this 
required the production of an entirely new record.141 Again, delays in voter registration 
were reported and the cleaning of the register was also problematic. During the cleaning 
process, the registered was publically displayed from late December to mid-January so 
that voters could confirm their names, polling stations, photographs, and collect their 
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voter cards.142 According to some observers, voters from both the ruling and opposition 
parties complained of missing names, incorrect polling locations, mismatched names, or 
missing photos.143 EU monitors also noted insufficient voter education, which was 
evidenced by general confusion among voters as to the location and procedures of polling 
stations, and the number of spoilt votes. 144 Problems over voter registration, card 
distribution, and education effectively disenfranchised many voters, undermining the 
fairness and legitimacy of the election. 
 The environment of the campaign was characterized by tension and mistrust. This 
was particularly evident in the treason and rape charges brought against Besigye. These 
accusations, and “attempts by the armed forces to infringe on the independence of the 
judiciary by insisting on trying Besigye and 22 other civilians in a Court Martial,” proved 
especially contentious and destabilizing.145 Although the treason charges were eventually 
dropped, the case against Besigye limited his ability to campaign, as he was only released 
from prison on January 2, 2006.146 While Museveni was able to campaign in all districts, 
Besigye was only able to reach 60.147 The controversial charges against Museveni’s 
opposition, and resulting disadvantages, strongly support charges that the 2006 elections 
were not fair. 
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 Unequal campaign resources and media access also evidence the charge that that 
electoral playing field was far from level. The president was given access to state 
resources that enabled him to campaign more successfully than the under-funded 
opposition. While parliamentary officials are prohibited by law from using state resources 
from their campaign, many did so illegally.148 DEMGROUP observers noted that state-
owned media unlawfully gave disproportionate coverage of National Resistance 
Movement Organization (NRM-O) candidates.149 Coverage of Museveni and his 
supporters was also more positive than coverage of the opposition.150 Finally, 
infringements on media freedom were also reported. The UJSC reported some cases of 
harassment and intimidation of journalists; for example, one Canadian reporter for the 
Economist was expelled from Uganda.151 Attempts on the part of the police to confiscate 
an FDC campaign documentary and other such cases of interference led to widespread 
fear amongst reporters and self-censorship.152  
Finally, other instances of violence and intimidation were reported during the pre-
election period. Instances of bribery were reportedly widespread during the campaign 
period and even on the day of the poll.153 According to EU monitors, on February 1, “in 
the central Iganda district…gun wielding Local Defense Unit personnel, wearing yellow 
NRM T-shirts clashed with FDC supporters.”154 On another occasion, three FDC 
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supporters were shot and killed by a soldier, as they waited for Besigye.155 Although 
these clashes between security forces and opposition supporters, as well as the 
aforementioned problematic areas of the pre-election phase, were limited, they certainly 
require government attention and reform. 
C. February 23, 2006: The Vote, Count, and Results 
 On the day of the vote, polling stations were scheduled to open at 7:00am, after 
the opening preparation procedures were completed. For the most part, stations opened 
on time, with some late openings reported by Commonwealth and Norwegian 
observers.156 The poll itself was widely observed. Nearly all polling stations had a 
domestic observer from DEMGROUP, and many others had an additional international 
observer. Most monitors noted that polling procedures were, on the whole, orderly and 
transparent.157 The election occurred in a general atmosphere of calm and voter turnout 
was nearly 20 percent higher than the turnout in 2001.158 However, irregularities and 
some serious flaws were also noted. The EU EOM reported some technical problems, 
such as a shortage of polling materials, such as ballot seals.159 They also noted that in 
some cases, polling officials failed to check for inked fingers, which could have led to 
voter fraud.160 The Commonwealth Observer Group noted evidence of bribery and 
intimidation on polling day, missing and removed names on the voters register, 
inconsistent electoral procedures, problems with the sealing of ballot boxes, insufficient 
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training of polling staff, and interference on the part of candidates’ agents at the polling 
stations.161 Still, most observers were satisfied with the security presence at polling 
stations, noting it was low-key yet effective.162 Only in a few areas of the country, where 
the situation was more tense, was the security presence problematic.163 
 Once the voting ended at 5:00pm, the counting began immediately. Observers 
found the counting process to be largely transparent and efficient, having taken place in 
view of voters and party agents.164 Some technical shortcomings were reported, as poor 
lighting and other infrastructural problems delayed the tallying of votes.165 The large 
amount of invalid ballots was also disturbing to monitors, and it evidenced the need for 
further voter education and improvements in the counting process.166 Monitors also 
reported transport delays of the ballot boxes to district centers and, in some cases, the 
absence of party agents or security officials during transport, which increased the 
opportunity for manipulation of the votes.167 
 When the counting was finished, the results were announced on February 25, 
2006. The EC declared Museveni the winner of the presidential election, with nearly 59 
percent of the vote.168 Besigye came in second with 37 percent.169 Museveni was most 
popular in the west and east, while Besigye had strong support in the north and in 
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Kampala.170 In the parliament, the NRM-O party won 211 of the 309 seats, giving them a 
solid majority.171 Despite the return to multiparty politics, the 2006 elections 
demonstrated the strong grasp on power maintained by Museveni and his NRM. 
D. IEM Findings and Recommendations 
 Monitors found the 2006 parliamentary and presidential elections, while marking 
a milestone in Ugandan political progress, were still seriously flawed and thus made 
numerous recommendations. The Commonwealth Observer Group, EU EOM, and 
DEMGROUP had similar conclusions and suggestions for improvement. With regards to 
the EC, monitors echoed earlier recommendations for improved voter registration and 
card distribution procedures. Additionally, EU EOM members called for the 
“enforcement of financing regulations and [a] code of conduct for political parties; 
improve[ments in] the electoral campaign structure; …further civic and voter education; 
[and] enhance[d] procedures for complaints and appeals.”172 Most observers called for 
greater efforts to ensure a level playing field during the campaign, so as to prevent unfair 
media coverage and the “abuse of incumbency.”173 They also recommended extra 
measures to prevent encroachment on the independence of the judiciary and harassment 
or intimidation of candidates by security personnel.174  
 Ultimately, the recommendations of observers were aimed at creating conditions 
conducive to continuing political reform. Unlike in Botswana, the nature of the FPTP 
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system is not the cause of most electoral problems, but rather the continued repercussions 
of Museveni’s Movement system, in which the state and party were and, in reality, 
remain fused. Thus, the recommendations of monitors are vital if one is to address the 
serious shortcomings of the 2006 election.  
 
VII. Conclusions and Implications 
 IEM efforts in Uganda were able to affect some real and positive changes, as 
opposed to the similar efforts in Botswana investigated in the previous section. The most 
noticeable and important evidence of such progress is the return to a multiparty 
democracy in the period between the 2001 and 2006 elections. IEM was able to 
encourage this change by bringing both domestic and international pressure to bear on the 
Ugandan government, in the wake of the flawed 2001 presidential and parliamentary 
elections. In this way, IEM was able to promote visible advances towards political 
reform; however, in other ways, IEM was less effective, as the flawed 2006 elections 
suggest. This suggests, as was concluded in the previous chapter, that other conditioning 
or intervening factors may have a greater role in creating conditions conducive to 
continued political reform.  
The effects of IEM in Uganda, according to the hypotheses, were expected to be 
mixed. Indeed, as predicted by H1, the adverse political and social conditions did limit 
the extent to which monitors could encourage political reforms. This difficulty was 
primarily manifested in where international monitors were deployed. The LRA 
insurgency in the northern region limited the regions where monitors could be sent. 
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Monitors observed polling stations primarily in central Uganda, leaving an important 
section of the country overlooked. This unrepresentative deployment undermines the 
evaluation and recommendations of international monitors, as a great deal of data is 
absent from their reports. 
 The findings and implications with regards to H2 are, however, more interesting. 
While the involvement of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has 
benefitted the Ugandan economy, it has in some ways adversely affected political reform 
efforts. Uganda has been championed by the World Bank as an all-around success story, 
despite its social and political shortcomings. Hence, it could be argued that the focus 
Uganda’s economic turnaround by the World Bank and other international financial 
institutions diverts attention from the political problems in the state. This may be an 
argument against H2, in cases where economic growth when accompanied by vast 
structural adjustment programs, may prove a hindrance to IEM efforts to bring about 
pressure for internal political reform. 
H3 is also supported by the experience of IEM in Uganda. The professional, well-
funded, and well-organized IEM missions, who worked in conjunction with domestic 
groups, produced better reports and results, especially when compared to the international 
monitors in Botswana. Domestic monitoring groups, who were much larger in number, 
provided a boon to overall observation efforts during all phases of the electoral process. 
The long-term nature of their mission was helpful in ascertaining the pre-election 
atmosphere; the widespread deployment of domestic observers on polling day also 
contributed to IEM evaluations of both elections.  
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The experience of IEM in Uganda suggests that IEM can bring about important 
changes conducive to internal political reform; indeed, the pressure for, and eventual 
move towards a multiparty system mark an impressive achievement. However, the 
primary hindrance to further internal political reform in Uganda is not the deficiencies of 
IEM missions, but the persisting repercussions of the Movement system, which has 
created an environment where the NRM party remains closely fused with state structures. 
The difficulties experienced by political parties and civil society groups in operating free 
from state interference or control evidence the real areas in need of development and 
reform. This may have significant implications for future IEM efforts, as it suggests that 
international actors should not focus as extensively on the nature of the vote, but on the 
flourishing of Ugandan society. This notion will be reflected upon further in the 
conclusion of this study. 
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Chapter 5: Mozambique 
I. Overview 
In the last half century, violent struggles for independence were common among a 
number of Sub-Saharan African states. Yet, of the three other cases in this study 
Mozambique is unique because even after gaining independence, it experienced a 
protracted and devastating civil war that lasted nearly two decades. While violent conflict 
in Mozambique has resulted in a ravaged economy and heavily divided society, several 
promising socio-political developments have occurred in the past decade and a half. Most 
importantly, during the past three elections, "the zone of conflict between Renamo and 
Frelimo and their supporters…appear[ed] to be entrenched in the political arena."1 
Additionally, and unlike Botswana and Uganda, the opposition Renamo party has been 
able to present a significant electoral challenge to the Frelimo party (although it is 
important to note, Frelimo has remained the ruling party). Despite high growth rates, 
international aid, and improved economic governance, Mozambique is one of the poorest 
countries in the world and a number of economic challenges remain for this country in 
transition. 
 Almost twice the size of California, Mozambique comprises over 300,000 square 
miles in southeastern Africa.2 Unlike Botswana and Uganda, it has a lengthy coastline 
along the Indian Ocean. Mozambique neighbors Tanzania to the north; to the west, it 
borders Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; and its neighbors to the south include South 
Africa and Swaziland. The climate in Mozambique is tropical and subtropical, and the 
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terrain ranges from coastal lowlands to high plateaus and mountains in the west and 
northwest.3 While only about five percent of the land is arable, most of the population has 
traditionally been employed in subsistence farming.4 Severe droughts in some areas and 
floods in others have increased the number of Mozambicans living in urban centers. 
According to World Bank figures, 35 percent of Mozambique’s 19.8 million citizens live 
in urban areas.5 Like the previous countries in this study, Mozambique is quite ethnically 
diverse. The main ethnic groups include the Makua, Sena, Shangaan, and the Tsonga.6 
With regards to religious diversity, roughly 40-50 percent of the population is Christian, 
20 percent Muslim, and the remainder holds indigenous beliefs.7 While Portuguese is the 
official language, it is only spoken by roughly nine percent as a first language and 27 
percent as a second language.8 A vast majority of the population speak indigenous 
languages.  
This chapter seeks to examine the impact of IEM on the processes of internal 
political reform in a state that is extremely economically underdeveloped but is showing 
positive and significant steps towards greater socio-political stability. Mozambique offers 
a unique opportunity to assess the role of IEM in post-conflict democratic transitions in 
Africa. According to H1 and H2, the effects of IEM on internal political reform are 
expected to be mixed in Mozambique, given its relatively stable socio-political conditions 
but severe economic challenges. Given their post-conflict nature, the elections in 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 World Bank, "Mozambique at a Glance," ed. Africa Data and Statistics (2006). 
6
 U.S. State Department, "Background Note--Mozambique," ed. Bureau of African Affairs U.S. 
Department of State (2007). 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Mozambique." 
  
104
Mozambique received a considerable amount of international attention; consequently, 
IEM efforts were well-funded and well-organized. H3, therefore, is expected to show that 
IEM was able to have a greater effect on transition and reform in Mozambique than, for 
example, on a state like Botswana, where IEM efforts were undersized and underfunded. 
This chapter will analyze the validity of H1, H2, and H3 in the case of Mozambique. 
Following a brief survey of the socio-political and economic conditions in Mozambique, 
this study will proceed by looking at IEM efforts during the 1999 and 2004 presidential 
and parliamentary elections.  
 
 II. The Political and Social Context 
Mozambique’s recent history has largely been characterized by external 
intervention. While Portuguese traders first arrived in present-day Mozambique as early 
as the sixteenth century, their rule over the entire indigenous population was not 
consolidated until the early twentieth century.9 Harsh Portuguese colonial rule “had very 
shallow roots and very little investment in human or physical infrastructure.”10 Yet, when 
other European states embarked on decolonization in the wake of World War II, Portugal 
retained its colonies for nearly thirty more years.11 In the face of growing independence 
movements, the Portuguese responded with extreme measures such as “the use of 
napalm, scorched earth policies, forced removals of rural poor, and internment camps.”12 
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Indeed, it was only after the Salazar regime was overthrown in Portugal that colonial rule 
officially came to an end. At the time of independence, Mozambique was extremely ill-
prepared for self-government—it was one of the world’s poorest countries; a vast 
majority of the population was illiterate; and it lacked an economic and political base for 
successful self-rule. 
Mozambique’s political and economic development was further hindered in the 
decades following independence as well. External actors played a role in this as well. 
Although Mozambique was not granted official independence from Portugal until 1975, 
independence movements merged to form the Frelimo party as early as 1962.13 At 
independence, Frelimo assumed control of the government and soon adopted Marxist-
Leninist doctrine. In response to Frelimo’s provision of refuge to members of the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), a group responsible for a rebellion against 
the white minority government, Rhodesian officials assisted Renamo in its efforts to 
overthrow the Frelimo government.14 Some scholars even cite that Renamo “was 
established by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization… [making it] an 
externally created insurgency.”15 When Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980, 
South Africa lent assistance to Renamo until 1984.16 The bloody civil war between the 
Frelimo government and the Renamo opposition continued despite this. By the 1989, 
Frelimo had begun a series of important political reforms, rejecting Marxist-Leninist 
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ideologies, and a new constitution that allowed for multiparty system and elections was 
adopted one year later.17 That same year, peace negotiations began in Rome between the 
warring parties and sixteen years of civil war ended with peace accords signed in 1992.18 
Under the 1992 General Peace Agreement, the task of post-conflict recovery and 
demobilization fell largely on the UN. The UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 
lasted from December 1992 until December 1994 and its mandate included 
demobilization of the two opposing military forces, the provision of technical assistance 
and monitoring throughout the electoral process, and the coordination of humanitarian 
assistance.19 During the ONUMOZ mission, over one million refugees returned to 
Mozambique and, with the aid of the UN’s humanitarian assistance programs, nearly 
three million internally displaced persons were resettled.20 Mozambique’s first multi-
party parliamentary and presidential elections were held from October 27-29, 1994. 
These elections were widely viewed as free and fair by UN monitors. Despite electoral 
victory by the ruling Frelimo party and the incumbent president, Joaquim Chissano, 
Renamo garnered 112 of 250 seats in the National Assembly and its presidential 
candidate, Afonso Dhlakama, won nearly 34 percent of the vote.21 Of the 6.2 million 
registered voters, nearly 88 percent turned out to vote in the historic election, revealing a 
general readiness for a peaceful transition.22 
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III. The Economic Context: Historically and Today 
As was previously mentioned, Mozambique was, at the time of its independence, 
one of the world’s poorest countries. The Portuguese invested little in Mozambique, and 
upon decolonization, the flight of skilled settler workers further disadvantaged the 
Mozambican economy. In the years following independence, the economic situation 
worsened as Frelimo adopted Marxist-Leninist economic policies, such as 
“collectivization of agriculture, forced resettlements, and the establishment of inefficient 
state farms.”23 In addition to the economic mismanagement, violent civil conflict further 
destabilized an already devastated economy.  
Over time, the Frelimo government’s moved away from its commitment to 
Marxist-Leninist economic policies; in 1987, the government initiated a series of reforms 
aimed at economic stabilization and liberalization.24 That year, the government adopted 
an IMF program for structural adjustment, the Economic Rehabilitation Program, which, 
among other things, “legitimized the pursuit of individual profit” and privatization.25 At 
the macroeconomic level, these and subsequent economic reforms had a largely positive 
effect on the Mozambican economy. Since 1993, real GDP growth rates have averaged 
roughly eight percent.26 In 2006, the GDP growth rate was an impressive ten percent. 
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From 1995 to 1997, inflation was reduced from 54 percent to 5.8 percent.27 Currently, 
inflation is just over twelve percent.28 
Still, even with this impressive growth, Mozambique remains one of the world’s 
poorest countries and is heavily dependent on foreign aid.29 On the United Nations 
Human Development Index, Mozambique ranked 171 of 177.30 Citizens in Mozambique 
face growing poverty, deepening inequality, and high levels of unemployment. While 
continued growth has reduced poverty levels, it is estimated that 70 percent of 
Mozambicans are living below the poverty line.31 According to the Carter Center, “a 
majority of people live on less than $2 a day and more than half of Mozambique’s 
population is undernourished and does not have access to clean water.”32 Average life 
expectancy in Mozambique is only 39 years, and infant mortality is roughly 129 per 
1,000 live births. 33 Inequality continues to grow and more than 20 percent of 
Mozambicans are unemployed.34 Mozambique faces a rising AIDS dilemma, with over 
twelve percent of adults living with HIV/AIDS.35 According to World Bank estimates, 
“AIDS has reduced per capita GDP growth by as much as [one] percent per annum 
because of reduced productivity growth, lower human capital accumulation, reduced 
physical accumulation, not to mention the social burden of the disease.”36 A lack of 
physical and social service infrastructure presents further challenges. Corruption, which 
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has grown steadily since privatization began in 1987, is another hurdle facing 
Mozambique’s economic and political transition. Thus, while it is clear that Mozambique 
has come a long way since conflict ended in 1992, the government faces a challenging 
road ahead as it searches for solutions to its many remaining economic problems. 
 
IV. Current Political and Social Structures 
A. The Mozambican Constitution—Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Structures  
 The current constitution of Mozambique was adopted on November 30, 1990 and 
it established a multiparty democratic republic.37 It replaced the 1975 constitution, which 
created a single party “people’s republic,” where the main executive post was held by the 
party leader.38 A three branch national government, with a separate executive, legislature, 
and judiciary, presides over ten provinces and the capital city, Maputo.39 The head of the 
executive branch is the president of Mozambique, who is the head of state, head of 
government, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.40 The president is directly 
elected for a term of five years, and may serve a maximum of three consecutive terms.41 
Like the Ugandan president, the president of Mozambique must be a citizen by birth and 
be at least 35 years of age to hold office.42 In Mozambique, the president wields 
substantial power. While the legislature “actively debates Government initiatives and 
does generate some independent legislative proposals, nevertheless, [it] remains clearly 
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subordinate to the executive branch.”43 What is more, a weak judiciary is also unable to 
fully check executive power.44 
 The primary legislative body in Mozambique is the National Assembly. This 
unicameral parliament consists of 250 directly elected members of parliament (MPs).45 
MPs are elected based upon a “party list system with proportional representation.”46 
However, political parties must gain at least five percent of the national vote in order to 
gain representation in the National Assembly. This party threshold is an important 
distinction, which essentially bars many minority parties from representation in the 
parliament. For example, during the 1999 elections, several minor parties were able to 
collectively garner nearly thirteen percent of the vote, yet were unrepresented as not one 
reached the five percent threshold.47 
 The judiciary in Mozambique consists of a Supreme Court, as well as courts at the 
provincial, district, and municipal level.48 While the 1990 constitution created an 
independent judiciary, more and more it has become weakened by executive interference 
and neglect.49 Freedom House has noted that corruption has pervaded the legal system, 
and even the Mozambican attorney general has observed “incompetence and abuse of 
power at all levels of the administration of justice.”50 The judiciary is further hindered by 
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a great shortage of judges and defense lawyers. Despite its population of nearly nineteen 
million, there are only 170 judges and roughly 200 defense lawyers in Mozambique.51 
B. The Electoral System 
 Unlike the two previous cases in this study, Mozambique uses a proportional 
representation (PR) electoral system, as opposed to the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) 
system. Essentially, a party’s percentage of the national vote should be reflected in the 
allocation of seats in the National Assembly. The PR system in Mozambique is what is 
termed a List-PR, where “candidates do not contest elections as individuals, in their own 
right, but as party candidates on a predetermined party list.”52 In a state recently divided 
by civil conflict, the PR system is a wise choice for many reasons. First, it allows 
political parties to win parliamentary representation based upon their electoral 
performance and threshold.53 Thus, the parliament tends to be more broadly 
representative, and this is advantageous for conflict resolution.54 Studies have shown that 
this electoral system is more conducive to participation by women, who might not have 
been able to win an absolute majority. In the 1999 election, 28 percent elected to the 
National Assembly were women; this was the highest percentage among all SADC 
countries.55  While this system is generally more inclusive of minority parties than the 
winner-takes-all system, the five percent threshold needed to win any seats at all does 
disadvantage some groups. This has been the case during several elections in 
Mozambique and will be discussed below. 
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C. Political Parties and Civil Society 
 Mozambique is a multiparty democracy; however, the two main parties, Frelimo 
and Renamo, form the main political cleavage. Frelimo continues to dominate the 
government, having won an absolute majority in the National Assembly and the office of 
the presidency for all three elections. Yet, as was previously mentioned, Renamo has 
managed to win a significant number of seats in parliament and, especially in the 1999 
election, has presented a serious challenge. Other smaller parties do exist, such as the 
Party for Peace, Development, and Democracy (PDD) and the Labor Party (PT).56 
These and other smaller parties have in the past collectively won eighteen percent of the 
vote in 1994, and 13 percent in 1999, yet because of the five percent party threshold, they 
remain unrepresented in government. 
 Mozambique’s history of conflict and a one party state-centric political system 
has created several challenges in the rebuilding of civil society. Indeed, Mazula notes that 
before 1990, “only a few mass and professional organizations were according 
recognition…by the ruling party.”57 These included organizations for women, workers, 
teachers, and youths for the purpose of mobilizing society along the lines of the ruling 
party.58 Today, multiparty politics has altered the relationship between state and society, 
and the number of NGOs has dramatically increased. In Mozambique today, over 400 
NGOs operate, a majority of which are independent of Frelimo.59 Although the number 
of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Mozambique is less than that in neighboring 
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states, the growth of such organizations is significant, given its relatively recent transition 
to democracy. NGOs and other CSOs are becoming increasingly vocal in their criticisms 
of the government.60 Organized labor is also becoming more independent of Frelimo and 
the state. In 1994, the Organization of Free and Independent Unions was created, and is 
the most independent trade union to date.61 All workers in non-essential service sectors 
now have the right to strike, and collective bargaining is a legally protected right.62 
Independent media outlets have grown in recent years; however, the state-run print and 
broadcasting outlets dominate the media.63 Women, aided in part by the PR system, have 
been able to participate in politics. For example, in 2004, Luisa Diogo became the first 
female to be named prime minister.64 Still, discrimination against women remains a 
problem in Mozambique despite significant progress towards gender equality. 
 
V. IEM and the Election of 1999 
A. The Electoral Context 
 The 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections in Mozambique were important 
for a number of reasons. First, they were the second multiparty elections held in the 
country since the civil war officially ended.  As a result, they were an important test of 
the progress of reconciliation and post-conflict recovery. According to the Carter Center, 
which had observed the election, the 1999 vote was “important to reinforcing peace and 
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democratic stability in the country and across the region.”65 Essentially, these elections 
would help gage the degree to which conflict between the two main rival groups, Frelimo 
and Renamo, was institutionalized in the political process. Second, this election is 
significant because the electoral law had been newly rewritten, in response to controversy 
over voter registration practices during the 1998 municipal elections.66 Third, the 1999 
election is significant because the margin of the Frelimo presidential victory was less 
than four percent. The Renamo coalition presented a major challenge to the ruling party; 
this development was seen by some observers as a sign of a “maturing political 
system.”67 
 The elections were scheduled to take place from December 3-4, 1999. However, 
the polling was extended another day, due to logistical problems in the Zambezia 
province.68 A number of international monitoring groups were invited by the National 
Elections Commission (CNE) to observe the presidential and parliamentary elections. 
These included delegations from the Carter Center, the Commonwealth Observer Group, 
the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) of the SADC, and the EU.69 In addition to 
hundreds of international election monitors, several domestic observation groups 
monitored the electoral process. These included the Associação Moçambicana Paro o 
Desenvolvimento da Democracia (AMODE), the Forum de Educação Civica (FECIV), 
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and the Forum de Educação Civica de Sofala (FORCISO).70 Due to an inability to access 
EU and Commonwealth’s observer reports before 2000, the primary data regarding this 
election will be drawn from Carter Center and EISA reports. This should not prove 
problematic, as the Carter Center consulted with these observer groups, coordinating 
deployment and sharing findings.71 
B. The Pre-Election Period 
 As was the case during the elections in Botswana, the ECF mission was again 
limited in its pre-election coverage by financial constraints; therefore, again it engaged a 
group of Mozambican researches to monitor the pre-election phase. This team, led by a 
sociology professor at Eduardo Mondlane University, published a monthly report of the 
electoral process from August 1999 until January 2000.72 The Carter Center, however, 
sent a thirteen person team in August 1999 to observe the voter registration process.73 By 
October, the Carter Center had set up a field office in the capital, Maputo, and dispatched 
a team of eleven medium-term monitors who would cover the campaign process and 
assess the feasibility of a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT).74 A PVT “involves the 
monitoring and recording of results from a random statistical sample of polling stations 
by election observers, and the comparison of these results to official results.”75 When 
properly executed, PVTs can provide a reliable projection of the vote and is thus useful 
for detecting fraud and electoral legitimacy. Despite the usefulness of a PVT, officials 
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from the CNE controversially argued it was illegal under Mozambican law for such a 
process to be performed. In light of the disputed electoral outcome, monitors later pointed 
to the absence of a PVT as a critical shortcoming of the election. 
Voter registration, the first phase in the electoral process, occurred from July 20 
until September 17, 1999. During the 1998 municipal elections, the validity of the voters 
roll was disputed and it was ruled that a new voters roll would be created for the 1999 
national elections.76 In Mozambique, all citizens who are eighteen years of age are 
required by law to register to vote.77 From July to September, approximately 85 percent 
of the 8.3 million eligible voters were registered to vote in the upcoming election.78 
Because the number of registered voters had increased from the previous election, the 
number of seats in parliament allocated to each province was also adjusted accordingly.79 
Voter registration was observed by over 3,500 domestic monitors from FECIV and 
AMODE, as well as international observers from EISA and the Carter Center.80  
Observers found that for the most part registration was conducted in an efficient 
manner; however, several important logistical problems were noted. First, in some cases, 
the registration offices were located long distances from many citizens, and many had 
great difficulties getting to these posts.81 Second, in some limited cases, there were 
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shortages in registration materials.82 Third, there was concern among observers that 
Renamo representatives were not fully integrated into the Technical Secretariat of 
Electoral Administration (STAE).83 Finally, monitors reported shortages of food and 
supplies for registration staff members, as well as confusion over the roles of party agents 
and domestic observers at certain posts.84 Yet, overall, the large turnout, general 
efficiency and calm led observers to positively view the voter registration process. 
In Mozambique, the STAE is responsible for the training of polling staff, voter 
education programs, and all other administrative and technical aspects of electoral 
preparation. Monitors from the Carter Center noted that the STAE’s training programs 
were well-organized and efficient in their training of thousands of “civic education agents 
and polling officials.”85 The STAE used “posters, pamphlets, theater, radio programs, 
printed T-shirts, newspapers, and colorful rallies” in order to educate voters.86 Other 
organizations such as the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the 
European Parliamentarians for Africa also assisted in training nearly 1,000 party agents 
in their electoral roles.87 While many domestic NGOs were unable to assist in voter 
education efforts due to funding shortages, the STAE-run programs were quite successful 
and a majority of voters understood the process on election day.88 
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The campaign period began on October 19 and officially ended on November 30, 
1999.  Ultimately, the campaign was dominated by Frelimo and Renamo, and other 
smaller parties or coalitions received much less attention. Under Mozambican law, the 
CNE is required to allocate government funds to political parties for the purpose of 
campaign finance. However, the CNE did not disburse the funds until two weeks 
remained in the campaign period.89 Opposition leaders argued this advantaged the 
incumbent Frelimo party, which had access to government resources. Additionally, 
monitors from the Carter Center found that media coverage during the campaign was 
biased and manipulated by both sides.90 Although electoral law prohibits state-run media 
outlets from biased coverage, these outlets were decidedly pro-Frelimo. For example, the 
government-run TVM television outlet was especially biased, and much of the media 
coverage “suggested that Frelimo was the victim of a war-mongering Renamo party.”91 
Accordingly, the negative campaign rhetoric incited incidents of violence, which 
marred an otherwise calm campaign. In some areas, such as the Changara district in the 
western Tete province, violence and intimidation were more commonplace. In Changara, 
the house of the Renamo candidate was burnt down by Frelimo supporters.92 Elsewhere 
in the district, five other homes were burned.93 Although Renamo lodged a formal 
complaint to the CNE, requesting the election be postponed in the district because of an 
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inability to campaign, it was turned down as a matter for the police.94 In other parts of 
Mozambique, violence broke out on occasions where rallies for both Renamo and 
Frelimo overlapped.  Following the Renamo campaign, there was an “outbreak of violent 
incidents including confrontations, beatings and the use of firearms” in the historically 
pro-Frelimo Majacaze, Chibuto, and Chokwe districts.95 While the campaign proceeded 
peacefully in most parts of the country, monitors found the outbreaks of political violence 
were quite disturbing, given Mozambique’s fragile democracy. 
C. December 3-5, 1999: The Vote, Count, and Results 
 On November 29, 1999 a 50-person delegation from the Carter Center, led by 
former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, his wife Rosalynn Carter, and former Botswana 
President Ketumile Masire.96 Monitors from the ECF arrived in Mozambique on 
December 1 and 2, 1999.97 On the day of the election, the Carter Center worked with 
other IEM groups to coordinate deployment and observation, given Mozambique’s large 
size.98 In all, monitors visited 747 polling stations in nearly all districts.99 The Carter 
Center also noted the presence of domestic observer groups in over 45 percent of polling 
stations visited.100  
 On the first day of the election, monitors reported that, overall, the polling stations 
opened on time at 7:00 am and voting proceeded in an efficient, calm, and orderly 
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manner throughout the day.101 Delayed station openings were reported by a few observer 
teams, particularly in the Zambezia province where accessibility by road is limited. In 
fact, by the second day of the election, the CNE announced a statewide extension of 
voting to a third day, citing logistical delays in the delivery of election materials and the 
resulting late openings at 77 polling stations in the Zambezia province.102 Yet even with 
the additional day of voting, logistical problems still prohibited eleven polling stations 
from opening.103 For the most part, observers had positive reports from the polling 
stations. ECF monitors noted that polling staff showed great dedication and 
professionalism, and party agents abided by electoral rules, conducting themselves in a 
“constructive manner.”104 Monitors from the Carter Center delegation reported instances 
where voters were turned away due to errors in their registration or on their voter cards; 
other teams observed instances of illegal campaigning and problems of confusion among 
non-Portuguese speaking citizens over voting procedures.105   
Voter turnout on the first day of the election was comparatively high, but was 
lower on the following two days. Observers estimated that, by the time the polls closed at 
6:00pm on the second day, between 70 and 80 percent of registered voters had voted.106 
By the final day of the election, December 5, the pace of voting had greatly slowed. At 
6:00 pm that evening, the polls officially closed and the counting process began. Votes 
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were counted each polling station, and the results are recorded on tally sheets termed 
editais. Generally, monitors found the count at the polling station to be efficient and 
accurate; however, they cited the lack of proper lighting as potentially problematic.107 
Once the editais were compiled at each polling station, they were sent to a provincial 
office, where STAE and CNE officials consolidated and computerized the results from 
the eleven provinces. To ensure accuracy, tally sheets are counted by two separate groups 
and entered into the computer database.108 Monitors were to be allowed access to the 
computer database, to compare the CNE results with their findings. Yet, in some cases 
where CNE and STAE orders were unclear, monitors were unable to access the database, 
or if so, only for periods of 15-30 minutes.109 The provincial counts took place from 
December 7 until December 15, and were several days behind schedule.  
After the provincial tallies were completed, the results were sent to the CNE 
headquarters in Maputo for review and calculation of the overall results. At the national 
headquarters, problem tally sheets are also reviewed and judged valid or invalid. 
Monitors noted that the reclassification process, during which invalid, blank, or contested 
ballots are reviewed, proceeded efficiently and without major difficulties. Problems did 
arise, however, during the computer data entry at the Maputo office. Monitors were 
barred from entering the first computer room, and could only view from a distance; they 
were able to receive access to the second computer database, but again, only for short 
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periods.110 Nor were monitors able to receive carbon copies of the tally sheets, rendering 
a throughout check of the results unfeasible. According to Carter Center monitors, “as the 
process continued, distrust between CNE members from the two parties increased and 
began to hinder the CNE’s ability to work.”111 During the final stages of the count, 
Renamo held regular press conferences, alleging any result apart from a Renamo victory 
was fraudulent as well as accusing Frelimo and the CNE of rigging the vote by declaring 
tally sheets from Renamo strongholds invalid.112 On December 20, the date on which the 
results were required to be announced, entry in the second database was terminated, 
causing further accusations of an unfair vote by Renamo officials.113  
When the final results were released on December 22, Chissano was declared the 
presidential victor, winning 52.3 percent of the vote; the Renamo candidate Dhlakama 
came in second with 47.7 percent of the vote.114 Frelimo also won a parliamentary 
majority, garnering 133 seats; Renamo won the remaining 117 seats, marking an increase 
from the 112 seats it won in 1994.115 Reacting to its loss, Renamo declared the electoral 
results invalid, alleging voter fraud and irregularities. In January 2000, Renamo lodged a 
formal complaint to the Supreme Court. After a series of closed-door investigations and 
meetings, the Supreme Court rejected the complaint, “dismissing most [of Renamo’s 
claims] as either incorrect, outside the court’s jurisdiction, or lacking sufficient 
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evidence.”116 In light of the controversy, international monitors expressed some concern 
over the transparency of the counting process, but did commend the government on a 
generally calm and orderly election.117  Monitors from the Carter Center also returned to 
Mozambique in April and May, 2000 so as to continue to evaluate the overall electoral 
process. 
D. IEM Findings and Recommendations 
 The 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections, according to Carter Center 
monitors, “showed signs of a maturing political system… [Where] parties forged a 
consensus electoral law and campaigned widely, and election day processes were well-
administered with high voter turnout.”118 Nevertheless, they also expressed concern over 
the transparency of the counting process as well as other technical and logistical 
problems that undermined the legitimacy of the election results. 
In their final reports, international election monitors made a number of 
recommendations for improving the efficiency and quality of the electoral process. With 
regards to the pre-election phase, ECF monitors cited the need for some improvement in 
voter education of the elderly, whom were often not familiar with voting processes.119 
Monitors also proposed reform of the CNE and STAE, so as to prevent partisanship and 
to enhance efficiency.120 The Carter Center proposed reducing the number of members on 
the CNE, and increasing the impartiality of its members by reducing the role of political 
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parties.121 Aside from these suggestions, and calls for reforming the system of campaign 
financing, most recommendations targeted the vote and counting processes. The ECF 
recommended greater privacy at polling stations; the locating of those stations closer to 
where registered voters live; improved delivery of voting materials; better 
communication between the CNE and the local polling stations; improved lighting at 
facilities; and the allowance of voters in line at 6:00 pm to be allowed to cast their 
vote.122 The Carter Center recommended limiting the vote to a single day, or ending early 
on the second day, so as to expedite the counting process.123 Monitors from the Center 
also recommended the standardization of procedures and configurations of the polling 
stations; the expedition of the tabulation and verification process; the permission for 
observers to monitor the data entry process; the authorization for “civil society, media, 
and national observers to gather information about election results, including conducting 
parallel vote tabulations;” and the reform of the institutions and processes for handling 
electoral disputes.124 Monitors also called for enhanced civil society participation in all 
stages of the electoral process. 
 
VI. IEM and the Election of 2004 
A. The Electoral Context 
 The 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections in Mozambique, like the 1999 
elections, offered the opportunity to assess the progress of democratic reform in 
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Mozambique.  Yet the elections were significant in other ways as well. First, they were 
significant in light of many electoral reforms that had occurred in response to problems 
that arose during the 1999 national and 2003 municipal elections. These reforms 
included: an increase in the size of the CNE from 17 members to 19 members, despite 
contrary recommendations from international monitors; the ability of political parties to 
proof ballots before printing; a ban on the use of central government’s property or goods 
for campaigning by the incumbent party; clarification of qualifications required of polling 
staff members (including the need for at least two staffers to speak the local language); 
the prohibition of a third day for voting; the provision of tally sheets to all party 
delegates; a ruling by the CNE to grant observers full access to the voting and counting 
processes at polling stations and to provide them with copies of the polling station editais; 
the ability for monitors to organize a PVT.125 Aside from the CNE expansion, these 
electoral reforms were encouraging; however, some problems noted during the 1999 
election still remained. For example, there was “no provision to ensure the timely and 
transparent preparation, testing, and verification of national tabulation software.”126 Also, 
polls were still to close at 6pm, which meant that counting would still proceed in a poorly 
lit environment. Perhaps the most important unresolved problem was the inability for 
election monitors to closely observe the computer data entry at the provincial and 
national offices. Like the 1999 election, monitors were only allowed to view the process 
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from behind a glass screen and were not permitted to observe decision-making regarding 
contested editais.127 
 The 2004 elections took place on December 1 and 2. Over 400 international 
observers from organizations such as the African Union, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
EISA, EU, Carter Center, SADC, and the UN Development Program (UNDP) 
participated in IEM efforts.128 Domestic monitors also played an important role in the 
2004 elections. The Electoral Observatory, an umbrella organization composed of a 
number of domestic NGOs, greatly assisted monitoring efforts and aided in the conduct 
of a PVT.129 Because the Carter Center, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the EISA, and 
the EU were the primary IEM delegations present during the election, their final reports 
will be used in the analysis of the 2004 electoral process. 
B. The Pre-Election Period  
 While many IEM groups began to arrive for pre-election observation in October, 
monitors from the Carter Center were present in Mozambique throughout 2004. Working 
alongside domestic observers, the Center was able to monitor the voter registration period 
from June to July.130 In early October, long-term monitors were deployed to all provinces 
to cover the start of the formal campaign on October 17.131 On October 20, the long-term 
observers from the EU arrived in Mozambique and were likewise deployed to all 
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provinces.132 The Commonwealth’s ‘Advance Group’ was deployed from November 13 
to the 22;133 however, this two member team was limited in its coverage, as compared to 
the Carter Center and the EU. While the EISA mission did not arrive until November 22, 
they engaged a group of Mozambican researches to cover the pre-election period and 
produce an Election Update publication, just as they had done during the 1999 
elections.134 
 Voter registration took place from June 28 until July 15, 2004. During this period, 
the existing voters rolls were to be updated with the names of newly eligible voters, those 
whom had changed residence, and those whom had lost their voter identification cards; 
the names of those deceased were also to be removed from the rolls. Voter registration 
was updated both manually and via computer. The Carter Center, which had observed the 
process, found that the manual updates of the voter registration proceeded efficiently and 
fairly; however, they expressed concerns over the reliability of the computerized voters 
roll, which was not widely reviewed by the public and contained many errors.135 Still, by 
the end of the registration period, over 1.2 million names were updated or added to the 
voters roll, bringing the estimates of registered voters to approximately 90 percent of all 
eligible voters.136 
 Voter education efforts and the training of polling staff were generally seen by 
Commonwealth, Carter Center, and EISA observers as appropriate. While the 
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Commonwealth observers viewed the civic education and staff training quite effective,137 
the Carter Center expressed reservations over delays and logistical difficulties in the 
education efforts.138 EU observers, however, were concerned with the adequacy of CNE 
and STAE electoral preparations. They noted, “Deficient logistical planning led to delays 
in the delivering of election materials which meant that 37 polling stations never opened 
and a high number of polling stations opened late or only on the second day.”139 In some 
cases, voting materials delivered to the polling stations included the incorrect voter 
lists.140 
  The campaign period began on October 17 and three days before the election, on 
November 29. Like the 1999 elections, the two most prominent parties during the 
campaign period were Frelimo and Renamo. Many of the problems observed during the 
2004 campaign period were similar to those during the previous election. Funding delays 
were again reported by a number of candidates.141 Renamo and PDD parties alleged the 
illegal use of state resources by Frelimo.142 Despite an electoral code of conduct, signed 
for the first time by all political parties months before the election, incidences of violence 
and intimidation were reported during the campaign period. Carter Center observers 
noted that in some areas “opposition parties reported they encountered difficulties setting 
up offices and were subjected to verbal provocations and in some instances, stabbings 
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and assaults.”143 During the 2004 election, media bias remained a problem, particularly 
on the state -run TVM television network.144 Still, certain independent weekly 
newspapers, radio programs, and fax paper news organizations proved less biased in their 
campaign coverage.145 Yet despite the negative political rhetoric between Frelimo and 
Renamo and isolated incidents of violence, the campaign proceeded calmly in a majority 
of the country. As a result of its significant funding resources, Frelimo and its presidential 
candidate, Armando Guebuza, enjoyed a great campaign advantage over Renamo and its 
presidential candidate, Alfonso Dhlakama.  
C. December 1-2, 2004: The Vote, Count, and Results 
 On November 27, a 60 person delegation from the Carter Center arrived in 
Mozambique in preparation for the December 1 and 2 elections. They were joined by a 
130 member EU mission, 63 member delegation from the SADC Parliamentary Forum, a 
34 person EISA delegation, as well as smaller delegations from organizations including 
the Commonwealth Secretariat and the UN.146 These IEM groups, working with each 
other as well as with domestic observer groups like the Electoral Observatory, were 
deployed to all provinces across Mozambique. 
Polling stations were scheduled to open at 7:00 am and remain so until 6:00 pm. 
In general, it was observed that a vast majority of polling stations opened and closed on 
time, with problems regarding improper opening procedures and ballot sealing reported at 
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only a small handful of stations.147 According to EU statistics, nearly 83 percent of all 
observed polling stations received complete voting materials, and all were properly 
staffed.148 Monitors reported that polling proceeded in a calm and organized manner, 
administered by a staff that appeared well-trained and professional.149 Additionally, 
voters generally seemed aware of voting procedures.150 At most polling stations, monitors 
were able to observe freely, although they were not allowed to talk with voters within a 
300 meter radius of the polling station.151 A few serious irregularities were reported by 
monitors. Generally, these involved delays in polling station openings, inaccurate voter 
registers, and difficulties in accessing remote polling stations.152 While turnout was 
higher on the first day of the election, the overall percentage of voter turnout was 
significantly lower than during the 1999 elections. It is estimated that between 36 and 43 
percent of registered voters cast a vote in the election.153  
Upon the closing of the polls on the second day, the counting process commenced 
at each station. Monitors found that the first phase of the process, the local counts, was 
generally transparent, although quite slow.154 Inadequate lighting many polling stations 
was cited as a main cause of delays. At the provincial and national levels, transport 
delays and technical difficulties greatly slowed down the tabulation process; indeed, 
monitors noted that “not one provincial election commission …completed this process by 
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the legal deadlines.”155 Perhaps the greatest shortcomings of the count stemmed from a 
lack of transparency in the process at the provincial and national level, and the 
questionable security of the software programs used for the count. Not only were the 
security features of the tabulation software weak, but over the course of the count, the 
software recognized a higher number of polling stations than actually existed.156 Also, 
observers were not given copies of the tally sheets, and although they could follow along 
with computerized tabulation, they were not able to analyze the results by location.157 
Monitors were only allowed to observe the CNE review of contested ballots for two 
hours a day, generating concerns over the transparency of the process.158 Again, when the 
counting process was dragged out, Renamo voiced complaints over the legitimacy of the 
vote. By the time the results were announced, four days after the legal deadline of 
December 17, serious doubts remained over the accuracy and legitimacy of the counting 
process. Worryingly, Carter Center observers found that “the results also excluded some 
699 presidential tally sheets (5.4 percent of total votes) and 731 legislative assembly 
tallies (5.7 percent of total votes) without explanation for their exclusion.”159 Although 
Renamo filed an electoral petition calling for new elections, it was rejected by the CNE 
on grounds that it was submitted after the legal deadline (two days following the 
announcement of the results).160  
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Perhaps the greatest achievement of the 2004 elections was the conduct of a PVT, 
in large part by the Electoral Observatory. A random sample of 792 polling stations 
across Mozambique was used in the PVT.161 Approximately 1,600 local observers were 
trained to collect data from these polling stations in order to run the tabulation; and 
despite some difficulties, nearly all the required information was gathered.162 The PVT 
results, which were announced within 72 hours after the polls closed, were quite 
consistent with the official results, “with a margin of error less than 0.5 percent.”163 
According to the official results, Guebuza garnered 63.6 percent of the national vote 
(63.3 percent according to PVT calculations), and Dhlakama earned 31.7 percent (31.8 
percent according to the PVT).164 In the parliamentary elections, Frelimo won 62 percent 
of the vote (61.5 percent according to the PVT), and Renamo earned 29.7 percent (30 
percent according to the PVT).165 The 2004 elections marked another victory for the 
ruling Frelimo party. Indeed, Renamo suffered greater electoral losses in this election, 
than in the 1999 poll. IEM monitors commended Mozambique on a peaceful election. 
And while the PVT did allay some fears about the legitimacy of the overall process, they 
did express some concerns particularly regarding the transparency of the count.  
D. IEM Findings and Recommendations 
 Given Mozambique’s post-conflict transition to multiparty democracy, the 
peaceful nature of the third national elections marked continued progress towards 
stability and recovery; however, the serious electoral shortcomings evidenced the need 
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for greater progress towards internal political reform. Monitors reported that, while 
Frelimo had a clear lead in the polls, “there [could] be no doubt that the election was 
riddled with enough administrative shortcomings to cast doubt on the commitment of the 
electoral bodies to the conduct of truly credible and legitimate elections.”166 The 
inaccuracy of voter registration, incidences of violence during the campaign period, 
inadequate logistical planning for the election, and generally uneven playing field 
between the ruling and opposition parties were all cited as lingering shortcomings of the 
pre-election phase.167 The vote and the count were marred by delays and inefficiencies, 
problems with transparency, and questionable security and accuracy of the tabulation 
software. Because many of the problems observed during the 1999 election were again 
reported during the 2004 election, IEM groups drew similar conclusions and made 
similar recommendations.  
 The recommendations given by each IEM group were essentially the same. All 
groups expressed the need for greater electoral reforms with regards to the voter 
registration process. Carter Center monitors suggested instituting an annual update of the 
register;168 and both EISA and EU observers called for the creation of a single voters 
roll.169 Monitors stressed the importance of campaign reforms to ensure greater 
impartiality, both in campaign funding and state-media coverage.170 With regard to the 
vote itself, monitors recommended that the vote be held only on one day, which would 
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prove less tiring to polling staff.171 Monitors also recommended a review of polling 
station locations, as many voters had to travel long distances to cast a vote and inadequate 
transport infrastructure made the delivery of election materials difficult.172 Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, monitors made several recommendations for improving the 
efficiency and transparency of the counting process. They recommended improved 
lighting at polling stations, to increase tabulation speed and accuracy. Monitors also 
recommended an improved tabulation software system, with enhanced security features, 
in order to deter fraud.173 Recommendations for reform of the CNE and STAE similar to 
those made during the 1999 elections were also put forth by monitors. Both Carter Center 
and EU observers recommended the membership of the CNE be reduced, and the 
composition altered in a way to lessen the current politicization of the body and give civil 
society members a greater role.174 Ultimately, these recommendations for CNE and 
counting reforms were suggested as means to increase the efficiency, transparency, and 
credibility of the tabulation so as to avoid electoral disputes that arose after both the 1999 
and 2004 polls. Finally, Carter Center monitors recommended that increased support be 
given to domestic monitors, whom were responsible for the successful administration of a 
PVT and greatly aided in IEM efforts.175 
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VII. Conclusions and Implications 
The experience of international monitors in Mozambique is important for the 
overall analysis of IEM in this study. In a country that, until only recently, was mired in a 
brutal and widespread civil conflict, and that is extremely economically underdeveloped, 
the atmosphere and outcome of the 1999 and 2004 elections demonstrate impressive 
process towards internal political reform. Despite the mixed success of IEM predicted by 
the hypotheses of this study, H1, H2, and H3 did not provide any major hindrances to 
monitoring efforts.  Several important recommendations of monitors following the 1999 
election were enacted by the Mozambican government prior to the 2004 vote. Indeed, the 
primary shortcomings of the election arose not from IEM, but from other conditioning 
and intervening variables. 
The experience of international monitors during the 1999 and 2004 votes supports 
H1. The relatively calm environment during both elections aided monitors in their 
observation efforts. Additionally, monitors found NGOs and other civil society groups 
receptive to their work, which broadened the participation of citizens in the electoral 
process. For the most part, conflict between societal factions has been institutionalized in 
the electoral and political process, which has created a political culture favorable for 
efficient international observation. 
While the adverse economic conditions of Mozambique were expected to 
undermine the effectiveness of IEM, they did not prove as detrimental as presumed. 
Logistical inadequacies and underfunding did impede registration, education, and polling 
efforts; however, international election monitors found these shortcomings surmountable. 
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Indeed, in the case of Mozambique, local NGOs and international organizations, such as 
NDI, assisted in polling staff training and other electoral preparations. The actions of 
Mozambican CSOs, NGOs, and international organizations compensated for the 
difficulties presented by adverse economic conditions. It can also be argued that the 
characteristics of the IEM groups also compensated for the shortcomings predicted by 
H2. 
Indeed, not only do the characteristics IEM in Mozambique offset the effects of 
H2, but they strongly confirm H3.  IEM groups in Mozambique were larger in number, 
had a longer presence, and had greater resources than those in either of the previous two 
cases—all of which enhanced the effectiveness and credibility of the electoral 
observation. Monitors from the Carter Center were especially noteworthy, as they had the 
longest presence before and after the elections and they worked closely with other 
international and domestic observer groups. The Center’s collaboration with over 1,500 
domestic observers to carry out a PVT during the 2004 elections proved an immense 
boost both to overall observation efforts and to the credibility of the election.  
The adoption of a number of IEM recommendations in the period between the 
1999 and 2004 vote confirms that IEM did have some important effects on political 
reform in Mozambique. Additionally, the PVT exercise in 2004, which confirmed the 
official results, also marked a considerable achievement given the post-conflict nature of 
the elections. Yet, monitors found that important shortcomings remained even after the 
2004 elections. These problems resulted not from IEM, but on account of other 
conditioning and intervening factors. One obstacle to continued internal political reform 
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is the structural problems inherent in the party threshold of the PR system, which renders 
many minority groups unrepresented. A second problem was that monitors were not 
permitted to access all aspects of the count and tabulation process. Problems with the 
CNE prevented monitors not only from conducting a PVT in 1999, but from closely 
observing the national tabulation, the part of the electoral process which proved most 
controversial. Thus, the case of Mozambique suggests that not only does the structure of 
the electoral system condition the success of internal political reform, but the receptivity 
of electoral bodies can affect the success of IEM.  
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Chapter 6: Zimbabwe 
I. Overview 
Although Zimbabwe has had the longest experience with multiparty elections of 
the four states in this study, the quality of governance has significantly deteriorated over 
time. When a long struggle between the Rhodesian white minority government and the 
black majority opposition, led by the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and 
ZANU came to an end with the 1979 Lancaster House Accord, Zimbabwe was granted 
full independence in 1980.1 Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party won a landslide victory in the 1980, garnering sixty-
three percent of the popular vote and a majority of seats in the parliament.2 Throughout 
the 1980s, Mugabe’s regime used “state institutions like the army… the police, the 
Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), and the media to suppress and demoralize its 
opposition.”3 Mugabe’s imprudent economic policies, coupled by his funneling of public 
funds to ensure his electoral success, further weakened the Zimbabwean economy 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The situation grew significantly worse in the late 1990s 
as the economy “went into free fall in 1997.”4 Now, two decades after independence, 
Zimbabweans had become one-third poorer.5 And although elections have continued 
regularly, Mugabe has remained in power through manipulation and intimidation.  
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 Located in southern Africa, Zimbabwe neighbors Mozambique to the west; 
Zambia to the north; Botswana to the southwest; and South Africa to the south. This 
landlocked state is roughly 150,000 square miles in size, or slightly larger than the state 
of Montana.6 The climate is mainly tropical and the terrain of Zimbabwe is 
predominantly high plateau.7 Approximately eight percent of land in Zimbabwe is 
arable.8 While farming was once the core of the economy, controversial land reforms, 
seizures, and general mismanagement have all but ruined commercial agriculture.9 
Zimbabwe is blessed with significant mineral resource wealth;10 however, imprudent 
policies and dwindling exports have hindered the profitability of such wealth. According 
to CIA estimates, the population of Zimbabwe is just over twelve million.11 Roughly 36 
percent of the population lives in urban centers, such as the capital city, Harare.12 The 
main ethnic group in Zimbabwe is the Shona, which makes up about 70 percent of the 
population; the Ndebele ethnic group accounts for roughly sixteen percent.13 The 
remainder of the population is composed of other smaller indigenous ethnic groups, and a 
very small percentage of citizens of mixed, European, or Asian descent.14 Half of 
Zimbabweans hold syncretic (mixed indigenous and Christian) beliefs, one quarter are 
Christians, and 24 percent hold indigenous beliefs, and the remaining one percent are 
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Muslims.15 English is the official language of Zimbabwe, but Shona and Sindebele are 
also spoken.16 
This chapter seeks to assess the impact of IEM on political reform, given 
Zimbabwe’s grave economic, social, and political problems. Zimbabwe, perhaps more so 
than any other state in this study, is the critical case for determining the effects of IEM, as 
it has occurred under the most adverse structural conditions. According to H1 and H2, 
IEM groups have the least likelihood for success, on account of Zimbabwe’s economic 
collapse and negative socio-political developments. The Zimbabwe case also presents the 
potential politicization or manipulation of election monitoring, which would greatly 
affect the validity of H3 as well as the general hypotheses of this study.  After a review of 
Zimbabwe’s socio-political and economic contexts, the presidential election of 2002, and 
the 2005 parliamentary elections will be examined. These elections are significant 
because they occurred within a context of socio-political and economic upheaval, and 
they attracted significant international attention. They monitoring missions present during 
these elections varied greatly, both in their make-up and their conclusions; making 
Zimbabwe a vital case for the study of IEM and internal political reform.  
 
II. The Political and Social Context 
 Of the four cases in this study, Zimbabwe was the last country to obtain 
independent majority rule; following a fifteen year struggle against a white settler 
government, Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980. Throughout the early twentieth 
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century, Southern Rhodesia, as Zimbabwe was then known, was an internally self-
governing British colony.17 The state was run by a white settler minority, whom, led by 
Prime Minister Ian Smith, issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from 
British rule in 1965.18 Although the British considered the UDI illegal, they used 
sanctions, rather than force to oppose the move. For fifteen years, Ian Smith’s minority 
government ruled Rhodesia promoting policies of political and economic repression, 
racial discrimination, and segregation to maintain settler rule.19  
Yet, like many southern African states, nationalist movements in Zimbabwe grew 
rapidly during this time, pressing for full independence and black majority rule. The two 
main opposition movements that arose were the ZAPU and ZANU.  In response to 
increasing repression, both groups commenced a guerilla campaign aimed at the 
Rhodesian government and army; and “what began as scattered and disorganized attacks 
as early as 1966 let to full-scale war in 1972.”20 In 1976, the ZAPU and ZANU 
movements formed an alliance called the Patriotic Front (PF). In response to military 
gains by the PF, and a worsening economic situation, negotiations between the Smith 
regime, ZAPU, and ZANU began in 1976, although a formal agreement was not reached 
until December 1979.21 Under the agreement, which became known as the Lancaster 
House Agreement, Zimbabwe was to be granted full independence and majority rule, 
after a transition period in which a new constitution would be implemented and elections 
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would be held.22 Having split from the alliance with ZAPU shortly after the Lancaster 
Agreement, Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party won a large victory in the pre-
independence elections.23 
On April 18, 1980 Zimbabwe was granted formal independence from Britain, led 
by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and President Canaan Banana.24 Since that time, 
Mugabe has dominated Zimbabwean politics, first as prime minister under a Westminster 
system of government, and then as president following changes to the political system in 
1987. In the years following independence, Mugabe’s government pushed for national 
reconciliation and respected the Lancaster provisions that safeguarded the property rights 
of the white minority, despite its declared socialist orientation.25 While most white 
settlers had left Zimbabwe by 1980, many of those whom remained were able “simply to 
continue a colonial lifestyle following independence.”26 Although the ZANU-PF held the 
political power, the white minority maintained its economic dominance throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, creating a system of patronage and discouraging the formation of an 
“autonomous black middle class.”27 At the same time, ethnic cleavages among the 
African majority began to play an important role in Zimbabwean society. Tensions 
between the two main ethnic groups, the Shona and the Ndebele have increased in the 
decades following independence; today, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 
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the main opposition group in Zimbabwe, has found large support in areas with large 
Ndebele populations.28 
Since the late 1990s, the socio-political and economic situation in Zimbabwe has 
steadily declined. Not only have racial and ethnic tensions worsened, but dissatisfaction 
with government policies and a deteriorating economy has grown among groups such as 
trade unions, students, and civil servants.29 In response, “the Mugabe government [has 
begun] to adopt an increasingly populist platform as [an attempt] to insulate itself from 
growing societal unrest and—after 1999—a serious political opposition.”30 From 1998 
until 2002, Mugabe involved Zimbabwe in the conflict in the neighboring Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), which had a devastating effect on the economy, costing 
nearly $1 million U.S. dollars (USD) daily.31 Seeking to scapegoat white commercial 
farmers for Zimbabwe’s economic upheaval, Mugabe’s government announced a land 
redistribution program in 1997, and by 2001, nearly two-thirds of all commercially-
farmed land was listed to be seized from their white owners without compensation.32 In 
one year, nearly 13 million hectares of commercial farmland were seized by the 
government.33 These controversial land reforms have, however, only hastened 
Zimbabwe’s economic collapse, as commercial agriculture provided nearly 400,000 jobs 
and formed the basis of the economy.34 According to Bauer and Taylor, much of the land 
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that has been seized “has gone to political cronies of the regime, or poor black farmers 
who have not been given the means to farm effectively or productively.”35 
As political opposition movements have become more outspoken, the government 
has grown increasingly repressive. The parliamentary and presidential elections of 2000 
and 2002, respectively, were marred by incidents of violence and intimidation. The 
government has passes legislation that limits the freedoms of speech, press, and 
assembly.36 Many Western countries have become increasingly critical of Mugabe and 
his regime, in light of the political violence committed by his government. While 
Zimbabwe’s most important neighbor, South Africa, has traditionally kept quiet about 
Mugabe’s government, in the wake of the recent attacks on MDC leadership, it has 
become more concerned and vocal.37 Given Zimbabwe’s economic collapse and growing 
socio-political chaos, there has been increasing external and internal pressure for the 78 
year old ruler to step down.38  
 
III. The Economic Context: Historically and Today 
 At time of its independence, Zimbabwe seemed better economically equipped 
than most of its neighbors to handle self-rule. According to the CIA, it “inherited one of 
the strongest and most complete industrial infrastructures in sub-Saharan Africa, as well 
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as rich mineral resources and a strong agricultural base.”39 Indeed, in the first year after 
independence, Zimbabwe managed an impressive real growth rate of over 20 percent.40 
Since 1997, however, the economy has been on a downward spiral. In November 1997, 
the Zimbabwe dollar lost 75 percent of its value in one day, and since then, inflation has 
been rapidly rising.41 According to official estimates, annual inflation rose dramatically 
from 32 percent in 1998 to 585 percent in 2005; and while official 2006 estimates placed 
inflation at nearly 1000 percent, informal estimates are much higher.42 In fact, U.S. State 
Department reported annual inflation for 2006 to be over 1,200 percent.43 
 A number of factors account for Zimbabwe’s economic reversal. In response to a 
slowing economy, Zimbabwe embarked on an Economic Structural Adjustment Program 
(ESAP) in 1991. Although the ESAP was intended as a solution to many of the problems 
facing the government, such as economic recession, droughts, and remaining debt from 
the Rhodesian government, the policies were greatly flawed and exacerbated Zimbabwe’s 
economic problems.44 Zimbabwe’s aforementioned involvement in the conflict in the 
DRC, which cost hundreds of millions of dollars, further hastened economic collapse by 
sapping the national treasury of its reserves.45 Finally, the controversial and devastating 
land reforms that began in early 2000 disrupted the commercial agriculture sector, which 
had formed the economic base of Zimbabwe. As Bauer and Taylor note, “the collapse in 
the formal economic sectors, namely commercial agriculture and manufacturing, and of 
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state-owned enterprises and their employment bases, led to increasing informalization of 
the economy.”46 
 Zimbabwe, which once earned much of its foreign reserves by agricultural 
exports, has experienced severe food shortages since 2001.47 The country has become 
increasingly reliant on foreign aid. Nearly 80 percent of Zimbabweans are unemployed 
and living below the poverty line.48 Infrastructure has steadily declined for the last 
decade, as economic collapse has made investment and repairs increasingly difficult.49 
Zimbabwe holds over $5 billion USD in external debt; and government arrears on past 
loans have led the IMF to suspend its activities, desperately needed, given the economic 
situation.50 Inequality, patronage, and corruption are also serious problems and Mugabe’s 
government has often used food aid as a political tool for securing supporters and 
repressing opposition. Finally, nearly a quarter of adults in Zimbabwe are infected with 
HIV/AIDS.51 Zimbabwe’s already stretched and deteriorating infrastructure is unable to 
address this epidemic, which further complicates the overwhelming economic crisis.  
 
IV. Current Political and Social Structures 
A. The Zimbabwean Constitution—Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Structures 
 The constitution of Zimbabwe was written in 1979, before its independence. At 
the time, it was a conservative document, which included provisions for 20 parliamentary 
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seats reserved for the white minority; and it could only be amended during the first ten 
years by a unanimous vote and with a two-thirds majority after that.52  Several changes 
were made to the constitution beginning in 1987, when the guarantee of reserved seats for 
whites expired. Namely, the specially-reserved seats were abolished; and the Westminster 
model of government was abolished in favor of a unicameral parliament and an executive 
system.53 Aside from these changes, the legal framework of the 1979 document was 
generally maintained, with many of its conditions reflecting prior colonial arrangements. 
Consequently, in 1997, a coalition of almost 100 CSOs, called the National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA), successfully lobbied for a new constitution.54 Yet, when 
75 percent of members of the commission to rewrite the constitution were from the 
ZANU-PF party, NCA denounced the commission.55 The government made the 
surprising decision in February 1997 to hold a national referendum on the proposed 
constitution, and 53 percent of the population voted to reject the draft on grounds that it 
did not reflect popular will.56 Not only was this referendum the first plebiscite ever held 
in Zimbabwe, but it marked Mugabe’s first electoral defeat. Yet, his subsequent moves to 
consolidate power and crackdown on political dissent have demonstrated his 
unwillingness to tolerate future defeats.57 
                                                 
52
 Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, 184. 
53
 Ibid. 
54Ibid., 185. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Masipula Sithole, "Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe," Journal of Democracy 12, no. 1 (2001): 
164. 
57
 The results of the referendum were not announced publically until 2000, and since that time, violence 
against political opposition groups and general human rights violations have  increased dramatically. 
  
148
 While the 1979 constitution created a system of government with three 
independent branches, similar to the other cases in this study, “constitutional principal 
has been subverted to executive authority in Zimbabwe, and the ruling party now ignores 
constitutional restrictions with impunity.”58 The president of Zimbabwe serves as the 
head of state, head of government, and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces; and, 
according to the document, he takes “precedence over all other persons in Zimbabwe.”59 
In order to be president, on must be a citizen of Zimbabwe by birth or descent, at least 40 
years old, and a resident.60 The president is elected to a six-year term by popular vote and 
may serve an unlimited number of terms. Throughout his 27 years in office, President 
Mugabe has managed to significantly expand his powers, using both the military 
apparatus and government resources to maintain his office and silence dissent. As head of 
the government and the ZANU-PF party, Mugabe greatly influences all other branches.  
 The national legislature of Zimbabwe is a bicameral parliament. The National 
Assembly, or lower house, consists of 150 members. 120 members of parliament (MPs) 
are popularly elected; the remaining 30 members are either appointed directly by the 
president or are chosen by their peers, whom are greatly influenced by the president.61 
The upper house of parliament, the Senate, was created in 2005 by a constitutional 
amendment and consists of 66 members.62 Only 50 senators are popularly elected; six are 
appointed by the president and 10 are selected by the Council of Chiefs.63  In all, nearly 
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20 percent of all members in the parliament are appointed by the president.64 All 
members of parliament serve five-year terms. Even with the significant parliamentary 
gains by the MDC in the 2000 and 2005 elections, ZANU-PF still maintains the majority 
needed to pass legislation, rendering the parliament a rubber stamp for executive 
authority. 65 
 The judiciary branch despite its nominal independence, also fails to check 
executive power. The judicial system in Zimbabwe consists of a Supreme Court and a 
High Court,66 members of which are appointed by the president.67 Although the courts 
have, in some cases, challenged the actions of the executive, since 2000, President 
Mugabe has increasingly disregarded unfavorable rulings from the bench.68 Forced 
resignations of judges, the high number of magistrate vacancies, low pay, and corruption 
have also undermined the functioning of the judiciary.69 
B. The Electoral System 
 Like Botswana and Uganda, Zimbabwe employs the First-Past-the-Post 
(FPTP) electoral system. The candidate from each constituency with a simple plurality of 
votes wins the parliamentary seat, even if he or she has not gained an absolute majority.70 
Suffrage is universal; and citizens must be eighteen years of age to vote.71 Zimbabwe is 
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divided into ten provinces and 120 constituencies;72 the number of constituencies within 
each province varies by size. From the 2000 to the 2005 parliamentary election, the 
delimitation of constituencies was updated, resulting in a loss of one seat from the urban 
Harare and Bulawayo provinces, and the gain of one seat in the Monaicaland and 
Mashonaland East provinces.73  
The primary electoral institutions are the Electoral Supervisory Commission 
(ESC), which was created by the constitution, and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 
(ZEC), which was only formed in 2005 so as to meet SADC election standards. The five 
members of the ESC are appointed by the president and are charged with the supervision 
of voter registration and the overall conduct of the election.74 During the 2002 
presidential election, the technical and administrative aspects of the election were 
conducted by the Registrar-General; however, during the 2005 election, the ZEC replaced 
this body and assumed its responsibilities.75 Other electoral institutions include the 
Delimitation Commission, which determines voter constituencies;76 and the Electoral 
Court, created in early 2005, which has jurisdiction over election petitions.77 
C. Political Parties and Civil Society 
Although Zimbabwe is nominally a multiparty democracy, it has been dominated 
for over two decades by the ZANU-PF party. Prior to the formation of the MDC in 1999, 
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ZANU-PF faced little opposition to its rule and maintained an electoral hegemony. The 
MDC arose in the late 1990s in response to the deteriorating economic situation and 
growing political repression by the regime. According to Bauer and Taylor, the MDC 
originated from Zimbabwe’s civil society, and it “emerged partly out of the labor 
movement and partly out of the NCA, but it came to attract myriad other interests as well, 
including NGOs, human rights organizations, churches, and legal groups.”78 The MDC 
provided a real electoral challenge in the 2000 parliamentary elections and 2002 
presidential elections, proving to be quite popular among urban voters, many of whom 
were dissatisfied with worsening standards of living and growing poverty.79 Despite its 
disadvantaged electoral position, the MDC gained a remarkable 57 parliamentary seats 
during the 2000 election.80 Since that time, however, the ZANU-PF government has 
responded with increasingly violent and repressive actions aimed not only at MDC 
supporters, but civil society organizations believed to oppose the ruling party.81  
 The main civil society actors include the labor movement, human rights 
organizations, NGOs, women’s organizations, and the media. Yet, many of these groups 
have faced increasing government restrictions, and in some cases, intimidation. While the 
main labor movement, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), was aligned 
with the ZANU-PF party during the first decade and a half after independence, it has, 
since the late 1990s, reacted strongly to the worsening economic situation and distanced 
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itself from the government.82 Under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai, who is now the 
current leader of the MDC, the ZCTU reemerged as an independent force that was 
willing to organize strikes to advocate for workers’ rights.83 Now, the ZCTU plays a 
central role in opposing the government.84 As a result, however, Mugabe’s government 
has responded by declaring strikes illegal, issuing widespread arrests, detaining trade 
union leadership, and using violence and intimidation.85 The government has even 
created a rival organization, the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU), as a 
means to undermine the ZCTU and other smaller independent labor movements.86 
 Human rights organizations, NGOs, and women’s organizations have also proved 
vocal critics of the Mugabe regime. Non-governmental groups, such as the Human Rights 
Association, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, and the others in the Kubutana NGO 
Network Alliance, work actively within Zimbabwe; however, they are facing a growing 
number of restrictions.87 The Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which became law 
in January 2002, and the Miscellaneous Offences Act (MOA), which was enacted in 
1964, have been used to limited civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and assembly.88 
For example, under the POSA, over 250 women from the group, Women of Zimbabwe 
Arise, were arrested during a peaceful prayer service on March 31, 2005.89 While 
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independent media outlets are active critics of the Mugabe regime, they have also been 
restricted by the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), enacted 
in March 2002, which effectively limits freedom of speech.90 Many journalists have been 
intimidated, detained, and even attacked for negative coverage of the regime. Hence, 
while opposition has arisen from both political parties and civil society organizations, 
Mugabe’s regime has thus far limited their success by responding strongly with 
repressive laws and outright intimidation. 
 
V. IEM and the Election of 2002 
A. The Electoral Context 
 The 2002 presidential election in Zimbabwe was significant for a number of 
reasons. First, in the wake of the flawed 2000 parliamentary elections, the 2002 vote was 
set against a backdrop of rising political violence, destabilizing land reforms, an 
increasingly repressive regime, and, perhaps most importantly, a growing vocal 
opposition. Indeed, 2002 marked the first presidential election in which Robert Mugabe 
faced real opposition from the MDC candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai. Second, it was also 
important because of the widespread political violence and intimidation in the period 
prior to the vote, and generated significant concerns regarding the legitimacy of the 
election. Third, the 2002 presidential election attracted much international interest, and as 
a result, a number of IEM groups from within and outside of the region. This growing 
international pressure on Mugabe’s regime, especially from the Western states like the 
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United Kingdom, increased tension between these governments during and after the 
electoral process, which important implications for future IEM efforts. Finally, the 
differing evaluations put forth by several primary IEM groups revealed a potential 
politicization of international observation, and the possibility for manipulation by and 
legitimation of Mugabe’s repressive regime. 
The 2002 presidential elections were scheduled to take place on March 9-10; 
however, in some parts of the country, voting was extended until March 11 on account of 
long lines and delays. The election was monitored by both international and domestic 
groups. While many international monitors had initially planned to be present during the 
2002 poll, the Zimbabwe government refused to accredit monitors from several European 
states, citing an alleged bias against the regime.91 Despite the withdrawal of the EU 
electoral observation mission, hundreds of other observers were accredited for the 2002 
presidential vote. IEM efforts included delegations from the SADC Parliamentary Forum; 
the SADC Electoral Commissions; the OAU; the Commonwealth Observer Group; the 
U.S.-based National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP); and 
various smaller delegations or national missions from states like Nigeria, Norway, and 
Japan.92  The most important domestic monitoring group was the Zimbabwe Election 
Support Network (ZESN), although only 420 of its 12,000 members were accredited by 
the government.93 IEM electoral reports on the Zimbabwe 2002 election varied widely. 
While the general consensus from domestic and many international monitors was that the 
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elections were seriously marred, some regional IEM groups drew different conclusions. 
The primary reports used in this analysis will be those from the Commonwealth Observer 
Group, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), 
the SADC Parliamentary Forum, and ZESN. These reports not only reflect the widely-
accepted consensus on the flawed elections, but they are representative of domestic, 
regional, and international observers. The conflicting assessments from the OAU and the 
NAACP will also be considered, although access to these reports was unavailable. 
B. The Pre-Election Period 
 Because most international monitors arrived in Zimbabwe only about a month 
prior to the March 2002 vote, pre-election coverage was primarily undertaken by 
domestic observers. The voter registration period was slated to occur from October 15 to 
December 13, 2001; however, the Registrar-General extended the registration deadline on 
three occasions on account of difficulties and delays.94 Voter registration officially ended 
only one week prior to the election, on March 3, 2002. Inspection of the voters roll took 
began on November 19, and was extended by ten days to close on December 19, 2001. 
Observers cited multiple problems with the voter registration process and the verification 
of the voters roll. First, much confusion arose over the registration requirements. In urban 
areas, voters needed to present a proof of residence, which could include title deeds, a 
lodger’s permit, or utilities or credit card bills with the citizen’s address; yet, in rural 
areas, only confirmation from a village leader or farm owner was required for 
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registration.95 In many cases, the urban poor, many of whom supported the MDC, were 
effectively disenfranchised, as they were unable to obtain the required documentation.96 
Postal voting was restricted to polling station officials, diplomats and members of the 
security forces stationed abroad, which left thousands of voters living outside their 
constituency unable to vote.97 Moreover, few measures were undertaken to maintain the 
secrecy and prevent misuse of the postal ballots. Monitors also criticized the inability for 
many voters to inspect the voters roll.98 Confusion over eligibility and registration 
requirements, inadequate communication between registration staff and the Registrar-
General, lack of transparency during the registration and inspection, and the overt 
omission of names from the voters roll marred the legitimacy of this process.99  
 Voter education and electoral preparations were also problematic. According to 
the General Laws Amendment Act (GLAA), NGOs are prohibited from assisting voter 
education efforts unless authorized by the ESC.100 ZESN was, however, evaluated and 
eventually permitted to assist in voter education; although the tense political climate 
impeded their efforts.101 As a result of tight restrictions on civil society and international 
participation in voter education, monitors concluded that the ESC’s efforts were 
“inadequate, as the main vehicles of imparting voter education, such as newspapers and 
the electronic media, did not reach those in greatest need, particularly in the rural 
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areas.”102 These deficiencies would prove detrimental to the overall electoral process, 
slowing the vote and increasing the number of spoilt ballots. The placement of polling 
stations also resulted in systematic disenfranchisement, in favor of the ZANU-PF. The 
reallocation of polling locations reduced the number of stations in urban areas (typical 
MDC strongholds) and increased the number of rural locations (typical ZANU-PF 
strongholds) in areas difficult for monitors to easily access.103 The reduced number of 
urban polling stations led to long lines and the inability for many citizens to vote. 
 Like many of the other elections in this study, the incumbent party enjoyed a 
significant campaign advantage over the opposition. The ZANU-PF party, which 
exploited its access to state resources, dominated the campaign period. ZANU-PF was 
able to organize over 50 presidential rallies, while the MDC organized under ten.104 
SADC monitors observed a disparity in the guarantees and protections of campaign 
rallies, reporting that ZANU-PF campaigns had noticeable police protection and were 
generally calm, while “rallies of the opposition MDC had little police presence and were 
often either disrupted by unruly elements or denied permission by the police on the 
pretext that they were likely to cause public insecurity or disorder.”105 Monitors also 
found media coverage of the campaign to be extremely polarized, with state-run media 
outlets noticeably biased towards the ruling party. The state-owned Zimbabwe 
Broadcasting Company (ZBC), despite having publically committed to providing equal 
electoral coverage, allocated a disproportionate amount of its radio and television 
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coverage to the ZANU-PF campaign, and what little coverage of the opposition it aired 
was negative.106 Independent broadcasting outlets are not permitted in Zimbabwe, 
severely disadvantaging the opposition parties. Similar uneven coverage was reported in 
the print media. The state-run papers strongly supported the ZANU-PF, while 
independent newspapers avidly backed the MDC. 
While monitors found each of these aforementioned shortcomings of the pre-
election period problematic, perhaps most disturbing was the violence that erupted in the 
lead-up to the election. The campaign period of the 2002 presidential election was 
marred, more so even than the 2000 parliamentary elections, by incidents of violence, 
intimidation, and coercion. Monitors from the Commonwealth, SADC parliamentary 
forum, and ZESN all cited disturbing incidents of political violence aimed primarily at 
MDC supporters or candidates. In most cases, violence was carried out by the state 
security forces and ZANU-PF supporters. For example, Commonwealth observers 
witnessed firsthand “a group of about 1,000 ZANU-PF youths, armed with clubs, [run] 
amok through the central business district of Harare attacking MDC offices and suspected 
MDC supporters.”107 All SADC observer teams reported witnessing similar incidents of 
political violence, often by these ZANU-PF youth militias.108 In some cases, politically-
motivated murders and rapes were reported; however, beatings and abductions occurred 
with greater frequency. Observers expressed special concern over the activities of the 
National Youth Training Program, a paramilitary youth group with government 
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affiliation, members of whom were primarily responsible for much of the pre-election 
violence.109 
 In all, both international and domestic monitors observed numerous shortcomings 
during all stages of the pre-election period. The systematic disenfranchisement of voters, 
unequal media coverage and campaign resources, and, most importantly, the politically 
motivated intimidation or violence towards candidates and voters violated the 
fundamental principles of free and fair elections, seriously undermining the legitimacy of 
the entire electoral process.  
C. March 9-11, 2002: The Vote, Count, and Results 
 In the days preceding the election, monitors from the Commonwealth, the SADC 
Parliamentary Forum, and ZESN were deployed to most areas of the country and all ten 
provinces. Despite the tense and violent period in the lead-up to the election, the polling 
proceeded in a generally calm and smooth fashion. On the first day of voting, Saturday 
March 9, monitors were present for opening procedures and observed that most polling 
stations opened on time, at 7:00 am. Monitors reported that a majority of polling station 
officials administered the vote in a professional manner, and seemed aware of their 
responsibilities.110 They also noted that most stations were well-equipped, organized, and 
had an appropriate police presence.111 However, they did notice a distinct difference 
between the rural and urban polling stations. The reduction of polling stations in urban 
centers like Harare and Chitungwiza led to long lines and delays in polling, as officials 
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could not cope with the large number of voters. In some cases, as many as 7,000 people 
queued in line to vote.112 According to electoral law, voters in line at 7:00pm when the 
polls are scheduled to close are permitted to vote. Hence, many urban polling stations 
remained open until early in the morning on March 10 to accommodate those in line.113 
Most stations, especially those in rural areas, closed on time on the first day of voting. 
Monitors, party agents, and security personnel stayed with the sealed ballot boxes and 
voters roll throughout the night. On the second day, opening procedures were repeated, 
and voting continued in a similar manner. Long lines in urban areas on the second day led 
the High Court to order that the vote be extended to a third day in Harare and 
Chitungwiza. However, confusion and miscommunication between the presiding officers 
of the polling stations and the Registrar-General led to late openings on the third day and 
the inability for many voters to cast a vote.114 
 While the vote was generally calm, problematic incidents were nevertheless 
observed. These included cases of physical violence; voter intimidation; large numbers of 
voters being turned away; voting by unregistered youths; inadequate voting materials; 
temporary closures of polling stations; unwarranted arrests; the absence of MDC party 
agents at some polling station; technical problems with voting machinery; harassment of 
monitors by polling staff, police, or youth militias; and in a small number of cases, 
bribery or voter fraud.115  
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 Confusion over the extension of the election generated similar confusion over 
when the count should commence. Generally, the counting process began on Tuesday 
March 12. According to electoral law, the count takes place at each of the 120 
constituencies after verification of the number of ballots in each box; upon the 
commencement of the count, no individuals are allowed to leave the room.116 While, on 
the whole, the count was performed according to these procedures, monitors did observe 
deviations in the counting process at a number of constituencies. In some areas, the count 
preceded the verification of the number of ballots; in other constituencies, the 
Constituency Registrars, whom directed the counting process, permitted individuals to 
leave the room during the count.117 ZESN observers reported that in some constituencies, 
the count proceeded without opposition party agents present.118 When the count was 
completed at each local center, the results were transmitted to the regional, and then 
national headquarters to be recorded and announced. Aside from the aforesaid 
problematic deviations, monitors cited other shortcomings; these included delays in the 
counting process, particularly in the urban constituencies, and the failure to announce the 
results at every constituency, which impeded the ability for observers to verify the figures 
when they were announced at the national level.119 
 When the final results were announced at 12:00pm on Wednesday, March 13, 
Robert Mugabe was pronounced the winner, having garnered nearly 1.7 million votes; the 
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MDC candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai came in second, with over 1.25 million votes.120 The 
2002 elections were the most closely contested in Zimbabwe’s history, and they revealed 
a clear divide in the population. A majority of urban voters supported the MDC, while 
voters in rural areas predominantly supported the ZANU-PF party.121 The MDC 
immediately decried the vote as illegitimate. 
 In the days following the announcement of results, monitors reported more 
political violence. Norwegian observers reported that “in particular, opposition polling 
and election agents were targeted by violent youths and war veterans reportedly using the 
list of polling agents published in the national newspapers before the election.”122 
Members of the army and police forces were also reported to have participated in illegal 
beatings and detainments of opposition supporters.123 
D. IEM Findings and Recommendations 
 While almost all domestic monitoring groups, and IEM groups from the 
Commonwealth, Ghana, Norway and the SADC Parliamentary forum agreed that the vote 
was neither free nor fair, observers from the NAACP, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, 
and the OAU reported the elections were indeed transparent and credible.124 The IEM 
groups who criticized the 2002 presidential election found that the greatest flaws in the 
election took place not on the day of the vote, but rather in the period preceding the 
election. They major flaws reported by these groups included: a disturbing level of 
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politically-motivated violence in period preceding and immediately following the 
election; systematic intimidation of opposition supporters and candidates led primarily by 
a paramilitary youth group affiliated with the government; a failure of state security 
forces to investigate incidents of violence, safeguard all candidates, and act impartially; 
problems with voter registration and verification that led to systematic 
disenfranchisement of a significant portion of eligible voters; inadequate electoral 
preparations by the ESC and Registrar-General, particularly with regards to voter 
education; unfair state-run media coverage, which was biased towards the incumbent 
party; a legislative framework that unfairly restricted the freedom of speech, assembly, or 
movement of opposition supporters and candidates; illegal use of state resources in the 
ZANU-PF campaign; and the improper reallocation of polling stations that 
disenfranchised many urban voters, on account of exceedingly long lines.125 
 In response to these findings, monitors from the Commonwealth, Norway, SADC 
Parliamentary Forum, and ZESN made a number of similar recommendations. These 
included: the cessation of all political violence and the restoration of the rule of law; 
greater measures to improve the independence and efficiency of the electoral bodies; the 
separation of the ZANU-PF party from state structures, and the prohibition of illegal 
manipulation of state resources for party gain; greater guarantees on the impartiality of 
the police and armed forces; the repeal of the POSA, GLAA, and AIPPA, which limit the 
civil liberties and freedoms of opposition parties; improvements in the voter registration, 
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verification, and education processes to prevent the disenfranchisement of voters and to 
ensure greater transparency and credibility; greater incorporation of NGOs and other civil 
society organizations into all aspects of the electoral process; a review of the delimitation 
of constituencies to more accurately reflect the voter population; regulations on public 
media during the campaign period to ensure more balanced coverage; expansion of the 
postal voting system to incorporate all eligible voters residing outside their constituency; 
the creation of a body to arbitrate electoral disputes or appeals; and the adoption of 
SADC electoral principles and norms to promote freer and fairer elections.126 
 
VI. IEM and the Election of 2005  
A. The Electoral Context 
The close but deeply flawed 2002 election demonstrated that the MDC had 
become a serious political contender, and that the ZANU-PF party was willing to take all 
measures possible, including repression, intimidation, and violence, to ensure electoral 
victory.  The parliamentary election of 2005 again revealed that the MDC presented a 
significant threat to the ruling party; however, incidents of political violence or 
intimidation were significantly lower in number as compared to that of the previous 
election.127 In a vote that drew much international attention, the 2005 election, the sixth 
since Zimbabwe’s independence, marked an improvement from the 2002 vote but was 
not free from controversy as a number of important electoral standards were not met.  
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 Several important changes occurred in Zimbabwe in the period of time between 
the 2002 presidential election and the 2005 parliamentary election. First, the 2005 
elections were held amidst growing tension between Zimbabwe and many Western 
governments, which significantly affected IEM efforts. Reacting to Western 
condemnation and the imposition of sanctions against the political and business elites 
following the 2002 election, Zimbabwe’s relations with the EU, Britain, United States, 
and other Western governments and organizations deteriorated immensely. Zimbabwe 
withdrew from the Commonwealth in December 2003,128 and Mugabe’s rhetoric towards 
the Europeans and Americans became increasingly hostile. At the same time, 
Zimbabwe’s relations with its neighbors and regional organizations, such as the African 
Union (AU),129 remained relatively amicable, due in large part to favorable assessments 
of the presidential election. As a result, IEM groups that had observed the 2002 election 
and denounced the vote, namely the Commonwealth Observer Group and the SADC 
Parliamentary Forum, were prohibited from returning for the 2005 election.  
 Second, Zimbabwe enacted several changes in electoral law in an effort to meet 
SADC electoral standards and boost its regional image, largely on account of its 
relatively cordial relations with its neighbors and regional organizations. In 2004, the 
Electoral Act and Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act instituted a number of reforms. 
The ZEC was created as another electoral body, replacing the Registrar-General and the 
Election Directorate but having many of the same functions as the ESC.130 The reforms 
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also established an Electoral Court, conditions for state-run media campaign coverage, a 
single day of voting, the commencement of the count upon closure of the polls.131 The 
use of translucent ballot boxes and visible indelible ink was also implemented for the 
2005 election.132 
 The 2005 parliamentary elections were held on March 31, 2005. While a majority 
of the electoral observation efforts during the 2005 election were conducted by domestic 
monitors, some 500 international observers were present.133 6,000 of the 7,000 accredited 
domestic monitors were from ZESN; as a result, domestic observers were present at most 
of Zimbabwe’s 8,235 polling stations.134 The largest international monitoring groups 
came from South Africa and the SADC (which did not include any monitors from the 
Parliamentary Forum).135 The AU also sent a small monitoring group; a number of 
governments, including Botswana, sent small teams and foreign embassies in Zimbabwe 
were able to accredit their diplomats.136 On account of the relatively small number reports 
available from IEM groups, the primary sources for analysis of the 2005 election will be 
reports from the SADC, NORDEM, and ZESN. This should not prove too problematic, 
as the SADC and ZESN had the largest observer presence; also, the reports compiled by 
NORDEM and ZESN referenced statements and observations of other monitors, 
including those from the AU and a number of foreign embassies. 
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B. The Pre-Election Period 
 Like the 2002 election, most IEM groups arrived in the two weeks preceding the 
election; therefore, domestic observers, particularly from ZESN, provided essential 
coverage of the pre-election period. Observers noted numerous shortcomings throughout 
this period, many of which were similar to those noted during the 2002 election. The 
voter register is continually updated until elections are announced and a date for 
registration to end is set; for the 2005 elections, voter registration was scheduled to end 
on February 4, 2005.137 Observers reported that voter registration and verification of the 
voters roll was inadequate. A majority of the registration process went unsupervised, as 
the ZEC only began operations in late February.138 Again, when many citizens were 
unable to provide the proof of residence required for registration, a large number of 
voters were disenfranchised.139 Observers expressed concern regarding insufficient 
verification of the voters roll, citing “although inspection of the rolls was extended by 
nearly a week, some sections of the population were unaware about it especially in rural 
areas.”140 
 Voter education efforts were also insufficient. Nearly six million voters had 
registered for the 2005 election, leading the Delimitation Commission to reallocate the 
constituencies to reflect this change.141 Many voters, however, were unaware of these 
changes as they were not able to easily access reports and maps reflecting the changed 
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boundaries.142 Not only were many voters unaware of the delimitation changes, but they 
were also unfamiliar with new voting procedures, as the ZEC was unable to commence 
its voter education efforts until a few weeks before the election. 143  
 Monitors reported improvements and remaining problems of the campaign period 
which began in February, 2005.  During the campaign period, there were undoubtedly 
fewer instances of political violence. Following the presidents calls for a peaceful 
campaign in December 2004, the frequency of violence was significantly reduced.144 
ZESN observers reported that no politically-motivated murders were reported in the lead-
up to the election.145 Some reported “subtle threats of violence, intimidation, [and] links 
of voting to food distribution;”146 however, SADC monitors noted that incidences of 
violence were reported to police and investigated.147 Despite the reduction in political 
violence, numerous other shortcomings were still reported regarding the campaign. 
Disregarding a public mandate to provide balanced electoral coverage, the ZBC was 
again biased in its favorable coverage of ZANU-PF.148 While opposition parties were, for 
the first time, allowed to advertise on electronic media, the cost of doing so was 
unaffordable.149 Monitors also reported that state-owned print media also gave unequal 
support of the ruling party, and some articles on the opposition “were tantamount to 
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brazen ‘propaganda’ pieces.”150 Observers also noted the illegal use of state resources in 
the campaigns of ZANU-PF candidates.151 While opposition supporters and candidates 
did not face rampant political violence or intimidation, other structural inequalities 
marred the campaign period.  
C. March 31, 2005: The Vote, Count, and Results 
 In order to ensure voting could take place in one day, the ZEC greatly increased 
the number of polling stations to over twice as many as were present during the 2002 
election, and created new procedures where voters would line up in one of three lines 
according to the first letter of their surname.152 In most parts of the country, the vote 
proceeded in a calm and efficient manner. SADC observers noted that for the most part 
“the polling stations opened and closed at the appointed times…”153 Polling stations, 
especially in urban areas, were well-equipped to handle the large numbers of voters.154 
Party agents and election observers were present at a majority of polling stations; only a 
few cases were reported where MDC party agents or ZESN observers were initially 
turned away due to accreditation problems, and most of these problems were resolved by 
midday.155 Still, the inadequacies of the voter registration and verification were evident 
when monitors reported that between five to fifteen percent of voters (as much as 25 
percent in some constituencies) were unable to vote on grounds that they were not 
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registered for that constituency or, in some cases, at all.156 By the times the polls closed, 
nearly 47.7 percent of registered voters had cast a vote in the parliamentary elections.157 
Compared to the previous parliamentary election in 2000, voter turnout was about ten 
percent higher, especially in rural areas.158 
 The count began immediately upon closure of the polls. In order to facilitate the 
ease and accuracy of the count at the polling stations, ZEC officials had also purchased 
an additional 15,000 gas lamps.159 At most polling stations, the count proceeded in an 
efficient manner. However, monitors did note a few problems during the count. In some 
stations, upon completion of the count, the presiding officer failed to display the results 
for public review as was required under the Electoral Act.160 In some cases, significant 
discrepancies arose between the preliminary figures and those reported in the final 
results.161 Indeed, the MDC alleged that the discrepancies between the preliminary results 
at the polling stations, and the official results from the ZEC (in some cases nearly 15,000 
unaccounted votes) could have altered the results in at least 30 constituencies.162 The 
ZEC, however, defended the final results. Monitors were concerned that the delays in 
displaying the results and the discrepancies in certain constituencies called into question 
the transparency of the count and they demanded immediate attention by the ZEC.163 
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 The ZANU-PF earned another victory in the 2005 parliamentary election, 
winning 78 seats in the National Assembly. The MDC garnered 41 parliamentary seats, 
sixteen seats less than what it had won in the 2000 election.164 One parliamentary seat 
was won by an independent candidate.165 In the days immediately following the election, 
the MDC rejected the results, staging a demonstration in the capital city.166 While the 
MDC filed sixteen petitions by mid-April, in the weeks following the election the general 
political atmosphere had normalized.167 
D. IEM Findings and Recommendations 
 Both international and domestic monitors stated that the 2005 parliamentary 
election marked a significant improvement from the widespread political violence that 
characterized the 2002 presidential elections. While some IEM groups promptly 
pronounced the 2005 vote free and fair,168 SADC and ZESN observers expressed 
reservations over certain aspects of the electoral process. They found that the structure of 
the parliament, with its specially-appointed seats, and restrictions on freedoms of speech 
and assembly severely undermined the legitimacy of the vote.169 These monitors also 
reiterated complaints from the 2002 election, namely, insufficient voter registration, 
verification and education; problems surrounding the delimitation process and the need 
for greater publicity; biased media coverage; illegal use of state resources by the 
                                                 
164
 Ibid., 44-45.; Roger Pederson, "Zimbabwe: National Assembly Election 2000," in Nordem Report 
Working Paper 16/00 (Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Center for Human Rights/The Norwegian Resource 
Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), 2000). 
165
 Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), "Zimbabwe 2005," 44-45. 
166
 Ibid., 49. 
167
 Ibid. 
168
 Botswana National Observer Mission, "Press Release of the Botswana National Observer Mission on the 
Zimbabwe National Elections of the 31st March 2005,"  (Botswana National Observer Mission, 2005), 2. 
169
 Zimbabwe Observer Consortium, "2005 Zimbabwe Parliamentary Election," 50-53.; Vollan, 
"Zimbabwe: Parliamentary Elections March 2005," 1-2. 
  
172
incumbent party; incomplete reforms and inefficiencies of the electoral bodies; and the 
disenfranchisement of voters living outside of their constituencies.170 
 In light of their findings, international monitors made a number of 
recommendations for future elections in Zimbabwe. These included: constitutional 
reforms to ensure the direct election of all members of parliament; the repeal of 
repressive laws, such as the POSA, GLAA, and AIPPA; greater civil society involvement 
in voter education efforts; the expansion of the postal voting system and improvements in 
its transparency; the streamlining of the current electoral bodies into one independent and 
efficient organization; greater efforts to balanced coverage in the state-owned media; 
restrictions on the use of state resources for campaign purposes; proper publicity of 
changes in constituency delimitation; further efforts to prevent political violence, 
intimidation, and fraud; further action to increase the transparency and legitimacy of the 
count at both local and constituency levels; and the promotion of dialogue between 
parties in the period following the election.171 
 
VII. Conclusions and Implications 
The case of Zimbabwe, as expected, has important implications for the wider 
study of the effects of IEM on internal political reform. IEM groups were unable to affect 
significant and positive changes. Just as was predicted by H1, the adverse political 
culture impeded the effectiveness of international monitors. International, and even 
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domestic monitors were unable to make notable contributions to the registration and 
education efforts. The conditions in Zimbabwe prior to the 2002 and even the 2005 
elections, namely the stringent restrictions on civil liberties, rendered many civilians, 
civil society groups, and journalists unable to actively participate in the electoral process. 
These factors undermined IEM efforts to engage more citizens in the election, and 
inhibited any real strides towards reform. 
As predicted by H2, the current economic crisis has also limited the extent to 
which international monitors could facilitate reform. The deep economic problems in 
Zimbabwe polarized society, and generated a hostility that was reflected in the 2002 and 
2005 elections. Supporters of the ZANU-PF benefitted from the land reforms, and other 
government policies, while opposition supporters became targets of intimidation or 
violence. This was particularly the case during the 2002 election, where the highly 
polarized and unstable environment made political consensus and reform less likely. 
Additionally, on account of the bleak economic situation, the electoral administration 
bodies had fewer resources available to ensure the proper conduct of the electoral 
process. International monitors faced even greater hurdles in Zimbabwe on account of the 
economic crisis, and were thus less effective at facilitating reform. 
 The characteristics of the international monitors varied greatly in both the 2002 
and 2005 elections. Large monitoring groups from the SADC Parliamentary Forum and 
the Commonwealth Observer Group (during the 2002 elections) and from the SADC and 
South Africa (during the 2005 elections), were able to deploy more broadly across the 
country and offer more accurate assessments of the electoral process. The variation in 
  
174
deployment, organization, professionalization, and funding of IEM groups in Zimbabwe 
during 2002 and 2005 led to differing conclusions as to the credibility of the elections.  
As predicted by H3, the brief and restricted presence of international monitors, as well as 
the lack of consensus amongst and coordination between all IEM groups, mainly during 
the 2002 election, undermined the effectiveness of international observation efforts as a 
whole.  
Yet, the real significance of the case of Zimbabwe centers less on the hypotheses 
of the study, but on the politicization of IEM and the attempts on the part of Mugabe’s 
regime to accredit international monitors who were believed would not strongly condemn 
the vote or the regime. While it is true that some electoral improvements were made in 
the period between the 2002 presidential and 2005 parliamentary elections, these were 
done on account of Mugabe’s desire to improve Zimbabwe’s regional reputation; they 
were not measures taken to incorporate the IEM recommendations from 2002.  Despite 
the reduction in violence during the 2005 vote, political violence and repression targeted 
at ZANU-PF opponents has again resurfaced in recent months—suggesting that any 
progress since 2005 has been reversed. And while international, specifically Western, 
pressure increased in the wake of the 2002 vote, it did not result in political reforms in 
Zimbabwe, as it had in the case of Uganda. The case of IEM in Zimbabwe revealed not 
only the limitations of monitoring efforts in adverse climates, but it revealed the dangers 
of the politicization of IEM. The lack of consensus among international monitors during 
the 2002 elections revealed the potential for monitoring to reflect the political motives of 
the organizations, rather than the judgments of an impartial third party. Because some 
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IEM groups declared the controversial and flawed 2002 vote to be ‘free and fair,’ 
Mugabe’s repressive regime gained greater legitimacy. This suggests that, in cases where 
political reform is most necessary, IEM can be politicized in a way that inhibits any 
positive progress. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
While this study has shown IEM has made some progress in domestic political 
reform, the mixed success reveals other factors or intervening variables may limit the 
agency of external actors in the electoral processes of these four states. In fact, this 
analysis has revealed important strengths and weaknesses of IEM, the implications of 
which will be analyzed in this concluding section. 
IEM can, via a feedback mechanism, encourage internal political reform over a 
period of time and a series of elections. In each of the four states, some of the IEM 
recommendations following the first election were adopted prior to the second election. 
In Botswana, to address the shortcomings of the 1999 vote, the number of polling stations 
was increased and voter education efforts were expanded prior to the 2004 election. 
Additionally, in accordance with IEM recommendations, constituency-specific ballots 
replaced nationally-uniform ballots. In Uganda, in response to IEM recommendations and 
international pressure, the 2006 election marked a return to a multiparty system. The 
Ugandan Electoral Commission also instituted a series of reforms intended to make voter 
registration more efficient and accurate, so as to prevent voter fraud. In Mozambique, a 
number of IEM recommendations were enacted, including the ability for monitors to 
organize a PVT, provisions to enhance the credibility of voter registration, restrictions on 
the unfair use of government resources by the incumbent party, and provisions 
guaranteeing the access of observers to tally sheets. Finally, in Zimbabwe, the frequency 
of political violence and intimidation was reduced and the regime committed to meeting 
the electoral principles set forth by the SADC (although, as was mentioned in the 
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previous section, these reforms were primarily aimed at satisfying regional organizations 
and monitors). The ZEC and Electoral Court were created, in an attempt to improve 
electoral administration and dispute settlement; conditions for fair coverage in the state-
run media were set; voting was reduced to a single day; and voting procedures aimed at 
deterring voter fraud were enacted.  
Although such reforms were enacted in all four states prior to the second election, 
not all IEM recommendations were heeded. Indeed, in Botswana, calls to extend the 
terms of office for ECF officials and to extend the presidential nomination period were 
ignored. Moreover, despite calls for a change in the First-Past-the-Post system, this 
problematic electoral structure persists. In Uganda, the government made efforts to 
improve in most areas suggested by international monitors; but as the 2006 elections 
showed, these reform efforts were not carried far enough. Despite calls by monitors for 
reductions, the size of the CNE was increased. Recommendations to improve the lighting 
conditions during the local counts were also neglected. Most importantly, monitors 
remained unable to closely observe the computer tabulation of the vote at provincial and 
national offices. While political violence largely ceased prior to the 2005 election and the 
regime announced its ostensible commitment to SADC electoral standards, a majority of 
IEM recommendations went unheeded. The repressive POSA, GLAA, and AIPPA laws 
remained in force for the 2005 vote; state resources were again manipulated by ruling 
party candidates; the public mandate for fair media coverage was generally ignored by 
the state broadcasting outlets; many voters were again systematically disenfranchised by 
  
178
registration requirements; and most civil society groups were prevented from assisting 
voter education efforts.  
Aside from Uganda, where the most critical recommendation for facilitating 
political reform—a return to multiparty elections—was implemented, IEM 
recommendations that went ignored in Botswana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe were 
most essential for reform. Nearly all of the flaws observed during the second elections 
resulted largely from failures to implement these recommendations. Had more IEM 
recommendations been heeded in Botswana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, greater 
progress towards internal political reform would have been likely. For the most part, the 
relative difference of import between recommendations that were eventually enacted and 
those that were ignored is revealing; it suggests that those reforms which were not 
accomplished were those which would have provided the strongest impetus for positive 
change. 
Still, aside from these considerations, IEM remains important in its ability to 
bring international pressure to bear upon regimes that do not protect the rights of their 
citizens. This was especially the case in Uganda, where international pressure influenced 
the regime’s receptivity to multiparty democracy. Yet, international pressure may not be 
enough to coerce repressive states to reform. For example, the ‘smart’ sanctions that 
targeted the Zimbabwean regime, which were enacted by the United States and the 
United Kingdom (among others) in response to the negative evaluations of the 2002 
election, have not been able to significantly alter Mugabe’s authoritarian policies. 
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Perhaps the effectiveness of IEM and international pressure could be enhanced if carrots, 
in addition to sticks, are offered in response to visible and lasting reform progress. 
However, the critical weakness of IEM is that it is largely affected by 
conditioning and intervening factors, perhaps more so than has been hitherto 
acknowledged. This study has revealed a number of variables that can adversely, or 
positively, affect the outcome of IEM, including: the nature of the existing electoral 
system, receptivity of government bodies to IEM, and the politicization or manipulation 
of IEM.  
In several of the cases studied, the nature of the electoral system conditioned, to a 
great extent, the likelihood of political reform. In Botswana, the progress of reform is 
being hindered most directly by the FPTP electoral structure. This winner-takes-all 
system has rendered it nearly impossible for opposition groups to present a real challenge 
to the longstanding BDP. Regardless of IEM efforts, it seems that real progress can be 
achieved only when the electoral structure is reformed in a way that broadens political 
participation. In the other cases, electoral systems play an important role, although for 
other reasons. In Uganda, the guarantee of specially-reserved seats for the armed forces is 
another example of how the existing electoral structures limit internal political reform. In 
Mozambique, where the PR system has generally worked better at protecting peace and 
expanding political participation, given the post-conflict conditions, the five percent party 
threshold has prevented many minority groups from gaining representation. However, in 
Zimbabwe, the nature of the electoral system matters less for internal political reform, as 
the state’s repressive policies are the most important concern. 
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While it may seem evident, the receptivity of a government and its electoral 
bodies to IEM efforts conditions the success of these groups in encouraging political 
reform. For example, in Mozambique, monitors had great difficulty observing the 
national tabulation of votes. This cast doubt, not only upon the validity of the electoral 
outcome, but upon the state’s commitment to internal political reform. A less apparent 
outcome of receptivity to IEM (or lack thereof) is the refusal to allow monitoring groups 
to return for future elections, as a result of negative IEM electoral reports. When monitors 
from the Commonwealth Observation Group and the SADC Parliamentary Forum 
condemned the results of the 2002 Zimbabwe presidential election, they were not allowed 
back to observe the 2005 elections. If this case is repeated in future elections, in 
Zimbabwe or in other states, this could create a situation where the only groups allowed 
in are those whom would be unwilling to denounce the government, possibly legitimating 
unfair elections.  
In the previous chapter, the 2002 elections in Zimbabwe demonstrated the 
problematic effects of politicization of IEM groups. For the most part, the international 
observers from neighboring states and regional organizations were less willing to decry 
the heavily flawed presidential elections of 2002. Despite numerous incidents of violence 
reported by domestic and international observers alike, monitors from the OAU, the 
NAACP, and states such as Nigeria, viewed the vote to be transparent, calm, and 
credible. The conflicting assessments of the 2002 election damaged IEM efforts as a 
whole; moreover, the positive reports ignored the significant infringements on civil 
liberties, and in effect proved counterproductive to reform efforts. While politicization is 
  
181
not a widespread occurrence, it is a critical and potentially dangerous shortcoming of 
election monitoring as it undermines both the principles on which IEM is based and the 
aims of promoting credible elections and internal political reform. 
Cooperation and consensus among the IEM groups present can also enhance or 
undermine the effectiveness of the process altogether. The success of IEM efforts as a 
whole can depend upon the extent to which all missions present cooperate and share 
results. Groups that collaborate can enhance coverage of the state and of all phases of the 
electoral process. This can entail an exchange and comparison of information not only 
with regard to IEM findings, but with regard to the situation in a given state in the period 
prior or following an election. A pooling of logistics and personnel resources can enhance 
IEM efforts that might otherwise have suffered from insufficient coverage in the lead-up 
to the election and during the poll itself. This organized collaboration could also involve 
plans to phase the often under-funded and under-staffed IEM efforts in a way that ensures 
an international monitoring team will be present during every stage of the electoral 
process. Some IEM groups may be deployed to a state for pre-election coverage, while 
others may arrive for the election or post-election period. Ultimately, this collaboration 
would better facilitate a consensus on the validity of the election which would enhance 
the credibility of an election, or in cases where the vote is flawed, it would help exert 
greater international and domestic pressure for reform via a unified stance. With the 
exception of Zimbabwe, IEM groups cooperated and communicated with each other to 
improve the results of the mission. When the reports from Botswana, Uganda, and 
Mozambique were released, there was a general consensus on the validity of the 
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elections. The united front presented by the international monitors strengthened the 
weight of their concerns and recommendations. 
Lastly, the effectiveness of international monitors is often dependent upon their 
ability to engage professional and impartial domestic observer groups. This study has 
revealed that domestic observers are, without question, necessary for successful election 
monitoring efforts. Because domestic groups had vested interest in free and fair elections, 
in most cases they provided critical and neutral assistance to international monitors. In 
each of the elections, monitors were limited in their ability to observe all aspects of the 
electoral process in all regions of a state. Domestic monitors provided vital eyes and ears, 
not only in a vast number of polling stations on the day of the vote, but in the periods 
leading up to and following the day of the election. Domestic observers were responsible 
for much of the reporting on the pre-election period. Also, they were able to deploy 
broadly across the country, more so than were international election monitors.  
In Uganda, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, domestic groups assisted in voter 
education efforts and help make the polling process more efficient and accurate. The 
successful conduct of a PVT during the 2004 Mozambique presidential and parliamentary 
elections would not have been possible without the help of domestic observers. In 
Zimbabwe, domestic observers were influential when they confirmed the conclusions of 
SADC Parliamentary Forum and Commonwealth monitors that the 2002 vote was 
severely marred. Conversely, in the case of Botswana, where domestic observation 
efforts were deficient, international monitoring groups were unable to deploy most areas 
of the country and thus, they had a limited role in internal reform processes. They were 
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also unable to work with domestic observers to mobilize civil society for the vote. Hence, 
each of the cases in this study confirmed that IEM must engage domestic observers in the 
monitoring process, in order to maximize their effectiveness and ultimately the likelihood 
of lasting political reforms. 
Given the prevalence of the phenomenon of IEM, it is surprising, or perhaps 
disconcerting, that there has been so little reflection on its effectiveness. IEM can be 
effective in Sub-Saharan Africa and, for that matter, elsewhere; indeed, despite the 
adverse structural conditions, IEM was able to facilitate some progress towards internal 
political reform in the four states of this study; one may suggest, therefore, that IEM can 
have greater applicability regionally or worldwide, with the exception perhaps of states 
like Sudan or Myanmar, which are in the midst of violent conflict or in which 
international monitors would not be invited. However, the ability for it to facilitate 
internal political reform is immensely impacted by the domestic structures of states. 
Indeed, IEM agency vis-à-vis structural conditions did vary by case.  It appears that of 
the four cases, IEM had the most impact in Uganda and Mozambique, where structural 
conditions were mixed, rather than the Botswana or Uganda, where domestic conditions 
were the primary determinant of internal political reform. With the possible exception of 
Zimbabwe where the current political turmoil and isolation of the Mugabe regime seems 
to have rendered IEM unproductive, IEM efforts from 1999 to 2006 have managed some 
enduring progress. Yet, given the considerable international attention and resources 
devoted to the promotion of ‘free and fair’ elections, the extent of progress in reform has 
not kept pace with the frequency of IEM.  
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This is not to say that the practice of IEM should necessarily be abolished—for it 
is important for states to sense some concern by the international community for the 
legitimacy of its elections, the importance of political reform, and necessity of the 
protection of human rights. However, this is to argue that emphasis should be placed not 
just on improving and expanding IEM efforts, but on improving the domestic conditions 
in which this phenomenon operates.  Indeed, the significant impact of domestic 
observation by civil society groups, whom are most vested in the electoral outcome, may 
even suggest that more consideration and aid should be given to this form of monitoring.  
Perhaps a more lasting contribution of IEM could be to help train local monitors and 
enhance their observation capabilities so as to create integral, ongoing, efficient, and 
independent domestic monitoring structures. Ideally, over the longer term, both public 
and private impartial domestic monitors would become a normalized component of 
political and electoral processes. These regularized and expected monitoring efforts could 
prove a greater impetus to internal political reform than any external agent. Additionally, 
HIV/AIDS assistance should become a priority, to prevent this crisis from undoing the 
political or economic progress experienced thus far. International trade policies that grant 
developing states an equal ability to participate or compete in global markets should also 
be promoted, as opposed to the more common practice of simply providing foreign aid 
(which has proved problematic for many Sub-Saharan African states, whose economies 
have become more dependent on international assistance rather than self-sufficient). Each 
of these measures could not only improve the lives of the millions in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
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but it could ultimately enhance the effectiveness of IEM in encouraging further internal 
political reform and development in such states. 
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